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Abstract 
Contestation, Confusion and Change: Urban Governance and Service 
Delivery in Zimbabwe (2000-2012). 
D. Muchadenyika 
Master in Administration Full Thesis, School of Government, University of the Western 
Cape. 
This study investigates how political dynamics impacted on service delivery in urban areas 
of Zimbabwe in general and, SPECIFICALLY, in the cities of Harare, Bulawayo, 
Masvingo and Mutare. The problematic of urban governance in these cities has been 
marked by contestation, confusion and change for a range of reason which would seem to 
be associated with issues of planning and management of urban areas, infrastructure such 
as provision and maintenance of roads, housing, public transport and water and sanitation. 
Consequently, these urban governance contestations almost led to the collapse of most if 
not all, urban functions and services in the aforementioned urban areas. 
 
That Zimbabwe is suffering from a crisis of governance and public service delivery for 
decades is not in doubt. In this thesis, I argue that whilst much attention has been given to 
state governance, it is at the local governance level where the impacts of the crisis are 
more severe. Why at the local governance level? Local government is mandated to deliver 
directly or indirectly key human development services to citizens. Inevitably, urban 
governance is an important determinant of urban services delivery.   
 
Urban governance takes place within a wider governance and political context. Post-
independent urban Zimbabwe was dominated by the Zimbabwe African National Union 
Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) until the turn of the millennium. When the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) began dominating urban local authorities, urban governance 
signaled an era marked by contestation, confusion and change. Subsequent urban 
governance political dynamics had profound impacts on service delivery.  
 
Change manifested itself in the rise of the MDC and the subsequent consternation of 
Zanu-PF in the control of urban councils. Zanu-PF responded through a spirited and 
heterodox comeback resulting in widespread contestation with MDC led councils. The 
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local government ministry and central government continuously interfered and distorted 
the operations of urban governments. Urban councils became weak as service delivery was 
politicized with party structures more powerful than urban administration. Political 
contestation brought confusion as it became difficult to determine who was in control of 
urban affairs. Elected councillors and mayors were suspended or fired with central 
government taking over the delivery of some urban services.  
 
The contest for control of the urban constituency between MDC and Zanu-PF has been 
sustained at the expense of service delivery. Considering the role of politics in urban 
governance, I conclude that the crisis of service delivery in urban Zimbabwe is a political 
crisis driven by the political impasse between the MDC and Zanu-PF.  
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CHAPTER ONE: REVITALIZING URBAN GOVERNANCE AND 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT: INTRODUCING THE STUDY. 
 
This chapter emphasizes the importance of reviving urban governance as a precondition to 
urban services delivery. Chief among the reasons for the revival is the increase in the urban 
population and the resulting increased demand for urban services. The research 
problematique focuses on the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 
controlling urban areas leading to contestation, confusion and change in Zimbabwe’s urban 
governance. Contestation, confusion and change within urban governance led to the 
deterioration of urban service provision. In principle, urban areas are engines of service 
delivery but in the Zimbabwean case they resemble sites of political struggles. The chapter 
provides the research problem, aim, assumptions, methodology, significance of the study, as 
well as the thesis structure. The ensuing section highlights urban services delivery as the 
primary reason for reviving urban governance and urban development. 
 
1.1 Introductory Remarks to Urban Governance and Urban Development 
Urban governance is practiced through planning, development and management of urban 
areas. Urban development is a function of urban governance systems. Urban governance 
systems refers to legislative, and institutional (both state and non-state) frameworks and 
actors that determine the production and delivery of urban functions and services. Urban 
socio-economic development relies on the functioning of urban governments.  
 
Planning is at the heart of sustainable urbanization (UNHABITAT, 2010a: 5) and is the main 
conduit of urban governance. Urban challenges such as slums, urban sprawl, urban poverty 
and poor service provision are explained largely by present urban governance systems and 
urban planning approaches (UNHABITAT, 2009). Urban service delivery relies on the 
functioning of urban governance systems. Therefore, urban governance is a sine qua non for 
urban service delivery. Urban governance is a result of political processes, making it 
imperative to have credible and legitimate political systems. To that end, reviving urban 
governance systems through legitimate and credible political systems is an important step in 
addressing present urbanization challenges. 
 
Urban planning is designed within a governance setting. The objective of urban governance 
institutions is to deliver functions and services to its constituency (urban community). The 
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urban community consists of many actors such as business, ordinary residents, pressure 
groups (civil society organizations, community based organizations, non-governmental 
organizations), political parties among others. Trends in urban governance have led to 
institutional fragmentation, multiplication of agencies, complex web of relationships, 
reconfiguration of networks, disparity of powers and responsibilities across different tiers and 
departments of governmental and non-governmental institutions, increasing role of market 
forces, and confusion over ‘who does what’ (Davoudi and Evans, 2005). The cosmopolitan 
urban community, if not properly managed within an urban political system, results in urban 
service provision decline as conflict and confusion take centre stage. 
 
Addressing socio-economic needs of urbanites requires shifts in urban governance thinking 
and approaches. The challenges of economic, social and environmental sustainability require 
shared opportunities for public participation in cities (UNHABITAT, 2010b).  The choices of 
citizens through elections and other forms of participation in urban governance are critical. 
Local government elections are a form of public participation (Williams, 2007) and service 
delivery programs can be linked to political party campaigning (Lijphart, 1985). In 
Zimbabwe; the election of the MDC to run urban councils resulted in tense political 
contestation with elected mayors and councillors dismissed.  Residents’ voices and choices 
through elections were suppressed. At the same time service delivery declined. 
 
Zimbabwe is a unitary state with a centralized government. Local government is not 
constitutionalized
1
 but rather a legislative creation. Local government is weak and subject to 
unrestrained interference from central government. Post-independent urban Zimbabwe was 
dominated by Zanu-PF until the turn of the millennium. Since 2000, MDC dominance grew 
in urban councils while the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development 
(MLGRUD) is headed by a Zanu-PF minister (RTI and IDAZIM, 2010). Political 
contradictions ensued; as efforts by the MDC to run urban local authorities seem to be 
systematically being frustrated by Zanu-PF through MLGRUD. Political struggles between 
Zanu-PF and MDC over the control of urban councils have turned more energy, focus and 
resources away from service delivery to political expediency. 
 
Reasons for revitalizing urban governance include the undeniable fact that, more people are 
living in urban areas meaning an unprecedented demand for urban services (UNHABITAT, 
                                                          
1
 Local Government is enshrined in the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013. 
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2008). Urban services form the core of human development indicators. Housing, water and 
sanitation, health, education and transport have direct impacts on peoples’ standards of living. 
Urban governance plays an important role in socio-economic development. Urban 
governments are the spring board of city, regional and national economies. Further, due to 
urbanization “the urban is shapeless, formless and apparently boundless, riven with new 
contradictions and tensions that make it hard to tell where borders reside and what’s inside 
and what’s outside” (Merrifield, 2012: 2). Service delivery contradictions and tensions within 
the urban political community threaten effective and efficient service delivery. 
 
This thesis investigates how political dynamics in urban governance impacted on service 
delivery. This stems from the fact that urban governance in Zimbabwe has been marked by 
contestation, confusion and change. Contestation, confusion and change led to the collapse of 
urban functions and services as discussed in the next section. 
 
1.2 Contestation, Confusion and Change – Urban Governance in Zimbabwe. 
Due to MDC dominance in urban politics, the post-2000 era saw urban governance in 
Zimbabwe becoming hotly contested, resulting in confusion as to the direction of political 
change. Urban areas in principle are hives of service delivery but in the Zimbabwean case 
they are sites of political struggles. Sites of struggles as political parties wrestle for the 
control of cities. Political contestation relegates service delivery as political grip and survival 
are prioritized. The struggles intensified after the 2008 elections in which the MDC won and 
controlled 29 of the 30 urban centers with Zanu-PF controlling the remainder (ZEC, 2008). 
The result has seen political conflict including the removal of MDC mayors by the MLGRUD 
(headed by a Zanu-PF minister) (RTI and IDAZIM, 2010). The rise of MDC in urban 
governance meant increased political fortunes and spheres of influence for the party.  
 
Realizing MDC electoral strength in urban areas, Zanu-PF launched a spirited and heterodox 
comeback aimed at regaining the control of local governance institutions (Kamete, 2006a). 
The comeback bid is advanced through the local government ministry which has a firm grip 
on the appointment of senior city managers, special interest councillors and suspension and 
dismissal of elected councillors. Councillors and mayors are decision makers, thus they have 
the political power. Administratively, council workers are the decision implementers and 
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urban managers. Conflicting political differences and allegiances between the council 
political and administrative wing was and is a standoff perturbing urban services delivery. 
 
The rise of multiparty democracy and the efforts to retain political dominance in urban areas 
resulted in the recentralization of administrative authority and political power. Jonga (2012) 
argues that urban governance institutions in Zimbabwe are captured by political bandits who 
are serving their individualistic interests at the expense of service delivery demise. He further 
points out the MLGRUD, councillors and political administrative structures as active agents 
of political banditry. Contestation and political struggles in urban governance are a result of 
political intolerance and the attempt by Zanu-PF to reclaim lost support. 
 
The crisis of governance and its ramifications in Zimbabwe has been a subject of long 
standing debate (Raftopoulos, 2006). This study argues that whilst much attention has been 
given to state governance, it is at the local governance level where the impacts of the crisis 
were more severe. Why at the local governance level? Local government is mandated to 
deliver directly or indirectly key human development services to citizens. Urban governance 
processes are heavily politicized struggles over the distribution of resources and quality of 
spaces (UNHABITAT, 2009). In urban Zimbabwe, when the MDC rose to political 
dominance, the impacts to service delivery were severe as stated in the problem statement in 
the succeeding section.  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
There is currently a major urban crisis in Zimbabwe expressing itself in failures of water, 
electricity, medicines, transport, and housing provision (Ranger, 2007). The crisis is a 
governance problem. In Zimbabwe, the birth of multi-party democracy and the fight to retain 
political dominance resulted in the recentralization of administrative authority and power 
(Jonga, 2012). Due to the rise of MDC electoral strength in urban areas with Zanu-PF 
controlling the local government ministry, urban governance in Zimbabwe became ardently 
contested. Intense contestation marked central-local government relations leaving the 
electorate and residents confused about the direction of political change. Removing Zanu-PF 
from urban governance was a way to usher in a new urban governance regime centered on 
effective and efficient service delivery. However, one can argue that, for now, to some extent 
the new urban governance regime has shown unexpected results mainly due to 
intergovernmental and inter-party contestations. The period under study was marked by a 
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governance crisis at national level with contestable local governance institutions legitimacy 
(Kamete, 2009a). 
 
The crisis of urban governance in Zimbabwe preceded the election of multi-party urban 
councils in 2000. In 2008, MDC controlled 29 out of 30 urban councils (ZEC, 2008).  Zanu-
PF controlled one urban council and the local government ministry, which ministry is 
responsible for the appointment of senior council officials, special interest councillors and 
suspension and dismissal of elected councillors. A palpable rift exists between appointed and 
elected officials, of which the former has been accused of following Zanu-PF diktats (Chirisa 
and Kawadza, 2008). This political reality has turned urban administration into a ‘political 
battle front’ rather than a locus of service delivery. Efforts by the MDC to manage urban 
councils seem to be systematically being frustrated by Zanu-PF through the MLGRUD.  
 
Politicians are seemingly abusing their power to suit their selfish and corrupt agendas 
(Kamete, 2003), causing confusion in urban administration. Political contradictions and 
contestations have resulted into deteriorating urban services delivery. Urban governance 
contestations led to the suppression of citizens’ choices (through elections) as elected mayors 
and councillors were either suspended or fired from office. Amidst contestation, service 
delivery declined to record levels. Service delivery levels question the feasibility of multi-
party councils under an authoritarian regime. To that effect, the thesis shows and connects 
how urban governance political dynamics have impacted upon service delivery. In principle, 
urban governance forms the cornerstone of socio-economic and political development in any 
nation. The process of building sustainable human settlements aimed at providing urban 
services centers on how cities are governed.  
 
Urban governance crisis led to service delivery failure (Ranger, 2007). The crisis took effect 
within a complex national socio-economic and political crisis. Urban local authorities form 
the core of public services management at the local level. The management of urban areas is 
a key component of local level democracy. Having stated the problem statement, the next 
section focuses on the competing explanations of service delivery failure. 
 
1.4 Service Delivery Failure: Competing explanations 
There are two competing explanations on service delivery failure in Zimbabwe. One is 
economic and the other is political. Zimbabwean cities have undergone an unprecedented 
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period of de-industrialization (Sachikonye, 2006; Kamete, 2006b) owing to economic 
challenges. De-industrialization affected local authorities’ revenue base. Other scholars use 
both economic and political arguments to explain service delivery failure for instance Kamete 
(2006c: 67) argue that for cities like Harare, a combination of bad governance, 
unemployment, economic rises, poverty and rising crime contributed to urban blight. On the 
other hand, other scholars focus purely on the political explanation for example Chirisa 
(2013) attributes the poor state of service delivery to weak institutions, urban 
mismanagement, and the reluctance of central government to promote good urban 
governance. This same argument is also supported by Jonga and Chirisa (2009: 178) who 
points out “poor service delivery, weak administrative institutions, ineffective and inefficient 
councils and unaccountable and corrupt urban councils systems” as the result of central 
government interference in local authorities. At this stage, it is vital explain the state and 
MDC’s views on the local government crisis and the subsequent service delivery failure. 
 
The Government of Zimbabwe’s (GoZ) through its economic blueprint, the Medium Term 
Plan (MTP) argues that “local authorities have weathered a turbulent economic period, and 
have emerged somewhat battered and bruised” (GoZ, 2011: 68). The position of the 
government in its economic blueprint raises the potency of the economy in explaining the 
local government crisis. In particular government identifies eight key challenges or 
constraints that affect the sound functioning of local authorities. These are financial non-
viability, obsolete equipment, outdated billing systems and accounting packages, inadequate 
or non-available trunk services, ageing onsite infrastructure and non-complaint internal 
planning and monitoring systems (GoZ, 2011: 68-69). 
 
However, the above stated government position needs to be looked at within a context. The 
MTP was crafted during the Inclusive Government comprising of MDC and Zanu-PF. Thus, 
the document falls short of being candid and attributing any failure to any of the two political 
parties. In fact, the document tried successfully to dissuade any blame to government 
coalition partners. In brief, it neutralizes the root causes of most development challenges it 
tries to address. 
 
Contrary to the government’s position, the MDC advances that the “local government system 
in Zimbabwe has suffered from extensive politicization and lack of or poor quality service 
delivery stemming from over-centralization of power by the local government minister” 
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(MDC, 2013a:25). Politicization and centralization are the two key drivers of poor service 
delivery, the MDC argues. This assumption of the MDC is important in this thesis, as the 
study intends to investigate the impacts of central government interference in local 
government. In addressing the service delivery impasse, the MDC proposed introducing a 
legislation outlining, the devolution of authority to local governments, introducing executive 
mayoral system, re-introducing strict city and town planning standards and guidelines, and 
prioritizing service delivery (MDC, 2013a: 25). To adequately explain the tension between 
Zanu-PF and MDC with regards to local government autonomy, the next section provides the 
local government ideologies of both parties. 
 
1.5 Zanu-PF and MDC ideologies on local government autonomy 
The position of the two parties (MDC and Zanu-PF) on local government autonomy in 
managing local affairs varies significantly. To illustrate this point, I will use the positions of 
both parties on local government during the constitution making process which ended in 
2013. Zanu-PF was against the devolution of power and functions to local authorities, a 
position (devolution) strongly supported by the MDC. To put this argument into perspective, 
Zanu-PF made a raft of changes on devolution to the COPAC draft constitution of July 17, 
2012 as shown on table 1. 
 
Table 1: Zanu-PF’s anti-devolution position during the Constitution making process 
Section COPAC’s position based on Draft 
Constitution July 17, 2012. 
Zanu-PF’s position in response to COPAC 
Draft Constitution. 
14.1 Devolution of governmental powers and 
responsibilities 
Decentralization of governmental powers and 
responsibilities 
14.1 (1) ‘governmental powers and responsibilities must 
be devolved to provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities’ 
‘governmental powers and responsibilities must 
be decentralized to provincial councils and local 
authorities 
14.1 (2) The objectives of the devolution of 
governmental powers and responsibilities to 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities are- 
The objectives of the decentralization of 
governmental powers and  responsibilities to 
provincial councils and local authorities are - 
14.2 (1) Provincial and metropolitan councils and 
local authorities must, within their spheres -  
Provincial councils and local authorities must, 
within their spheres of jurisdiction - 
14.2 (c) exercise their functions in a manner that does 
not encroach on the geographical, functional or 
institutional integrity of another tier of 
government; 
exercise their functions in a manner that does not 
encroach on the geographical, functional or 
institutional integrity of another structure of 
government; 
14.5 (1) There is a provincial council for each province, 
except the metropolitan provinces, 
consisting of - 
There is a provincial council for each province 
consisting of -  
Sec 5 Tiers of government. Structures of government. 
Adapted from COPAC Draft Constitution of Zimbabwe, 17 July 2012; The Draft Constitution of 
Zimbabwe 18 July 2012 incorporating approved Zanu-PF Amendments; Herald 30 August, 2012. 
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Table 1 (page 7) shows the devolution struggle that characterized the Constitution making 
process. Zanu-PF saw devolution as threat to its hold on power and had a strong belief in 
centralization. This was in contrast to the push in favour of devolution by the MDC, to which 
the party reiterated its devolution stance by outlining its vision for local government as “to 
promote devolved local governance that is democratic, sustainable and delivers quality 
services equitably” (MDC, 2013b: 185).  
  
Further to illustrate the divergence of views of Zanu-PF and the MDC on the running of local 
government affairs, I draw local government aspirations of both parties in the 2013 
harmonized election manifestos. Zanu-PF’s 2013 election manifesto leaves out devolution in 
its list of ‘goals of the people’ the party defended during the COPAC constitution making 
process (Zanu-PF, 2013: 67-73). Not surprising, the 108 page Zanu-PF Manifesto does not 
even mention the word ‘devolution’ which shows the party’s total disregard of devolution. A 
big contrast, as the MDC Manifesto takes pride on devolution: “we fought for devolution and 
it is now a cardinal principle of the new Constitution and we are committed to making sure it 
works for the people” (MDC, 2013a: 6). 
 
Form the abovementioned points; it is clear that Zanu-PF’s ideology is centered on control of 
local government structures using decentralization as a ‘façade’. One the other hand, the 
MDC believes in the devolution of power and functions in which local authorities are govern 
the right to govern in areas of their jurisdiction. This divergence of ideologies is at the core of 
this thesis as explained in Chapters 5 and 6 in which Zanu-PF continuously interferes in local 
government affairs. Building on the problem statement and local government ideologies of 
the MDC and Zanu-PF the next section justifies the importance of the study. 
 
 1.6 Significance of the Study 
The study sheds light on: 
a) The role of urban governance in service delivery in Zimbabwe. 
Beginning 2000, the Zimbabwean urban political landscape witnessed the emergence and 
ascendancy of MDC dominance over the running of urban affairs and the subsequent 
consternation of Zanu-PF (RTI and IDAZIM, 2010). Zanu-PF lost credibility and legitimacy 
as the main governing party in urban areas. Zanu-PF became ‘irrelevant’ in the management 
and administration of cities signaling a big political loss to Zanu-PF. It is therefore critical to 
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study and examine the role of the change from Zanu-PF to MDC on service delivery. This 
stems from the fact that local governments address critical issues of service delivery in the 
daily lives of the population (Kamete, 2003). 
 
b) Understanding the politics of service delivery in Zimbabwe. 
Local level democracy has resulted in multi-party councils presenting both opportunities and 
challenges to service delivery. MDC and Zanu-PF, two different political parties with two 
conflicting ideologies found themselves in council chambers with a common mandate of 
delivering services to citizens. For decisions to be agreed upon, parties have to debate and 
agree on courses of action. However, the polarization of the relationship between MDC 
controlled urban councils and central government (RTI and IDAZIM, 2010) led to the 
politicization of service delivery. Studying the politicization of urban service delivery helps 
to understand the functioning of urban governments in contested environs. 
 
1.7 Research Aim, Assumptions and Methodology. 
This section provides a synopsis of the research objectives, assumptions and methodology. 
Research Aim and Objectives 
The overall aim of this study is to investigate the impacts of urban governance political 
contestations on urban services delivery. The specific objectives are to: 
1. Provide an overview of the historical and current perspectives on urban governance 
and urban development. 
2. Provide an overview of the political, policy and legislative changes in Zimbabwe’s 
urban governance. 
3. Describe the impacts of urban governance political dynamics and conflicts on urban 
services delivery. 
4. Recommend policy directions as to how urban services can be effectively and 
efficiently delivered in Zimbabwe’s contested urban governance. 
 
Research Assumption 
This thesis suggests that contestation and confusion in urban governance politics led to the 
deterioration of service delivery. With a view to address this problematique, it is essential that 
governing authorities pay attention to issues such as contestation, confusion and change. 
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Research Methodology 
The study is a qualitative assessment of what transpired during the period under study (2000-
2012). The key focus of the study is not on measuring service delivery changes per se; rather 
it focuses on the nature and context of political contestations and how such contestations 
affected service delivery. Thus, in order to fully understand and explain such political 
contestations, a qualitative methodology is necessary. Information was gathered from a 
number of sources that include: 
a) Urban governance institutions involved in urban service delivery (planning, provision, 
management and administration) such as urban local authorities.  
b) Local government ministry responsible for overseeing urban services (MLGRUD). 
c) Analysis of international development agencies involved in human settlement 
planning and management (UNHabitat, SIDA, and Practical Action Southern Africa). 
d) Review of experiences of residents associations, advocacy groups, research Institutes, 
and professional planning bodies.
2
 
 
The main data collection methods used includes: 
a) Key Informant Interviews with purposively selected individuals from organizations 
involved in urban governance work. 
b) Secondary literature review and analysis such as legal and policy instruments (by-
laws, Acts of Parliament and policies governing urban planning and management) as 
well as reports (published and unpublished). 
c) Participant observation (as planner at IDAZIM3 responsible for the Local Governance 
Research and Policy program). 
 
1.8 Thesis structure 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter provides the general overview and 
introduction to the thesis. A critical review of extant literature on urbanization and urban 
governance forms the second chapter. Chapter three explains the research methodology used 
to investigate urban patterns in Zimbabwe. The fourth chapter examines in detail the 
Zimbabwean urban governance and urbanization context. Presentation and discussion of 
research findings form the fifth and sixth chapters. The last chapter provides conclusions and 
                                                          
2
 These are the Zimbabwe Institute of Regional and Urban Planners, Dialogue On Shelter for the Homeless in 
Zimbabwe Trust, Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation, Department of Rural and Urban Planning - 
University of Zimbabwe, and Harare Residents Trust. 
3
 Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe – Local Governance Centre of Excellence. 
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recommendations as to how urban services can be effectively delivered in Zimbabwe’s 
contested urban governance. 
 
1.9 Conclusion. 
The chapter introduced the topic under study by outlining the main impetus to revitalize 
urban governance and urban development – increases in the demand for urban services. 
Further, the chapter explained the problem statement that is, due to the rise of MDC electoral 
strength in urban areas, urban governance in Zimbabwe became hotly contested, resulting in 
confusion as to the direction of political change. Subsequently, urban areas became sites of 
political struggles instead of engines of service delivery. Sites of struggles as political parties 
wrestle for the control of cities; in the process political grip and survival was prioritized, 
relegating service delivery. The research problem, assumptions, methodology, study 
significance and structure of the thesis conclude the first chapter. A critical review of extant 
literature on urbanization and urban governance is discussed in the successive chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO: CRITICAL REVIEW OF EXTANT LITERATURE 
ON URBANIZATION AND URBAN GOVERNANCE. 
 
In this chapter, I explain the relationship between urban planning, urban governance and 
urban development. Literature reviewed in this chapter demonstrates that in both developed 
and developing countries, urbanization occurs in the context of socio-economic development. 
This is also true in the Zimbabwean context as explained in chapter four. This chapter sets 
out the framework of urban governance as an important driver for urban planning and urban 
development. Furthermore, the chapter takes a closer look at the theoretical and historical 
perspectives of urban governance.  
 
Urban governance, urban planning and urban development are interrelated and hence form 
the core of this chapter. Current debates (cf. UNHABITAT, 2009; Watson, 2009) about 
revisiting urban governance, planning and politics are analyzed. In addition, the chapter 
discusses the theoretical framework (Urban Political System) used as a foundation for the 
study. The basic premise of the Urban Political System rests on the response of local politics 
to environmental change as a way of addressing the urban question. A summary of the main 
urban governance arguments concludes the chapter. After outlining the chapter introduction, 
the next section explains the challenge of humanity - urbanization. 
 
2.1 Introductory Remarks to Urbanization. 
Urbanization and climate change are challenges confronting humankind (UNHABITAT, 
2009; World Bank, 2010). Urban planning is seen as an important tool for addressing the 
challenges of urbanization and climate change. The complete urbanization of the society 
(Lefebvre, 1970) is a reality in progression, as urbanization levels reach new levels every 
single day. However, the geography of urbanization is more pronounced in Global South 
cities. In that respect, the World Urban Forum in Vancouver (June 2006) called for a major 
shift in global thinking about the future of Southern cities (Watson, 2009). A shift in thinking 
stems from the realization that for the first time in humankind history; in 2008 the majority of 
the worlds’ population became city inhabitants (UNHABITAT, 2008). It is estimated that by 
2030, about 4.9 billion, some 60% of the world’s population will be living in cities 
(Merrifield, 2012). If the trend continues, it is projected that by 2050, about 75% of the planet 
earth will be urbanized (Burdett and Sudjic, 2007). The urbanization reality is occurring 
against a backdrop of mounting challenges such as the global financial crisis and its attendant 
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effects, climate change and resource depletion, increasing informality and poverty in urban 
settlements. Therefore, innovative, and inclusive urban governance is critical in addressing 
urbanization ills.  
 
Urbanization brings to the fore the urban question. By definition, the urban question refers 
“to the organization of the means of collective consumption at the basis of daily life of all 
social groups: housing, education, health, culture, commerce, transport etc.” (Castells, 1978: 
3). Why is the urban question so important? What is the role of urban governance politics in 
addressing the urban question? The urban question forms the essential levers of social 
organization and social change in any society. The urban question deals with services that 
make or break human lives. It is precisely the urban question that urban governance seeks to 
answer. In doing so, interactions between the state, urban politics, social movements and civil 
society are principal analytical arenas. Understanding urbanization requires a closer look at 
historical aspects of urban governance and urban planning which are explained in section 2.2. 
 
2.2 The General history of Urban Governance and Urban Planning 
Urban governance is practiced through the planning, development and management of urban 
areas. Contemporary urban planning dates back to the dawn of human civilization. Early 
forms of urban planning kept on changing and being modified to suit prevailing 
circumstances. Colonialism, international development agencies, and planning journals acted 
as conduits of transferring urban planning ideologies across the world.  Industrial revolution 
in Western Europe largely influenced 19
th
 century urban planning (UNHABITAT, 2009); in 
which planning was “described as a tool for attaining political and ideological goals of the 
state or ruling class” (Ibid: 49). Therefore, urban planning was a state function used to justify 
state actions and decide the distribution questions of who gets what, when and how. 
 
The 20
th
 century saw urban planning featured as “essentially a political, social, cultural, 
professional and technical response to a blend of circumstances which marked the years at the 
turn of the century” (Cherry, 1979: 306). Urban planning visions postulated by individual4 
thought influenced urban planning practice. Physical, master, and layout planning are the 
main features of 20
th
 century urban planning. Most urban planning ideologies developed in 
Western societies and diffused through different channels to the rest of the world.  
                                                          
4
 For instance Ebenezer Howard, Le Corbusier, Walter Christaller, Patrick Geddes, Jane Jacobs, Lewis 
Mumford, Manuel Castells, Peter Hall among others . 
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Sager (2011) argues that, the modern era is dominated by neo-liberal urban planning 
approaches featured by a “shift from government to private strategies or a conversion from 
publicly planned solutions to competitive and market forces” (Ibid.: 148). Neo-liberalism 
relegates Keynesian welfare economics and is characterized by extended property rights, 
privatization, deregulation, erosion of the welfare state, devolution of central government, 
uneven economic development and increasing social polarization (Harvey, 2006). Neo-liberal 
urban planning includes urban economic development initiatives (for instance city marketing, 
competitive bidding); infrastructure provision (private sector involvement in financing and 
operating transport, and water procurement); housing and neighborhood renewal (housing 
market liberalization, private housing); and management of commercial areas (public space 
privatization). Though neo-liberal planning is consistent with New Public Management 
(NPM), it overrides citizens’ interests in favour of private interests and de-democratizes 
urban planning leading to severe distribution inequalities. Ultimately urban planning serves 
private and not public interests leaving the notion of public planning hanging. 
 
New urban planning methods such as new forms of master planning, strategic spatial 
planning, Participatory Budgeting, Integrated Development Planning, and new urbanism are 
surfacing in urban planning theory and practice. Since establishment in 1978, UNHABITAT
5
 
has been championing innovative approaches to urban planning in the whole world. 
UNHABITAT and other international development organizations
6
 have been promoting 
‘good urban governance’ approaches in the whole world and their efforts in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) are instrumental. The intensity of urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa is more 
pronounced compared to other regions; hence the study turns to the regions’ urban 
governance and urban development. 
 
2.3 Urban Governance and Urban Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Historically, urban planning in Sub-Saharan Africa was influenced by urban planning trends 
in colonial Europe. Planning methodologies, legislation and institutions were adopted and 
modeled from European countries. African cities were governed and controlled remotely by 
colonial municipal administrations from capital cities in the Global North, thus “playing a 
critical role in the process of colonial political domination and in the extraction of profit by 
                                                          
5
 United Nations Centre for Human Settlements. 
6
 Most notable are United States Agency for International Development (USAID), European Union (EU), and 
World Bank. 
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colonial business enterprise” (Harrel-Bond et al., 1978: 309). Urban governance was a tool 
for supporting the status quo and repressing revolutionary movements. In modern times, little 
emphasis has been placed on local urban planning conditions in SSA when adopting urban 
planning methods. Urban planning continues to perpetuate social and economic segregation.  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the least urbanized, but the most rapidly urbanizing region in the world 
(UNHABITAT, 2009: 25).  A number of factors drive the magnitude and extent of 
urbanization in the region. Pre-colonial, post-colonial and prevailing socio-economic and 
political developments are imperative explanations. Urban development in SSA is influenced 
by both external and internal factors. Urban development aid from USAID
7
, World Bank and 
the European Union largely contributes to post-independence urban infrastructure design. 
The region’s rapid urbanization growth is accompanied by severe urban governance 
challenges which include reliance on central government controlled policies, legislation and 
finances. In some instances, this dependence renders urban governance weak and susceptible 
to manipulation by central governments. 
 
Like other world’s developed cities, SSA cities require an independent governance and 
economic engine in order to make the transition from demographic to socio-economic 
growth. The rate of urbanization has not been tallying with urban socio-economic 
development. The State of African Cities Report (UNHABITAT, 2010b: ii) advances that “… 
as the urbanization of African poverty makes further progress, the prospects of a dignified 
and productive life continues to elude the poorest among Africans”. Rapid urbanization in the 
developing world is seriously outstripping the capacities of cities to adequately provide 
services to citizens (Cohen, 2006). Slum settlements, problems of congestion and urban 
sprawl make urban governance ‘too demanding’ in providing basic infrastructure and 
delivery of essential services. 
 
Urban population in Sub-Saharan African cities is growing at an undoubtedly unprecedented 
rate. The compensatory effect in terms of urban development service provision is rather 
negative. Rapid urbanization is taking place against a backdrop of economic stagnation, poor 
agricultural performance, rising unemployment, financially weak municipalities incapable of 
                                                          
7
 United States Agency for International Development. 
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providing basic services, poor governance, and the absence of a coherent urban planning 
policy (Cheru, 2005). Ultimately, service provision declines to record levels. 
 
Urban planning practice has been ‘too technocratic’ rather than a socio-political process 
anchored on participatory approaches. Blue print urban planning approaches are inexistence. 
In addition, existing urban planning tools, such as master planning, zoning, building 
regulations and restrictive planning laws which have European origins continue to shape the 
region’s cities (Wekwete, 1995). Localization and ‘home growing’ of urban planning has 
been piecemeal at its best. Maintenance of high planning standards has been prioritized as 
compared to local socio-economic and political dynamics as key urban planning decision 
factors. In this case planning, therefore, was and still is, used as a tool for social segregation 
and exclusion in many territories (UNHABITAT, 2009). Numerous informal settlements in 
most SSA cities are testament to rigid urban planning methodologies. 
 
Urban social movements in the form of residents associations, civil society organizations 
(CSOs), community based organizations (CBOs) have been viewed as detrimental and not 
key urban development stakeholders. Revision of planning laws has received limited 
response and attention. Radical revisions to the inherited legislative base for this technocratic 
blue print approach to planning have been rare, despite its failure to provide effective 
guidance for rapid urban growth (Attahi et al., 2008). 
 
Moreover, Esser (2012) argues that the political impasse prevalent in African cities governed 
by opposition parties is a result of incomplete decentralization, in which the devolution of 
functions is not matched with a reallocation of resources. Ultimately urban governments fail 
to deliver sufficient urban services. Governing underfunded, rapidly urbanizing and 
politically contested sub-Saharan African cities raises questions about what kinds of urban 
governance arrangements are feasible under these circumstances.  
 
Present day urban political realities are contested and service delivery is used as a source and 
resource for political agency. In the City Council of Lusaka, Zambia, Resnick (2011: 142-3) 
argues that city council struggles are a result of inter-party power politics, with the national 
party in power actively constrains the opposition-led city council in order to prevent it from 
developing successful initiatives and creating a springboard for future electoral victory at 
national level. Consequently, “cities are sites of contestation (marked by) deeply contested 
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politics” (Robinson, 2006: 166). An analysis of urban governance systems, existing urban 
development tools and the prevailing urbanization rates, and urban poverty indicate to a crisis 
in perpetuity. Subsequently, revisiting urban governance, planning and politics becomes a 
necessity, as explained in the following section. 
 
2.4 Revisiting Urban Governance, Planning and Government (Politics) 
Historically, in the 1980s the good governance mantra was popularized by the World Bank 
and UN agencies in packages like privatization, decentralization and democratization of the 
state. The rise and fall of the Washington Consensus in the 1990s left an imprint of ‘good 
governance’ slogan as a pre-requisite for development in the developing world. Urban 
planning is seen as an important vehicle to promote good governance. Interactions between 
urban governance and central government shape the nature and form of urban planning. To 
that end, “the purpose of planning and how it is undertaken are shaped by the wider context 
of governance” (UNHABITAT, 2009: 72). Present day urban areas have numerous actors of 
which urban governance institutions labour through and deliver services. 
 
The United Nations agency responsible for human settlements, UNHABITAT (2002: 14); 
defines urban governance as: 
 
The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the 
common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse 
interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken. It includes formal 
institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens. 
 
In practice, urban governance includes urban management and heavily politicized struggles 
over distribution of resources and quality of places (UNHABITAT, 2009: 74). Urban 
planning processes and outcomes are muddled by different actors with conflicting interests. 
In the context of urban governance, good governance has been defined “as an efficient and 
effective response to urban problems by accountable local governments working in 
partnership with civil society” (Ibid.: 74). Solving urban problems is a crucial function and 
responsibility of urban governance. 
 
Urban governance shapes urban areas. The way in which cities are governed and organized 
both reflect and reinforce changes in the social, economic and spatial structure of urban areas 
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(Ibid.: 72). Consequently, urban governance is a key determinant of socio-economic and 
political development in cities. The World Bank, in its 1997 World Development Report 
observes that the difference between the performance of cities and countries across the world 
can be partially explained by differences in governance. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America, present day urban government institutions are an impediment and require 
significant changes to address contemporary urban challenges. 
 
The governance equation in urban areas concerns the production and delivery of services. 
Service provision is when the organization or institution involved is responsible for the 
quality and quantity of the service and ensures its financing and execution (Davey, 1993). 
Good governance deals with the efficiency and effectiveness in which service production and 
provision is done. The demand for service delivery due to rapidly increasing urbanization 
makes urban governance an important sphere of state governance. However, the relationship 
between state and urban governance is defined by power and authority. Therefore, urban 
governance is essentially about power relations within and between political actors and 
institutions leading to power struggles (Harpham and Boateng, 1997). 
 
In urban planning processes, actors are drawn from the private sector, state and civil society. 
It therefore requires considerable inclusivity and dynamism of urban governance in order to 
produce meaningful results. In most instances, these actors have antithetical rather than 
complimentary interests and objectives. Despite actor contradictions, the challenge of urban 
governance is to provide its constituency with urban services that are key to people’s 
standards of living. Having discussed the need to revisit urban governance, the next section 
explains the various approaches to the study of urban politics and urban governance. 
 
2.5 Approaches to the study of Urban Politics and Urban Governance in extant 
theory. 
A number of theories to explain the interactions, relationships and contradictions between 
actors in urban affairs have been put forward by a range of authors as indicated here below. 
The following five theories explain urban political and policy making processes: 
a) Institutional theory: existing institutional, constitutional and legal frameworks as key 
determinants of political processes. 
b) Community power theory: the main driving force explaining the revival of interest 
among political scientists in city government affairs (Dahl, 1961). 
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c) Urban political system: what happens in a city is a response to changes in its 
environment (Easton, 1965).  
d) Theories that emphasize the role of individual and local political culture, ideology or 
values in explaining city political processes (Goldsmith, 1980: 28). 
e) Marxist city analysis associated with Manual Castells (Castells, 1977). 
The urban political system provides a near and proximate analogue of the context of 
Zimbabwe, hence applying it forms the conceptual foundation of the thesis as detailed in the 
subsequent section. 
 
2.6 The Urban Political System: A Framework of Analysis 
The basic premise of the urban political system rests on the response of local politics to 
environmental change as a way of addressing the urban question. By definition, the urban 
question refers “to the organization of the means of collective consumption at the basis of 
daily life of all social groups: housing, education, health, culture, commerce, transport etc.” 
(Castells, 1978: 3). Why is the urban question important? It forms the essential levers of 
social organization and social change in any society. The urban question deals with services 
that make or break human life. Traditional approaches sees politics, as based on performance, 
efficiency and management of technical solutions to agreed problems (Stone, 1987, 1989). In 
this study, politics is seen as conflict, the reconciliation of competing interests (Keating, 
1991:5) and the ultimate delivery of urban services. 
 
To visualize the urban political system, Fig. 1 (page 20) shows the interaction, relationships, 
inputs and outputs within urban politics.  
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 Fig. 1: A Systemic model of the Urban Political System (Source: Goldsmith, 1980:37). 
To explain Fig. 1, a local administration area (urban) is taken as a political system with the 
political community (residents) with political capacity, political authorities (formal and 
informal decision makers) and a regime (rules of the game) (ibid.: 35). Political parties, 
pressure groups and the media are key actors in the system due to their communication, 
advocacy and feedback comparative advantages. Citizens and decision makers are each 
placed at one end of the actor interaction continuum. Three actors (political parties, pressure 
groups and the media) act as a bridge between citizens and decision makers. In urban 
governments, elected and appointed officials are key decision makers. Actor interaction 
makes political conflicts especially electoral conflicts severe in urban decision making 
processes. In this case, contestation in the urban areas emanates from different urban 
development and ‘quality of life’ policies from different political players (Castells, 1978:1). 
 
Exemplifying a French setting, Castells highlights the contradiction that exist when two 
different political parties have hold, one on local government and the other on central 
government. He noted “the ability to impose a political change at the local level prior to 
obtaining national power can be seen as an essential stage in consolidating a relationship to 
the population in the long term process of societal structures” (Castells, 1978: 1). This 
explains also the Zimbabwean setting; as the rise and ascendancy of the MDC in urban 
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government signifies a long term regime change strategy. Nonetheless, this development 
infuriated the ruling party (Zanu-PF), hence the contestation. Political conflicts continue to 
destabilize urban management.  
 
The existence of social groups in the urban political system transacts to urban social 
movements that is “movements in which protests concerning the urban and ecology, organize 
and mobilize populations, transform relations of force between classes… and become one of 
the essential axes of social change” (Castells, 1978: 2). Social groups voice their concerns on 
a number of urban policy concerns such as allocation and use of land, supply and distribution 
of urban public services. The rise of urban social movements leads to social and political 
change coupled with the breakdown of one party statism in city politics. Changing inefficient 
urban regimes is a strategic objective of social movements within cities. In the Zimbabwean 
case, social movements like Harare Residents Trust (HRT), Combined Harare Residents 
Association (CHRA), Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association (BPRA), Masvingo 
Residents Association, and Mutare Residents Association (MRA) voice their concern in the 
production and delivery of urban services through residents’ demonstrations, petitions and 
other advocacy means. 
 
The aforementioned residents associations foster active citizenship in urban areas.  Residents 
groups play a significant role is the shaping of urban governance in Zimbabwe. Citizens, 
through different interactions with other actors within the urban sphere shape the nature of 
urban policy outputs and services. Active citizens are “democratic agents, empowering 
themselves through their challenges to the activities of institutions and organizations that 
shape their everyday lives” (Raco and Imrie, 2000: 2188). In the urban political system, 
citizens input demands and supports, act as actors and recipients of outputs and outcomes. 
 
Popular citizen protests deepen the politics and urban crisis of service delivery. Urban 
political conflicts and contradictions provoke state intervention. Fulfilling the ‘social contract 
argument’ justifies and legitimatizes state intervention. In reality, state intervention is a 
convenient way to guarantee and favour state political interests. The internationalization of 
the contestation and political sensitivity of the urban question inflames a political crisis. The 
urban political arena is itself “an object of contest with social and political groups seeking a 
form of politics which contains competing demands” (Keating, 1991: 42); with each of the 
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two groups trying to maximize own interests at the expense of the other resulting in unending 
conflict.  
 
From the abovementioned argument, the state becomes the actual manager of the urban 
system (urban services), of which intervention positively and negatively affects social groups 
and residents. Ultimately,  “state intervention in the city, while attempting to overcome the 
contradictions resulting from the inability of producing the goods and services it urgently 
needs, in fact politicizes and globalizes urban conflicts by articulating directly the material 
conditions of daily life...” (Castells, 1978: 170). Once politicized and globalized, the crisis 
grows in stature and complexity. As a result, many actors claim to have solutions to the crisis 
and in the process deepening the crisis.  
 
Decision makers constitute council elected and appointed officials. The logical flow of a 
decision moves from making to implementation. The implementation of decisions in urban 
affairs depends on the nature of decentralization regime in place (Section 2.6.1); nonetheless 
city bureaucrats form a critical component of this implementation. City bureaucracies are 
both a resource and a constraint to elected officials in the delivery of urban services. The two 
(bureaucracies and elected officials) need each other in solving the urban question. Non-
synchronization of bureaucrats and elected officials’ goals, leads to unending conflict. In 
Zimbabwe, elected council officials do not have power and authority to hire and fire senior 
administrative staff. Mayors are ceremonial (Chirisa and Jonga, 2009) and town clerks are 
heads of council administrative staff and are appointed by the Local Government Board 
(appointed by the local government minister). Unending conflict ensued between council 
elected and appointed officials affecting service delivery. 
 
The external system environments relates to the national, international economic 
environment, national social, physical and political environment that have a direct influence 
on the urban political system. UNHABITAT, SIDA and Practical Action Southern Africa are 
running programs and projects aimed at strengthening urban governance and service delivery 
in Zimbabwe. The political environment comprises intergovernmental relations between local 
and national governments, or other local authorities, and quasi-government organizations. 
Intra-system environments relates to the physical, social, economic and ideological 
characteristics prevailing in an urban setting. The urban political system faces a number of 
opportunities and constraints provided by the environment. 
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The results of decision makers are seen in policies, outputs and services. Outputs refer to 
decisions and non-decisions, policies, and service provision levels in the urban area 
(Goldsmith, 1980: 38). One can flag out urban problems on which action or inaction has been 
taken. Consequences of outputs; intended and unintended; form outcomes. Feedback results 
from the inclusion of outputs and outcomes back into the system. In principle, feedback is of 
essence in making sure that the system responds differently in future. The framework of 
analyze leads to decentralization and political leadership in the urban political system. First, I 
explain decentralization, democracy and service provision in the next section.  
 
2.6.1 Decentralization, Democracy and Service Provision within Urban Governance 
The relationship between local and central government is defined by two constructs which 
are centralization and decentralization. Centralization sees urban governance as local 
administration that is an extension and integral part of a sovereign state. This implies that the 
state has “an obligation to supervise local government to ensure that powers delegated to the 
subnational units are not overstepped” (Ismail et al., 1997:14). The decentralist approach sees 
urban governance as enshrined in constitutional arrangements thereby enjoying autonomy. 
The extent and magnitude of decentralization differs. 
 
The currency of decentralization in the developing world is unpatrolled with 80% of all 
developing and transition countries undertaking some form of decentralization in the past two 
decades (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008: 7). African states have a long history of being 
centralized states in which centralized planning and administration was or is prevalent. With 
pressure from international development agencies and civil society organizations, most 
countries have implemented decentralization reforms at one stage. 
 
A consensus of the need to ‘roll back the state to the frontiers of development planning’; in 
simpler terms reducing the role of the state in public service provision and development 
processes provided the impetus for decentralization. The World Bank (1989) in its report 
‘Sub Saharan Africa – From crisis to sustainable growth’ argues that decentralization 
concerns the division of roles and responsibilities between central authority, local 
government and local communities with a view to reduce the number of tasks performed by 
central government and to decentralize the provision of public services. The debate about 
decentralization, brings to the fore the centrality of local governments in any state. The thrust 
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of decentralization lies in the perception that local government is more responsive to local 
needs and is inclusive of the majority poor (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). 
 
In defining decentralization, it is common to outline three different forms that emphasize one 
or other of these elements, as exemplified by Manor (1999: 5): 
i. Devolution (or democratic decentralization), i.e. transfer of power and resources to 
sub-national authorities that are both (relatively) independent of central government 
and democratically elected. 
ii. Deconcentration (or administrative decentralization), i.e. the transfer of authority to 
sub-national branches of the central state, often to line ministry officials based in local 
areas. 
iii. Fiscal decentralization, i.e. authority over budgets ceded to deconcentrated officials 
and/or unelected appointees or to elected politicians. 
 
In Africa, south of the Sahara, the emphasis on decentralization has shifted from 
deconcentration to devolution and to some extent privatization. This is exemplified by the 
writing of new constitutions in Kenya and Zimbabwe which emphasized on devolution of 
power and functions. In addition, both countries were reacting to a ‘too much centralized 
state’ under authoritarian regimes. Political decentralization is the creation of local 
government through “devolution of powers to represent local councils, each with separate 
legal existence” (Tardoff, 1994). Devolution forms a complete form of decentralization as 
finances and functions are transferred 
 
The World Bank in its 1999/2000 World Development Report calls for a rethinking of the 
government in which decentralization allows local people “greater self-determination and 
influence in the decisions of their government” (World Bank, 1999: 107). It is important at 
this point to highlight the importance of proper planning and full implementation of 
decentralization programs so as to go beyond the political rhetoric. More often, 
decentralization programs are outlined as political gimmick in order to appease certain 
political constituencies but without full implementation. Decentralization reforms must spell 
out the sharing of roles, responsibilities and finances between central and local governments. 
This should be enshrined in the constitution and subsidiary legislation. 
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In Zimbabwe, since independence, the objectives and nature of the government’s 
decentralization thrust has changed over time (Wekwete and de Valk, 1990; Gasper, 1997; 
Makumbe, 1998; Chakaipa, 2001; Conyers, 2003). The changes over time are explained in 
detail in Chapter 4 (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). Suffice to say, here I provide some views from 
literature on Zimbabwe’s decentralization programme. Emerging issues on Zimbabwe’s 
decentralization programme include the importance of capacity building and capacity of local 
institutions, political environment and viewing the process as a ‘learning process’ (Conyers, 
2003). 
 
Marumahoko (2011: 37) argues that in the Zimbabwean case, “efforts to capacitate urban 
councils through decentralization are futile if urban local government lacks the necessary 
financial means to fulfill its responsibilities”. At the centre of this argument is that 
decentralization of finances and resources is critical for local government to perform its 
functions. It goes without saying that decentralization of functions only results in unfunded 
mandates. The period under study in this thesis was marked by decentralization of functions 
and not finances to local authorities. This presented challenges to the delivery of services. 
First, local authorities relied on central government grants (which were no longer provided) 
making the former subservient to the latter. In a harsh macro-economic environment, central 
government prioritized its functions neglecting local authorities. Thus, the GoZ has been 
accused of using decentralization “as a means of reducing the costs of providing public 
service” (MLGPH, 1999: 7). This denotes the wrong reasons of applying decentralization. 
 
After making a review of decentralization and recentralization in Africa, James Wunsh 
argued that central government must relinquish authority to local government in the 
following areas. These are planning and capital investment, budgeting and fiscal 
management, personnel systems and management, and finance and revenue (Wunsh, 2001: 
227). These areas of focus are articulated in Chapters 5 with a view to see how central 
government is interfering in urban planning and management systems of local authorities. 
 
With regards to the provision of urban services, neo-liberal theorists have argued for 
privatization. The push for privatization has a long history dating to the 1980s and 1990s. 
Chief proponents of privatization are the World Bank and IMF, through the former’s 
Washington consensus that outlined Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). However, a 
study carried out in 2000 found out the reluctance of Zimbabwe to commercialize or privatize 
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urban services (Pasipanodya et. al., 2000). Despite this, recently attempts have been made to 
commercialize or privatize some local authority functions. Examples include the attempt to 
commercialize Harare Water which is now a standalone entity and the preparation to 
privatize non-core activities by Bulawayo city council through the formation of strategic 
business units, leasing out properties and contracting out services (BCC, 2004: 15-16). 
 
Most recently, MacDonald and Ruiters (2012) have called for alternatives to privatization. 
They defined alternatives as (i) “public” entities that are entirely state-owned and operated 
(such as a municipal water utility or a provincial electricity generator) and (ii) “non-state” 
organizations that operate independently of the state on a not-for-profit basis and are oriented 
to principles of equality and social citizenship (such as certain types of NGOs or community 
groups) (MacDonald and Ruiters, 2012: 3). For urban services delivery this approach is 
promising, but requires more scrutiny. First, this approach needs to be wary of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of wholly-owned state entities in public services delivery. In an 
environment where the state is weak and inefficient, this approach might not bring anticipated 
benefits. Second, for non-state actors to fully provide public services like water, electricity on 
a non-profit basis requires immense investment in capacity building of these entities. 
 
In Zimbabwe, urban governance is an appendage of the central government. Centre-local 
relations are confrontational and contested due to divergences in local autonomy and central 
control. In this instance, local government becomes “a creature of statute subject to the 
vagaries and predilections of central political administrations” (Sullivan et al., 2004). The 
birth, growth and demise of urban governance lie in the hands of central government. The 
creation, redefinition and functional changes are detected by central government as it so 
desires (Kamete, 2006a: 256). Power, resources (financial, human and capital) and real 
jurisdiction lies in the central government and is transferred to urban authorities when central 
government so wishes. 
 
Contradictions are worse and tense in multi-party councils, especially when central 
government power dynamics are not representative at local level. Kamete argues that it is 
unimaginable for a party in government to lack a presence at local government (Kamete, 
2006a). Absence of central government representation at local level makes political players at 
central government level feel losing political support and on the road to political exit. The 
fear emanates from the perception of a rival in creation (Keating, 1995), and the “problem 
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ceases to be simply about the functions of local government” (Kamete, 2006a: 257), but 
political infighting and survival.  
 
Kamete argues that “when city residents vote into council a political party other than the 
ruling party and central government appears to be harrying the opposition controlled council, 
residents may interpret this as an assault to their democratic choice.…” (ibid.: 257). On the 
contrary, the state justifies its action as a guarantor of the social contract thus ensuring 
delivery of services to citizens by its agencies. Control from central government “often create 
more problems than they solve, including delays, frustrations, additional costs and perverse 
behavior” (Devas and Delay, 2007: 687). This resembles a prototype of the urban governance 
scenario in Zimbabwe after the ascendancy of MDC in urban governance, and the resultant 
central government interference. Service delivery deteriorated to record levels. Next, I 
discuss the importance of leaders (conceived by political parties) in the urban political 
system. 
 
2.6.2 Local Political Leadership and Urban Governance 
Political parties conceive urban local leadership. Therefore, the configuration, culture and 
thrust of political parties are largely endowed by its leadership at the local level. In view of 
this, Judd argues that “urban leaders have the ability to make choices, but within the 
parameters imposed both by local political arrangements and by external forces” (Judd, 2000: 
959). The complex urban political environment makes leadership key in coordinating and 
rationalizing diverse interests.  In this case, the main essence of leadership; “is the ability to 
inspire or persuade others to follow a course of action where there is at least some initial 
resistance to following” (Leach and Wilson, 2000: 11). 
 
Leadership is crucial to the functioning and success of local governance (Borraz and John, 
2004). Bochel and Bochel (2010: 726) argue that “strong leadership is a functional response 
to the institutional fragmentation prevalent in urban politics”. Strong local leadership 
emanates from the legitimate crisis and lack of political accountability at national level. Over 
the recent years, citizens have turned to local administration as a service delivery promising 
vehicle due to central government failures. Moreover, leadership is crucial for “resource 
mobilization, construction of governance arrangements, and transformation of local 
government institutions” (Haus and Sweating, 2006: 270). A number of stakeholders such as 
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business, non-state actors
8
 and central government are active in local governance making 
local leadership an expansive and important responsibility. Local leaders are stretched by the 
“urban polity complexity, with straddling jurisdictional boundaries and authority dispersion 
among multiple actors” (John and Cole, 1999: 98-9). Cooperation and coordination by urban 
leadership is essential, without which confusion and conflict takes effect.  
 
2.7 Some Concluding Remarks on Urban Governance in existing theory 
The chapter has emphasized that urban governance is an engine for urban service delivery. In 
essence, the delivery of urban functions and services is a product of the governance system in 
place. The internationalization of governance as a ‘pill’ for development through 
international development organizations influenced urban planning across the world. In 
addition, the chapter discussed the theoretical framework (Urban Political System) used to 
conduct the study. The basic premise of the Urban Political System rests on the response of 
local politics to environmental change as a way of addressing the urban question. Drawing 
from the urban political system as a framework of analysis, politics continue to shape and 
destabilize urban governance in Zimbabwe. Urban governance remains under threat from the 
central government – a phenomenon leading to urban contestation, and confusion. The next 
chapter focuses on the research methodology used to investigate urban patterns in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 These include Community Based Organizations, Civil Society Organizations, Non-Governmental 
Organizations, and International Development Organizations. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY TO INVESTIGATE 
URBAN PATTERNS IN ZIMBABWE. 
 
This chapter discusses the research methodology used to examine urban patterns in 
Zimbabwe. The chapter delimits the research within Zimbabwe’s urban governance. 
Sampling procedure, data collection methods, and data processing methods are articulated. 
The chapter concludes by highlighting possible limitations and research gaps resulting from 
the chosen research methodologies. First, the next section delimits the study. 
 
3.1 Delimitation of the Study 
Urban areas in Zimbabwe are defined as local boards, towns and municipalities established 
and conferred functions through the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15). Currently, there are 
32 urban local authorities and the study key informants (elected and appointed officials) are 
drawn from four cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare. These four cities have a 
combined population of 2 401 239
9
 out of a national population of 12 973 808 (ZimStat, 
2012). Urbanization levels in Zimbabwe as of 2010 stood at 38, 25% (UNHABITAT, 2010) 
meaning that 4 962 481 Zimbabweans are leaving in cities. In principle the study covers half 
of the urban population. The four named cities provided key informants such as mayors, 
heads of council departments, and councillors. Reasons for delimiting the scholarship on the 
four said cities are based on the fact that the four cities had evident urban political 
contestations during study period. In addition, the four cities constitute the largest urban 
population centers in Zimbabwe. 
 
The study on average retains a national coverage because other key informants are drawn 
from organizations with a national reach. Key informants were drawn from organizations 
involved in urban planning and urban governance on a city-wide and national scale. Time 
boundaries for the study stretch from 2000 to 2012. During this period, urban governance in 
Zimbabwe suffered from an “an authoritarian or guided democracy, which is basically a 
tyranny of the elite that borders on authoritarianism leaving the governed with only limited 
control over the government” (Kamete, 2009b). As a result, urban governance went through 
major political changes that were highly contested leading to severe implications to the 
functioning of urban local authorities. 
 
                                                          
9
 Mutare (188 243), Bulawayo (655 675), Masvingo (88 554), Harare (1 468 767). 
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Politics is confined to formal and informal power relations between central government, 
political parties, non-state actors, and (inter and intra) urban local authorities. This includes 
elections, legislative changes, ministerial policies, Statutory Instruments and directives. 
Urban services under investigation are limited to low cost housing, water and sanitation, road 
infrastructure, management systems, the profession of urban planning, and public transport. 
 
3.2 Sampling Procedure. 
The study is a qualitative research as explained in section 3.3, and purposive sampling forms 
the core method of drawing and selecting respondents. Purposive sampling results in a 
purposive sample; that “provides a clear criterion or rationale for the selection of participants, 
or places to observe, or events that relates to the research questions” (Ezzy, 2002: 74). The 
following criteria were used to select 31 key informants: 
i. Key political figures in urban governance such as mayors and councillors, 
ii. Key administrative heads of urban councils departments, 
iii. Practicing planners within and outside government ministries and departments, 
iv. International development agencies running urban governance programs, 
v. Community based organizations involved in urban governance and urban planning, 
vi. Civil society organizations active in urban governance, 
vii. Political parties with representatives in urban local authorities, 
viii. Research Institutes training urban governance professionals. 
 
Key informants were purposively selected based on the criteria mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph. Purposive samples facilitate the selection of few cases for intensive study 
(Bernard, 2002), which makes the researcher to get an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomena under study. Data from the mentioned sample is collected using the methods 
explained in the following section. 
 
3.3 Data Collection Methods 
The study consists of qualitative research. By definition, qualitative research is an “inquiry 
process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a 
social or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, 
reports detailed views of informants, and conduct the study in a natural setting” (Creswell, 
1998: 15). Thus, qualitative research “is used to describe a set of non-statistical inquiry 
techniques and processes used to gather data about social phenomena” (McNabb, 2010: 225). 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
Collected data is called qualitative data. Qualitative data refers “to some collection of words, 
symbols, pictures, or other non-numeric records, materials, artifacts that are collected by the 
researcher and have relevance to the social group under study” (Ibid.:225). The aim of the 
researcher was to collect data from key informants, create understanding, interpret and 
analyze the data critically. 
 
Devine (1995) argues that qualitative methods play an important role in political analysis 
emanating from the study of individual groups inside a formal political arena. This stems 
from two reasons. First, is that qualitative research allows researchers to record what they see 
and also interpret meanings they get from the study group. Second, qualitative research 
allows flexibility thus permitting the researcher to follow information leads of interest to the 
study. Qualitative methods benefits political analysis as it allows a comprehensive analysis of 
gathered data. To gather qualitative data, the researcher uses key informant interviews, 
document analysis, and literature review and participant observation. These methods are 
detailed in succeeding paragraphs. 
 
3.3.1 In-depth Interviews 
Thirty one (31) key informants were selected according to criteria set in section 3.2. The 
people interviewed are involved in mainstream urban governance work. The researcher 
anticipated that selected key informants possess a rich experience about the impacts of urban 
governance politics to service delivery during the period under study. It was envisaged that 
the key informants were ready and keen to share their experience and understanding about the 
topic under study. Bernard (2002: 189) argues that “good key informants are people to whom 
one can easily talk to, who understand the study information needs and who are glad to give 
information to the researcher”. In selecting the key informants the researcher looked at 
professional, academic and work experience of key informants. 
 
The key informants were drawn from diverse sectors such as central government ministries, 
urban social movements, local authorities, NGOs and International Development Agencies 
Political Parties and Consultants, Practicing Planners and Research Institutes as shown on 
Table 2 (page 32). 
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Table 2: Key Informants by category 
Category Number 
Central Government ministries 5 
Urban Social Movements 5 
Local authorities 6 
NGOs and International Development Agencies 7 
Political Parties 3 
Consultants, Practicing Planners & Research Institutes 5 
Total 31 
Source: Author’s Field Work, 2013. 
 
Field research for this thesis was carried out between June 01 and September 01, 2013. The 
researcher booked appointments and permission for interviews two weeks before the 
proposed interview dates. This was done through emails attaching the letter of filed research 
from the School of Government and the interview guide. The topic was deemed politically 
sensitive by many interviewees. Other senior government officials declined to give the 
researcher an official interview, rather some preferred an informal discussion. The political 
sensitivity of the topic and the nature of Zimbabwean politics (violence, victimization of 
independent opinion and patronage) affected the researcher’s repeated claims for 
interviewees to validate their opinions with concrete evidence. The researcher was often told 
that what he wanted to know further was ‘deep waters’. 
 
Key informant interviews were guided by an interview guide with open ended questions. 
Probing by the researcher provided a technique to follow up on information leads of 
particular interest. Devine (1995: 138) posits that “open ended questions are used to allow the 
interviewee to elaborate on what s/he has said”. Intensive interviewing allowed the researcher 
to record interview nonverbal cues through observation; explore informants’ subjective 
experiences, meanings and interpretation they attach to these experiences. 
 
The researcher relied on field notes taken during the conducting of field research. McNabb 
(2010: 294) defines field notes as “notes, recordings, reminders, and other subjective reports 
that the researcher records while observing behaviors or interviewing respondents”. Field 
notes are detailed and organized reports that the researcher produces from two senses of 
seeing and hearing. Field research is what is done when researchers want to know something 
about people, understand behaviors, or describe a group of people who interact in some way 
(Neuman, 2000). Written notes from the field work were treasured as they were a point of 
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reference at different stages of thesis compilation. Compilation of field notes was done on a 
daily basis so as to assess any information leads coming out. 
 
3.3.2 Document Analysis 
Published and unpublished documents covering urban politics and service delivery were used 
as data collection sources. These documents were accessed from organizations that house the 
key informants as well as the other organizations in general. In particular, the study drew 
information from documents produced by the Government of Zimbabwe, Cities of Harare, 
Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare, and other non-state actors. 
 
3.3.3 Participant Observation 
The researcher’s experience as a practicing planner at Institute for a Democratic Alternative 
for Zimbabwe’s (IDAZIM) Local Governance Centre of Excellence responsible for local 
government research and policy provided some reflections. The researcher’s professional 
experience working with local authorities in Zimbabwe offered critical insights to the study. 
Moreover, the researcher’s experiences as an urban resident in Zimbabwe for the past 15 
years were also useful to the study. 
 
3.3.4 Literature Review 
Extant literature concerning urban governance and politics provides the study with major 
conceptual and theoretical foundations. Literature review shapes the direction of the study. 
The theoretical approach found in literature is used in conceptualizing and contextualizing the 
study. Literature concerning urban governance impacts to service delivery is used as data 
validation sources for research findings. 
 
The meaning, process and context of the phenomena under study were captured by four data 
collection methods that are key informant interviews, document analysis, participant 
observation and literature review. The afore-mentioned methods provided the researcher with 
an understanding of political processes within urban local authorities and the attendant 
impacts to service delivery. The political events within the urban setting are analyzed in 
greater detail from the obtained data. The next logical step after data collection is data 
processing and analysis which is discussed in the ensuing section. 
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3.4 Data processing methods 
Data collected using methods described in section 3.3 were analyzed, presented and 
interpreted in chapter five and six (Research findings). Data processing is disaggregated into 
two processes: data management and data analysis. Managing data began with organizing the 
data collection process. Pre-planning, securing entry and granting of permission by key 
informants were prioritized as a key data management process. The researcher kept a detailed 
record of all field work steps and processes. Collected data were stored in format befitting 
data qualities.  
 
Interpretation is at the heart of qualitative research process. Data analysis is condensed into 
three interpretation processes which are (i) data reduction (ii) data display, and (iii) drawing 
conclusions from data (McNabb, 2010: 288). These three processes are explained in detail in 
the subsequent paragraphs. 
 
3.4.1 Data reduction 
Not all collected data founds its way in chapter five and six (Research Findings). The 
researcher organized collected data into six service delivery categories that are; low cost 
housing, water and sanitation, road infrastructure, management systems, the profession of 
urban planning, and public transport. This process is called conceptualization as it entails 
breaking down large data into workable and ordered bits of information. Conceptualization 
enabled the researcher to have data that is manageable with some degree of confidence. 
Contact summaries that are notes summarizing all questions from a key informant were 
prepared on a daily basis. Summaries around six defined service delivery themes were 
developed from contact summaries. The researcher checked for similarities and differences 
after clustering data in to six defined service delivery themes. This process is called 
comparative data analysis. 
 
Comparative data analysis, according to Miles and Huberman (1994: 254) is a process of 
‘drawing and verifying conclusions’ in qualitative data studies. In actual fact, comparative 
data analysis serves as an “analytical tool used to stimulate thinking about properties and 
dimensions of categories” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 73). Comparison helped the researcher 
in asking further questions of particular interest to the study. 
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3.4.2 Data Display 
Data are displayed in both descriptive and summary statistics such as direct and indirect 
quotations, profiles, narratives and graphic diagrams to show relationships, and interactions 
of urban governance politics and service delivery. Methods of data display are aimed at 
organizing and focusing information so as to allow the researcher to draw conclusions with 
easy. The explanations to be described and the type of data available determine how the data 
is displayed. 
 
3.4.3 Drawing Conclusions from Data 
The researcher prepares preliminary thematic summary reports (one per service delivery 
theme). Thematic summaries show vital information from collected data and thus can be 
incorporated partially or wholesale in the research findings chapters. Thematic summaries 
feed into major constructs or explanations. Combining constructs, themes and field notes with 
the researcher’s analysis and synthesis forms the core of the research findings. This is a rather 
tedious and important process as it involves a number of activities such as  
 
Assembling evidence, arguments, and conclusions into a report is always a crucial step; but 
more than in quantitative approaches, the careful crafting of evidence and explanation makes or 
breaks (qualitative) research. A researcher distils mountains of evidence into exposition and 
prepares extensive footnotes. She or he weaves together evidence and arguments to 
communicate a coherent, convincing picture to readers (Neuman, 2000: 395). 
 
The researcher employs analytical research skills during the process distilling explanations 
and conclusions from collected data. 
 
3.5 Ethics Statement 
This study used primary data collected from key informants through in-depth interviews. 
Carrying out the research in a contested and polarized political environment raised some 
ethical concerns. The researcher was fully aware of the sensitivity and volatility of carrying 
out socio-political research at a time when Zimbabwe was heading for elections. Most key 
informants raised concerns about the political sensitivity of the subject under study and 
therefore the confidentiality of their views is an important aspect.  However, there are key 
informants who were keen in divulging their confidentiality; hence they are quoted directly in 
the thesis. The primary responsibility of the researcher was to investigate and state the 
findings in an integral manner. Permission to interview senior city officials was granted in 
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writing from the city of Harare. The results will be made available to policy makers, research 
institutions, and research participants. The research was conducted in alignment with quality, 
integrity and ethical research standards. 
 
3.6 Research Limitations and Conclusion 
Qualitative methods are sometimes portrayed as unrepresentative and atypical, with its 
findings seen as impressionistic, piecemeal and idiosyncratic (Devine, 1995). In addition, 
qualitative research methodologies are often castigated as posing difficulties in replication 
and comparability making it not suitable for making generalizations. Despite these criticisms, 
the method remains critical in extracting and explaining people’s views inside and outside 
political systems and the ontological and epistemological positions of defined practitioners. 
 
The 2013 harmonized elections in Zimbabwe posed some challenges to this study. Several 
high ranking officials who had been targeted by this study (councillors, mayors, and cabinet 
ministers) kept on postponing interviews dates. Politicians were busy campaigning and the 
researcher had difficulties to arrange for interviews. Nonetheless, the researcher had to 
concentrate on key informants who were available. 
 
The chapter discussed the research methodology used to examine urban patterns in 
Zimbabwe. Study delimitation, sampling procedure, data collection process, and data 
processing methods were explained. The chapter concluded by highlighting possible 
limitations and research gaps resulting from the chosen research methodologies. The study 
narrows down in the next chapter to explain Zimbabwe’s urban governance and urbanization 
context. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ZIMBABWE’S URBAN GOVERNANCE AND 
URBANIZATION CONTEXT. 
 
This chapter outlines the context of Zimbabwe’s urban governance system by looking at 
historical and recent trends in urban governance and urbanization. Since British conquest in 
1890, local government in Zimbabwe kept on changing to suit the needs of the government in 
power. Post-independent Zimbabwe introduced some reforms, though largely central 
government retains control in local government matters. In both pre and post-independence 
Zimbabwe, local government is a political muscle that any ruling regime manipulates, 
associate with and advance certain political interests. First, I outline in brief Zimbabwe’s pre-
independence local government in the ensuing section. 
 
4.1 Pre-Independence Local Government Context (1890-1980). 
Like in most African states, the growth and emergence of local government was inextricably 
linked to colonialism. Local government in Zimbabwe was largely determined by the racial 
system of land apportionment between blacks and whites (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1991).  A two 
tier local government system existed that is; a more self-governing system for the white 
minority and a separate system for the indigenous majority. The system was designed to 
maintain peace and order within the black population, and to ensure continued black 
contribution to the settler economy. There were urban, rural and African Councils, with the 
first two covering ‘white or European’ areas. African councils were designated to ‘African or 
black areas’. In the resultant paragraphs, I break down local government into rural and urban. 
 
The 1923 ‘Responsible Government Constitution’ marked the beginning of institutionalized 
rural local government as Native Councils were created for the first time in African areas. 
The Native Councils Act of 1937 led to the creation of formal Native Councils composed of 
chiefs, headman, and local black nominees. Thereafter, the 1957 African Councils Act 
broadened powers of African Councils to include making bye-laws, imposing rates, and 
exercising powers comparable to those of a town council. The 1966 Rural Councils Act was 
enacted and catered for commercial farmers and the formalization of existing road 
committees (Jordan, 1984).  The 1980 District Councils Act replaced 220 ‘African Councils’ 
with 55 District Councils, though fragmentation existed as Rural Councils were found in 
former ‘European areas’.  
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Makumbe (1998) asserts that the Salisbury Sanitary Board of 1891 marked the beginning of 
urban local government. The Town Management Ordinance of 1894 established more 
sanitary boards in the main towns of Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru (Matumbike and 
Muchadenyika, forthcoming). Afterwards, the Municipal Ordinance of 1897 granted 
municipal status to Salisbury (Harare) and Bulawayo, with wholly elected councils 
(Chakaipa, 2010). The Municipal Act (1930) and Urban Councils Act (1973) provided the 
legal framework for urban local authorities. Town planning services were categorized 
according to race, with African townships having limited services as compared to European 
areas. Most pre-independence changes (institutional and legislative) took place in rural than 
in urban areas mainly because the colonial government was trying to manage the ‘African 
areas’ which were increasingly becoming restless and revolutionary. In cities, African 
housing was tightly controlled and restricted to those formally employed. Rural-urban 
migration controls were a way of managing urban African population and matching it with 
the under provision of services in African areas. 
 
Zimbabwe’s urban development history is inextricably linked to colonialism. Colonialism 
brought a new socio-economic and political fabric in the form of the densification of the built 
environment in what became known as towns and cities. The aim here is not to detail pre-
independence urban development but suffice to mention its importance in designing and 
shaping the form and structure of present day Zimbabwean cities. From pre-independence, 
the study details the post-independence urbanization and urban governance in the succeeding 
section. 
4.2 Periodization of Urbanization and Urban Governance in Post-Independent 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe inherited a dichotomous and tripartite local government framework comprised of 
urban councils, ‘white’ rural councils and ‘black’ rural local authorities fragmented along 
racial lines (Masundu-Nyamayaro, 2008). Fragmentation in rural local government was 
eliminated in the 1988 Rural District Councils Act, which amalgamated ‘white’ rural councils 
and ‘black’ rural local authorities into rural district councils. At the national level, 
independent Zimbabwe inherited a highly centralized system of government, founded and 
built upon racial lines (Helmsing, 1991).  In pursuit of the twin objectives of socio-economic 
development and the reduction of colonial disparities, local government changes through, 
legislation, directives, and policy pronouncements were made after independence.   
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Local government reforms of the 1980s, designed to achieve several development objectives 
such as rural, urban and regional development, are evident. The main purpose of urban local 
governments is to manage urbanization and its related processes. Post-independence 
urbanization and urban governance can be analyzed in four distinct phases. These are the 
decentralization period (1980-1990), urban governance reforms (1990-2000), change and 
contestation period (2000-2008) and deepening contestation and confusion (2008-2012). 
After setting out a brief introduction to Zimbabwe’s post-independent local governance 
context, the study focuses on the decentralization period (1980-1990) in the next section. 
 
4.2.1 1980-1990 (Decentralization Period). 
Post-1980, urban development pursued a one city concept aimed at deracializing cities. 
Despite this attempt, Wekwete (1994) argues that the income and physical fabric of the built 
environment show potency to segregation. Initial attempts at local governance reforms were 
imbued in decentralization. Decentralization in Zimbabwe expended much rhetoric leading to 
a number of practical challenges as the government showed more romanticism than realism. 
As Rondinelli and Nellis, point out most decentralization policies are undertaken for 
primarily political reasons; and how the policy works out in practice will depend on similar 
struggles (Conyers, 1986). Objective wise; the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) achieved 
political as compared to urban and development planning benefits in the decentralization 
program. 
 
The 1984 and 1985 Prime Minister’s Directive10 outlined the new local government 
structures and introduced development committees at village, ward, district, provincial, and 
national levels with the aim of fostering bottom up planning. Roles of these committees 
included information supply, implementation, delegated and independent planning, and 
policy making and review (Gasper, 1991). Development priorities were identified and 
formulated at village level, channeled through the ward, district, and provincial levels to the 
national level. The basic premise was that contents of the national development plan should 
be development priorities discussed and prioritized at the village and ward level. 
 
                                                          
10
 As enunciated in three government documents that is a) ‘The Provincial Governors and Local Authorities in 
Zimbabwe: A Statement of Policy and directive by the Prime Minister’ released in 1984, b) ‘The Provincial 
Councils and Administration Act, 1985’, c) ‘Structure of Village Development Committees and Extension 
Services’ released in 1985. 
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In practice, development planning agencies suffered time and budgetary constraints, lack of 
skilled personnel and central government interference in local decision making. As a result, 
created development planning agencies became insignificant and fruitless. By the end of the 
first decade of decentralization, it was clear that the process had failed to yield anticipated 
results as Brand (1991) likened the process to “centrally created decentralization”. It is 
evident that central government was not committed to the letter and spirit of making local 
government a distinct sphere. Gasper (1991:41) point out that: 
 
Decentralization can never simply be instituted by a set of legal or administrative decrees. It 
required many measures of information dissemination, demonstration, incentives, training, 
discussion, mobilization, and ongoing informal coordination. 
 
In addition, the 1980 Urban Councils Act introduced universal adult suffrage by repealing 
the 1973 Urban Councils Act which was premised on colonial property franchise. 
Oppressive migration laws were repealed and massive rural-urban migration ensued. 
Urban population growth ballooned as shown in table 3 section 4.4. The first decade did 
not yield expected reforms to foster improved local governance. Post-1990 reforms aimed 
at strengthening urban governance are explained in the following section. 
 
4.2.2 1990-2000 (Urban Governance Reforms). 
In the 1990s, the objective of the government’s decentralization programme shifted to 
promoting democracy and the focus of attention turned to elected local authorities (Conyers, 
2003). Local governments play a pivotal role in the promotion of local participation and local 
level democracy. To that effect, it became necessary to democratize local governments in the 
post-1990 period. An important vehicle used in the democratization process is elections 
(Laakso, 1999) which started in 1993 in rural district councils and 1995 in urban councils. 
The introduction of local government elections was a landmark development as citizens 
became active agents of deciding who runs the local level. 
 
The introduction of a directly elected executive mayor in 1995 marked a major change in 
urban governance. The move was aimed at strengthening representational democracy as 
urban residents were given the right to elect the political and administrative head of urban 
councils. Despite this development, the Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 17) argues that:  
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The Executive Mayor is a poor hybrid of the traditional British style Mayor and the American 
Strong Mayor…. Unlike the American strong Mayors who are executives with appointing and 
dismissing powers and veto powers, the Zimbabwe Executive Mayor is accountable to full 
council. In real terms, the Executive Mayor gained no executive authority. Attempts by 
Executive Mayors to assume executive functions have often led to clashes between the Mayor 
and Town Clerks.  
 
Several practical challenges ensued in cases where the mayor was not from the ruling party 
(Zanu-PF). Such mayors were castigated by central government as pursuing parallel policies. 
The Executive mayoral system resulted in a tug of war between the Mayor and Town Clerk. 
Such conflicts were premised on overlapping and duplication of roles and responsibilities. 
 
Furthermore, the World Bank’s Urban I and II which started in the 1980s continued in the 
1990s focusing “upon improving urban services and strengthening city governance…the 
project did make useful investments in sites and services, basic urban infrastructure and 
community health and education services in low income areas”. Post-2000 exposed the 
intensity of the outcome of political decentralization as the MDC controlled urban councils. 
Central government reacted by heavily interfering in local government, defeating the whole 
purpose of decentralization. Government’s attempts can be likened to re/centralization. In the 
subsequent section, I focus on urban political struggles between 2000 and 2008. 
 
4.2.3 2000-2008 (Change and Contestation Period). 
Politics became a central destabilizing factor to post-2000 urban governance. The autonomy 
and functioning of urban government institutions became more contested than in previous 
decades as central government tried to wrest control of MDC controlled local authorities. A 
‘cat and mouse’ relationship ensued between central and local government. .The rise and 
ascendancy of MDC in urban local government resulted in serious confrontations between 
state and local level. This was mainly because the ruling party had lost the control of most 
local authorities in elections and used any means possible to re/centralizes local government. 
Box 1 (page 42) shows the rapid deterioration of local governance due to political 
contestations.  
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Ranger (2007) argues that, since 2000 the Zimbabwean state has radically intervened in urban 
local government. Ultimately, the sacking of opposition executive mayors
11
 and their 
replacements with commissions loyal to Zanu-PF ensued. Terrence Ranger acutely puts it: 
 
Elected executive mayors have been dismissed; whole municipal councils have been sacked; 
commissions appointed by the state have attempted to run cities. A whole series of new state 
authorities - governors for both Harare and Bulawayo; district administrators for the townships 
- have been inserted above and into the cities (Ranger, 2007). 
 
For Harare city, after the sacking of the mayor and the subsequent resignation of a number of 
councillors in protest, the situation became worse as of December 2004, when there were not 
enough elected councillors remained to form a quorum (Kamete, 2009a). In accordance with 
the Urban Councils Act, the local government minister appointed commissioners to run city 
affairs. The commission’s term must not exceed six months and it was scheduled to end in 
June 2005. Ironically, the local government minister re-appointed the commission again and 
extending the commission’s term in violation of Section 80 (3) of the Urban Councils Act.  
 
Chirisa and Jonga (2009) sum it as the ‘defeat of democracy in council business’. At the 
height of central government interference in local authorities was the formers’ instigation of 
the infamous Operation Murambatsvina / Restore Order in 2005. The GoZ embarked on an 
operation to ‘clean filth’ in cities on May 19, 2005 in contravention to eviction regulations 
stipulated under the country’s Regional, Town and Country Planning Act (Part V, Section 35) 
and against the right to housing conferred in Article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of 
                                                          
11
 Mayors sacked and replaced by commissions: Harare (Mudzuri), Chitungwiza (Shoko), Chegutu (Dhlakama) 
and Mutare (Kagurabadza). 
Box 1: The deterioration of local governance due to political contestations. 
 
Zimbabwe represents the example of a country that once had very robust institutions of local governance 
especially in the urban centers but the powers and resources of these institutions have systematically 
degraded over time as a result of political developments at the national level. A 1994 study by this author 
(Oluwu, Dele) found the Zimbabwean city of Harare and Kariba to manifest all the indicators of a sound 
local governance system at par with similar capital cities in South Africa (Cape Town and Durban), India 
(Bombay) and Canada (Toronto). In fact, in some important respects, the two sample Zimbabwean cities 
were better managed than some cities in India (Delhi and Hydebrad) and Nigeria (Lagos and Kano). Within 
a decade, most of these elements of good governance had been eroded as a result of the power struggle at the 
national center, one of whose elements is what I now understand to be major constitutional amendment on 
municipal government to neutralize the growing power of the opposition to the ruling party especially in the 
cities of Bulawayo and Harare. 
 
Source: Olowu, 2009: 117-18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
 
Human Rights. Operation Restore Order, a demolition and eviction campaign led by the 
military and police affected an estimated 700,000 people in cities across the country who lost 
homes, livelihood sources or both and indirectly affecting 2,4 million people (Tibaijuka, 
2005). The Operation shows the authority and supremacy of political interference from 
central government cementing the relegation of urban councils political and administration 
authority. 
 
The Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development is not held accountable 
constitutionally for his actions because local government is not constitutionally empowered 
(RBZ, 2004). Chaos, contestation and confusion characterized Zimbabwe’s local government 
system. Local government legislature that is; the Urban Councils Act, and Regional, Town 
and Country Planning Act give unrestricted powers to the minister who  often (ab)use the 
office for political expediency. Hence, local authorities have been turned into political 
battlegrounds rather than avenues of service delivery. The resultant effect has been the poor 
delivery in key human development services such as water and sanitation, housing, 
education, energy and transport in local authority areas (Ranger, 2007). 
 
The battle to control urban areas saw the GoZ empowering the Zimbabwe National Water 
Authority (ZINWA), a government parastatal supreme to all water resources and related 
infrastructure. In June 2006, the GoZ issued a directive compelling all local authorities to 
transfer all water and sewer services to ZINWA. The shift was meant to weaken the sphere of 
influence of local authorities. Most urban councils lost substantially as water and sewer 
infrastructure were transferred at no cost. ZINWA presided over a cholera epidemic which 
claimed over 4,000 lives (ICG, 2009). Realizing the big mistake, GoZ shifted all water and 
sewer functions to local authorities in January 2009. The move attracted much resistance as 
ZINWA did not want to relinquish assets as well as the refusal by urban councils to take over 
a bloated and politically appointed workforce. The contestation and confusion deepened 
further after the 2008 elections as explained in the next section. 
 
4.2.4 2008-2012 (Deepening Contestation and Confusion). 
The executive mayoral system was abolished in 2008 and the ceremonial mayoral system was 
reintroduced (Chirisa and Jonga, 2009). The Urban Councils Act was amended to include (i) 
the abolishment of the executive mayoral system reintroducing the ceremonial mayoral 
system, and (ii) the appointment of special interests councilors as well as the appointment by 
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the local government minister of ceremonial mayors who did not have to be councilors. 
Reversion to the ceremonial mayoral system can be argued as an attempt to scuttle MDC 
controlled urban councils. Section 114 of the Urban Councils Act gives the Minister of local 
government the powers to suspend and dismiss elected councillors. Ministerial powers 
overshadow the will of citizens, destabilizing the functioning of a representative democracy. 
A political party in control of central government can (ab)use section 114 to frustrate citizens 
choices at local authority level (Musekiwa, 2012: 239). 
 
Unfettered powers of the local government minister such as appointing special interest 
councillors, senior city management staff and setting conditions of service for councillors, 
and staff, suspending and dismissing councillors, further increases the contestations at urban 
governance level. The Urban Councils Act allows the local government minister to appoint 
special interest councillors though one can argue that, there is nothing special they bring to 
council chambers except Zanu-PF loyalty. In conformance to Statutory Instrument 94 of 
2010, the Minister of Local Government appointed 86 special interest councillors to 
compliment the 389 elected councillors. Unexpectedly, “most appointed councillors in urban 
councils turned out to be Zanu-PF candidates who had lost elections” (Musekiwa, 2012: 245). 
Musekiwa argues that, special interest councillors are there to protect Zanu-PF interests and 
make MDC controlled urban councils ungovernable (Ibid.: 246). Therefore, the goal of 
central government through the local government ministry seems not to foster service 
delivery but rather to make MDC urban councils fail. 
  
The March 2008 harmonized presidential, parliamentary and local government elections 
brought major changes to the governance of urban councils. All municipalities, town councils 
and town boards remained MDC strongholds, with the MDC winning the majority of Ward 
seats (EISA, 2008). Chakaipa (2010) notes that in the 2008 elections, MDC won 29 Urban 
Councils, and Zanu-PF 1 out of the 30 Urban Councils. Presidential elections were 
inconclusive heralding the inauguration of the Inclusive Government in January 2009 
composed of two MDC formations and Zanu-PF. The election result sealed the total rejection 
of Zanu-PF by the urban electorate. At the same time, the result signaled the trust given to the 
MDC by urban residents. In practice, the election result ushered in another ‘urban governance 
war’ as Zanu-PF launched a spirited and heterodox comeback. In addition to contestation, the 
situation got worse as most of the elected councillors were mere party activists with limited 
or no experiences in public governance.  
 
 
 
 
 45 
 
After 2008, Zimbabwe entered a difficult, tortuous and protracted transition (Masunungure 
and Shumba, 2012). It was expected that the transition ushers in transitional governance 
arrangements aimed at improving service delivery. Transitional governance is used here to 
refer to the systematic introduction of new forms of governance at local government level 
(Williams, 1999). Table 3 shows the firing and dismissal MDC elected councillors and 
mayors during the transitional period. 
 
Table 3: Interference of Central Government in Urban Councils During the Transition Period. 
Local Authority No. of Councillors 
suspended 
No. of Councillors 
dismissed. 
No. of Councillors whose 
suspensions were lifted 
Bindura Town 
Council 
          3            2           1 
Chitungwiza 
Municipality 
          2            2  
Harare City Council           9            6           3 
Rusape Town 
Council 
          7            5           2 
Total          21           16          6 
Source: Musekiwa, 2012: 239. 
 
During the transition, most urban councils were marked by contestation and confusion as 
Zanu-PF tried to regain control of the urban constituency. Table 3 shows 21 suspended 
councillors with 16 of them totally dismissed by the minister of local government between 
September 2008 and January 2012. All suspended councillors are from the MDC, amply 
demonstrating the conflict laden with urban governance in Zimbabwe. Moreover, in May-
June 2012, the local government minister suspended the mayor, deputy mayor and one 
councilor in Chinhoyi municipality (Muchadenyika, 2013).  
 
To further show the deeper contestation in urban governance, I put into perspective political 
contradictions in Mutare city council. Mutare is the fourth largest city in Zimbabwe and is 
situated in the Eastern highlands providing a gateway to Mozambique. Over the past decade 
the population of the city has more than doubled to around 188 243. Between 2008 and 2013, 
the city was dominated by MDC councillors under the leadership of MDC Mayor Brian 
James. Despite significant progress by the local authority to improve service delivery, 
contestation resulted in the mayor being suspended and finally dismissed. Box 2 (page 46) 
portrays the unending central government desire to fire MDC councillors based on contested 
grounds. It can be argued that, the firing of MDC councillors is a Zanu-PF strategy to 
destabilize the functioning of local authorities. Ultimately, in Zimbabwe the efficacy of 
multi-party urban councils is queried. 
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The suspension and dismissal of Mutare City mayor came despite the fact that Mutare City 
council has won two Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce Cleanest City award (2010 
and 2011) and Best Performing Urban Local Authority in Waste Management award at the 
2013 Zimbabwe International Trade Fair. This demonstrates the ministers’ spirited efforts to 
undermine the performance of MDC led councils as way of de-campaigning the MDC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The contradictions in urban local authorities are not only inter-party but also intra-party. In 
February 2010, the MDC fired all its 24 councillors in Chitungwiza municipality citing 
corruption, misdeeds and defiance to party directives. The MDC spokesman argued: 
Box 2: Contestations in Mutare City Council 
The minister of local government wrote a letter in March 2010 to Mayor Brian James titled Remedial 
Intervention 11. The minister mentioned with concern Mayor Brian James’s refusal to accept directives 
from the ministry. The letter read “Remember for avoidance of doubt, that section 313 as read with 
section 314 of the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) empowers me as the minister to: i. Give direction 
on matters of policy and ii. Reverse, suspend, rescind resolutions, decisions etc. of councils”. 
The letter noted the following: 
- Dismissal of Councilor Mukorera from the office of deputy mayor which should have been a 
ministerial role. 
- Refusal by the council to award exit packages to (Zanu-PF appointed) commissioners running 
the city prior to the current council. 
- Refusal by the council to conclude land sales between Mr. Manyuchi, Mr. Chinjekure (top Zanu-
PF officials) and the previous city administration (commission). 
- The role distinction between administrative staff (led by the Town Clerk) and a ceremonial 
mayor. 
In a letter dated 19
th
 January 2012 the local government minister suspended Mutare Mayor Brian James 
citing “…reports of misconduct continue to come to my office implying that you are unrepentant. This 
leaves me with no option other than to invoke section 114 of the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) to 
suspend you from being a councilor (Ward 12) for Mutare City, with immediate effect”. The letter was not 
explicit on the basis of suspension except the word ‘misconduct’ which is vague. The mayor was evicted 
from his office by Zanu-PF youth under the supervision of Mr. Chinjekure (a Zanu-PF official in Mutare). 
Here, it raises questions as to the role and interests of Zanu-PF, a mere political party. 
Afterwards, the local government minister appointed a ‘partisan’ five member team to ascertain the 
allegations leveled against the mayor. The investigation team’s findings were never made public. It could 
be argued that by not providing clear allegations as contained in the minister’s 2010 letter and that the 
mayors’ eviction was supervised by Zanu-PF implies a grand plan to undermine MDC’s support base. It 
can also be argued that the partisan investigation committee manufactured allegations in order to ratify the 
Ministers’ decision. The mayor was finally dismissed by the local government minister in April 2013 
citing cases of ‘mismanagement, misconduct and insubordination’.  
 
Sources: Mayor Brian James’s Remedial Intervention 11 and suspension letter; News Agencies (News 
Day, Voice of America, The Herald, Financial Gazette. 
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They (expelled councillors) are no longer MDC councillors. They have been fired for lack of 
good governance, accountability, failure to deliver and to live up to the mandate given them by 
the people. They have also been dismissed for defying the party. They have been fired for 
placing wrong priorities in the discharge of their duties – it’s a whole litany of complaints from 
residents and the party that has necessitated their dismissal (Chipangura, 2010).  
 
The MDC Chitungwiza mayor Israel Marange had been jailed for corruption and the 
councillors defied the party’s directive on who should take over the post. However, the 
councillors remained in office as the local government minister refused to dismiss them. 
 
In April, 2012 the MDC set up a probe team to investigate all MDC controlled councils in the 
country. The party argued that reasons for the probe were aimed at reclaiming ‘Zimbabwe’s 
self-respect, a climate of accountability, and pushing for zero tolerance on corruption and all 
evils’ (MDC, 2012). Basing on the findings of the probe team, the MDC expelled 12 
councillors
12
 in August 2012 citing corruption and mismanagement of office. The local 
government minister did not suspend the councillors arguing that the MDC did not inform the 
parent ministry of the allegations. The councillors continued in office since according to the 
Urban Councils Act suspension, and dismissal powers are vested in the local government 
minister. The next section looks at the prevailing urban governance and planning law.  
 
4.3 Urban Governance and Planning Law: Powers and functions of local 
government 
During the period under study (2000-2012), local government in Zimbabwe was not 
constitutionalized
13
 (Olowu, 2010) but a legislative creation. Zimbabwe had a unitary system 
of government, where local government (sub national) entities exercise their powers by virtue 
of the ultra vires (beyond the powers) principle. Local government powers are specifically 
delegated by central government, which can override the formers’ decisions. Central 
government supervises local government through the MLGRUD allowing the former to 
prevent the unlawful use of funds and other property of local authorities, prevent corruption, 
or improve the performance of local authorities (Machingauta, 2010). 
 
                                                          
12
 Harare (Deputy Mayor Emmanuel Chiroto, Peter Marange, Phumulani Musagwiza, and Xavier Vengesai), 
Gweru ( Mayor Tedious Chimombe,  Clemence Kwaru and Holly Dzuda), Bindura (Iveory Matanhire, Vengai 
Mudadi, Rickson Kaseke), Zvishavane (Alois Zhou) and Kwekwe (Johanees Ngozo). 
13
 The 2013 Constitution constitutionalizes local government. 
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Two main local government Acts
14
 provide the framework of urban governance in 
Zimbabwe. The management and administration of urban areas is governed by the Urban 
Councils Act (Chap 29:15). The Act: 
 
provides for the establishment of municipalities and towns and the administration of 
municipalities and towns by local boards, municipal and town councils; to provide for the 
conferring of town and city status on growth points, municipalities and towns; to provide for 
the declaration of local government areas and the administration of local government areas by 
local boards; to confer functions and powers and impose duties upon municipal and town 
councils and local boards; to provide for the establishment of the Local Government Board and 
to provide for the functions thereof; and to provide for matters connected with or incidental to 
the foregoing. 
 
In terms of urban planning the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act (Chap 29:12), 
Revised Edition of 1996 reign supreme. The Act provides:  
 
for the planning of regions, districts and local areas with the object of conserving and 
improving the physical environment and in particular promoting health, safety, order, amenity, 
convenience and general welfare, as well as efficiency and economy in the process of 
development and the improvement of communications; to authorize the making of regional 
plans, master plans and local plans, whether urban or rural; to provide for the protection of 
urban and rural amenities and the preservation of buildings and trees and generally to regulate 
the appearance of the townscape and landscape; to provide for the acquisition of land; to 
provide for the control over development, including use, of land and buildings; to regulate the 
subdivision and the consolidation of pieces of land; and to provide for matters incidental to or 
connected with the foregoing.  
 
A number of allied Acts aid the governance of urban local authorities and the urban 
development process. These include the Land Survey Act (Chap 20:12), Land Acquisition 
Act (Chap 20:10), Model Building Bye-Laws (1977), Environmental Management Act (Chap 
20:27), Housing Control Act (Chap 29:08), Minerals and Mining Act (Chap 21:05), Public 
Health Act (Chap 15:09) among others. Gazing into the future, consolidating legislation 
pertaining to urban governance and planning are important overtures. 
 
                                                          
14
 These are Regional Town and Country Planning Act (Chap 29:12), and Urban Councils Act (Chap 29:15). 
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Urban governments perform legislative and executive powers. Mandatory and permissive 
functions such as development, forward planning, financial, governance and regulatory 
(Mushamba, 2010) form the basis of local authority operations. These powers and functions 
are derived from the Urban Councils Act, and the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act. 
Local governments in Zimbabwe perform legislative and executive functions. Executive 
functions enable local authorities to: 
i. Make, adopt and implement policies, 
ii. Administer local government areas; and 
iii. Enforce local laws (by-laws) (Mushamba, 2010: 105). 
 
Through the Urban Councils Act (Chap 29: 15), urban local authorities have power over 
immovable property, construction of sidewalks, hiring and firing of junior council employees, 
sewerage and drainage, water, parking, omnibuses and other transport services, valuation and 
assessment of property for rating, and finance and budgeting. Part XV, sections 198-222 of 
the Urban Councils Act outlines other powers of urban councils. These powers relate to 54 
development functions outlined in the Second Schedule of the Urban Councils Act. These 
include but not limited to: 
i. General powers (flexible as the local authority or local government minister decides 
the interpretation and use of such powers), 
ii. Enforcement of conditions of title on property and buildings, 
iii. Fire brigade services, 
iv. Tendering (local government minister has powers to compile of contractors and 
determine contractor eligibility to contracting) and contracting, 
v. Procurement (local government minister has powers to make regulations that affect 
the operation of municipal procurement boards), 
vi. Construction, maintenance and working of railway service sidings, 
vii. Estate development (local government minister has powers to work on behalf of 
councils regarding estate development), 
viii. Numbering of houses and naming of roads (re-naming of roads require ministerial 
approval), 
ix. Prohibition and regulation of use of ramps or similar devices, 
x. Electricity, 
xi. Street lighting, 
xii. Refuse collection, 
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xiii. Fixing tariffs and charges or deposits (lease agreements require ministerial approval), 
xiv. Right of entry to and use of land, 
xv. Undertaking income generating projects with written approval from the minister, 
xvi. Establishment of cooperatives with written approval of the minister. 
 
However, it is important to highlight that central government has the powers to vary, redefine 
and reassign local government powers. A case in point is electricity, the Urban Councils Act 
mandates local authorities run, and operate electricity plans tans generators. Despite this, the 
GoZ in 1987 took over ownership of Harare Thermal Power Station without compensation to 
the Harare City Council. Even today, the title deeds of the power station in question show the 
legitimate owner as Harare city council. 
 
Planning related functions and powers of local governments are stipulated in the Regional 
Town and Country Planning Act. These include master and local planning, control of 
development, subdivisions and consolidations, and acquisition and disposal of land. To 
summarize the discussion on powers of local governments, I put a comparison of the main 
powers of local and central governments in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of local and central government powers 
Local Government Central Government 
1. Plan and implement local 
development. 
2. Manage water and sanitation. 
3. Provide and maintain roads. 
4. Manage education and health. 
5. Manage refuse removal. 
6. Provide housing and serviced 
stands. 
7. Manage cemeteries. 
8. Carry out social welfare. 
1. Establish, abolish or alter local government status. 
2. Fix the area of a local authority (number of wards and thus 
Councillors). 
3. Approve the getting or taking over of land by the local authority. 
4. Carry out planning and estate development. 
5. Appoint the Local Government Board. 
6. Appoint a Valuation Board. 
7. Appoint auditors. 
8. Appoint an investigating team where an inquiry is needed. 
9. Suspend or dismiss councillors who have committed serious offences. 
10. Appoint a commissioner to run the affairs of a Council when there 
are no councillors. 
11. Give general direction on policy. 
12. Authorize anything not covered by the Act. 
13. Publish model by-laws, direct Councils to adopt specific by-laws and 
approve Council developed by-laws. 
14. Suspend a Council resolution when it goes against the interests of 
residents. 
15. Correct any omissions. 
17. Regulate accounting and loans. 
18. Prescribe amounts beyond which Councils should seek tenders. 
19. Approve income generating projects and co-operatives. 
20. Direct Councils to pay their debts and reduce deficits. 
21. State what types of local charges can be raised without approval. 
Source: ACPDT, 2002 and Chatiza, 2010. 
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The majority of central government functions stipulated in Table 4 are carried out by the 
local government minister. Table 4 summarizes the operating environments of local 
governments in Zimbabwe, in which central government wields more power in the running of 
local government affairs as compared to local government. 
 
Unlike in other countries
15
 urban governance in Zimbabwe does not enjoy autonomy as it 
performs the functions conferred to it by central government. The functions, while defined in 
law are open to central government variation and re-assignment to other state agencies 
(Chatiza, 2010: 14). In this regard, central government determines the birth, growth and 
demise of local government compromising the functioning of the latter. Pre and post-
independence policy and structural developments have sustained centre-local relations that 
undermine the emergence of sound local governance (Ibid, 2010). To fully appreciate 
Zimbabwe’s urban governance and urbanization context, the study discusses the state of 
urbanization and service delivery in the following section. 
 
4.4 Current state of Urban Governance, Urbanization levels and Service 
Delivery. 
Urban governance is part of the broader local government system. Local government refers to 
the sub-national level of government (Mushamba, 2010). Appointees and democratically 
elected officials form the core of urban administration. Urban governance resembles a more 
decentralized and democratic system than in rural councils. The Urban Councils Act (Chap 
29:15) governs the administration of urban areas. As of 2010 there were 7 city councils, 9 
municipalities, 11 town councils and 4 local boards (Mushamba, 2010).  
Urban local authorities have undergone and survived a turbulent political and economic 
period and have emerged severely battered and bruised (GoZ, 2009). Urbanization in 
Zimbabwe has not been associated with corresponding economic growth and 44% of 
Harare’s population is composed of young people (5-25years) (UNHABITAT, 2010).  As a 
result, the youth bulge puts a huge strain on urban services like housing, employment, 
education, infrastructure, and participatory governance. For comparative purposes table 5 
looks at past, existing and projected levels of urbanization in Zimbabwe from 1950 to 2050. 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Examples include South Africa, Uganda, and Tanzania. 
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Table 5: Urbanization levels in Zimbabwe from 1950 – 2050 (in percentages). 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
10,64 12,61 17,36 22,37 28,99 33,76 38,25 43,92 50,71 57,67 64,35 
Source: UNHABITAT, 2010. 
 
The growth of urbanization was accompanied by a tremendous increase in the urban 
population. Better economic and social service opportunities found in cities explain rural-
urban migration. To disaggregate Table 5 into city specific population figures, I put into 
perspective population growth estimates in Zimbabwe’s major cities from 1982 to 2012. 
 
Table 6: Demographic Trends in Major Zimbabwean Towns and cities (1982-2012). 
Name of urban 
centre 
                                                          Year 
 1982  1992   2002
16
  2012
17
 
Harare 656 000 1 184 169 1 435 784 1 468 767
18
 
Bulawayo 414 000    621 742     676 650    655 675 
Chitungwiza 172 000    274 035     323 260    354 472  
Gweru   79 000    124 735     140 806    158 233 
Mutare   70 000    131 367     170 466    188 243 
Kwekwe   48 000      74 982       93 608    100 455 
Kadoma   45 000      67 267       76 351      90 109 
Masvingo   31 000      51 746       69 490      88 554 
Chinhoyi   24 000      42 976       55 968      79 368 
Redcliff   22 000      24 994       32 453      35 924 
Marondera   20 000      39 384       51 871      62 120 
Chegutu   20 000      30 122       43 424      49 832 
Shurugwi   13 000        6 029       16 863      22 456 
Kariba   12 000       21 039        23820      41 420 
Victoria Falls     8 000       15 010       31 519      33 710 
Source: Wekwete (1992:54); GoZ (1992/2002); ZimStat (2012). 
Table 6 shows that the Zimbabwean urban population is on the rise since 1982. As a result, 
there is immense pressure on cities to deliver more services to an increasing urban 
population. Urbanization process in Zimbabwe has led to challenges of urban sprawl, urban 
poverty, inadequate housing for the urban poor, inadequate infrastructure and service 
provision including clean portable water, sewerage reticulation, power supply, garbage 
collection and disposal, and inadequate transportation at affordable levels (Munzwa and 
Jonga, 2010). The provision of urban goods and services has not been commensurate with 
urbanization levels. The mismanagement, corruption and contestation in urban councils 
results in cities failing to provide urban services such as water and sanitation, housing, public 
transport and refuse collection. 
 
                                                          
16
 2002 figures extracted by the author from 2002 Zimbabwe Census Report. 
17
 2012 figures extracted by the author from 2012 Zimbabwe Census Preliminary Report. 
18
 Figures only for Harare Urban excluding Epworth and Harare rural. 
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Urbanization has not been matched with economic growth. To illustrate the mismatch, Table 
7 shows the economic performance of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s GDP between 1998 and 2006 
declined by –37 percent (UNDP, 2008).  
 
Table 7: Zimbabwe’s Economic Performance, 1980-2006. 
Economic Indicators 1980-1990 1991-2000 2001-2006 
Average annual GDP Growth (%) 4.30 0.90 -5.70 
Employment Growth (%) 1.90 0.40 -7.50 
Inflation in final year of period (%) 12 56 238 
Exports as % of GDP in final year of period 23.00 43.00 24.00 
Manufacturing as % of GDP 20.35 17.70 15.00 
Agriculture as % of GDP 16.20 14.90 17.00 
Mining as % of GDP 4.30 4.20 4.00 
Budget deficit as % of GDP -2.10 -6.30 -5.80 
Source: GoZ, 2011:8. 
 
The mismatch between urbanization and economic performance (Table 5, 6 and 7) meant that 
local authorities were confronted with increased demand on services with limited returns 
from a receding economy.  As a result, Deborah Potts argues that the reality of urbanization 
in Zimbabwe resembles ‘shattered dreams and hopes’ (Potts, 2006) due to the deteriorating 
economy. The mismatch exposed urban councils as the main revenue sources (companies) 
either shut down or relocated to neighboring countries. Inflation, which according to official 
and conservative government figures exceeded 8,000% a year, with respected economists and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimating a figure in excess of 150,000% (Coltart, 
2008) and the depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar made urban development planning 
almost difficult in local authorities. Formal employment decline increased the informal 
housing and employment sectors of which most local authorities had not planned their cities 
with informality in consideration. The informal sector in many instances had a free ride on 
services as their administration and planning became politically contested rather than a town 
planning matter. Harsh macroeconomic environment made long term planning difficult 
resulting in local authorities preoccupying themselves with immediate concerns of survival.  
 
Munzwa and Jonga (2010: 140) argue that the politico-economic breakdown of the principles 
of good governance between 2000 and 2008 led to “unemployment, environmental pollution 
and destruction, non-development and maintenance of infrastructure, shortages of urban 
transport, inadequate supply of water, etc.” Urban goods and services are an important 
determinant of human development. However, the Zimbabwean urban governance case 
shows a reverse in civilization as shallow wells replace water taps, blocked storm drains lead 
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to ‘artificial and unnecessary’ flooding in streets, uncollected refuse produce stench smell and 
pot holed roads make ‘normal and straight’ driving impossible. The politics, governance and 
institutional behaviors in urban centers of Zimbabwe deteriorated severely calling for a 
reengineering of urban governance.  
 
Here, it is vital to explore the divergent views of Potts (2006) and Munzwa and Jonga (2010). 
Whilst it is clear that, the economy had impacts on service delivery, it is my proposition that 
politics had far reaching and deep entrenched impacts on service delivery. It is this thesis’ 
assertion that the underlying cause in Zimbabwe’s service delivery failure is political but the 
economy became a convenient scape goat. There are some services that do not require mush 
resources such as maintenance and repair of street lighting and traffic lights. Second, after the 
introduction of the multi-currency scheme (United States Dollars, South African Rands, and 
Botswana Pulla) in January 2009, local authorities began collecting tariffs in hard currencies 
but service delivery did not significantly improve as most people expected. What could be the 
reason? This substantiates my support for the assertion that the problems are more to do with 
politics than economics in Zimbabwe’s local government. 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks on Zimbabwe’s Urban Governance and Urbanization 
The chapter discussed in detail the context of Zimbabwe’s urban governance system by 
looking at historical and recent trends in urban governance and urbanization. Since 
colonization in 1890, local government in Zimbabwe kept changing to suit the needs of 
governments in power. In both pre and post-independence Zimbabwe local government is a 
political muscle that ruling regimes manipulates, associate with and advance certain political 
interests. Politics continue to shape and destabilize the urban governance system in 
Zimbabwe as the system remains under threat from the central government. Centre-local 
contestations are leading to poor service delivery. The next chapter discusses empirical 
evidence from the field research focusing on the interface between urban governance politics 
and urban planning in Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN URBAN 
GOVERNANCE POLITICS, URBAN MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING 
SYSTEMS IN ZIMBABWE. 
 
This chapter emphasizes the interface between urban governance politics, and urban 
management and planning in Zimbabwe. The study period was characterized by political 
polarization in Zimbabwe’s local government. The MDC controlled most urban councils 
through its councillors and mayors with Zanu-PF controlling the local government ministry. 
On urban management, the chapter focuses on four aspects that are the appointment of 
council heads of departments, relations between councillors and appointed officials, 
appointed officials accountability channels, and the attribution of council failure. The primary 
emphasis is to analyze how central government through the MLGRUD influenced the 
administration and management of urban affairs.  With regards to urban planning, I explain 
the effects of centre-local relations to urban planners, how urban planners executed their 
duties in a turbulent political environment, Operation Murambatsvina / Restore Order 
(OM/RO) and the public image of the planning profession, and Operation Garikai (OG) and 
Urban Planning. The ensuing section explains urban management systems. 
 
5.1 Urban Management Systems 
5.1.1 Role of councillors, central government and political parties in the appointment of urban 
council’s heads of departments 
The contest between the MDC and Zanu-PF over the control and administration of urban 
areas provides challenges over the management of urban affairs. Ten out of eleven council 
and government officials argued that the appointment of council heads of departments is 
influenced by political allegiance.  Around mid-2000 most highly trained individuals such as 
planners and engineers left city councils for greener pastures. Zanu-PF had an opportunity to 
infiltrate the system, “as it was difficult for councillors to preside over the appointment of 
professionals”.19 Thus, “urban councils are short of people appointed on merit”.20 Political 
appointments were based on patronage and clientelism. 
 
                                                          
19
 Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013. 
20
 Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013. 
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The Urban Councils Act Part IX provides for the appointment of senior council staff. 
Councillors recommend their preferences to the Local Government Board (LGB), which 
body either approves or selects its preferred candidate. This relationship on one hand is a 
system of checks and balances and on the other it is an avenue for the MLGRUD to push its 
own agenda. Due to capacity and resource constraints, the LGB has been staffed by people 
seconded from the ministry of local government. Hence, people who constituted the LGB at 
the “pleasure of the local government minister often consulted the Minister before approving 
any position”.21 This demonstrates that as a legally constituted body, the autonomy of the 
local government board is compromised. 
 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned point, the composition of the LGB (Section 116 of the 
Urban Councils Act) is to some extent representative (Urban Councils Association, 
Municipal Workers Union, Town Clerks, Public Service Commission representatives and two 
people with public administration experience). In principle, this representation is supposed to 
make it a fair and impartial body. However, questions arise as to the extent to which the 
body’s decisions are final and the role of the local government minister? A senior official in 
the local government ministry who declined a formal interview to the researcher argued that 
“I sit in the local government board but let me tell you this; we have been reduced to a rubber 
stamping body. The only views that matter are the Minister’s”. 
 
The process of recruiting council senior officials through the LGB has been “soiled; resulting 
in the appointment of people with little or no local government knowledge and experience”.22 
A case in point is the appointment of Dr. Tendai Mahachi as town clerk of Harare city 
without prior experience in local government.  Dr. Mahachi is a Chemist by profession. Prior 
to his appointment to the city of Harare, he had been fired through industrial action at 
Unilever Zimbabwe. In addition, he was fired by the GoZ as chief executive officer of Air 
Zimbabwe in 2009 due to ‘generous disruption of the airline’s operations and services’. Local 
government is one of the powerful ministries as it is the ‘real government level’ that 
interfaces with citizens on a daily basis.  
 
                                                          
21
 Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013. 
22
 Interview with Joseph Kamuzhanje, 12 June 2013. 
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Thus, Dr. Tendai Mahachi, the Harare Town Clerk “was appointed because of his strong 
allegiance and friendship to the local government minister”.23 Subsequently, ministry of local 
government official argued that the Harare Town Clerk would ask the local government 
minister before implementing council decisions and resolutions. More so, “the local 
government minister has been accused for not considering legal and technical advice from the 
ministry’s legal adviser”.24 From the foregoing argument, one can argue that, councillors do 
not have the power to run city affairs. In fact, the local government minister runs councils 
through appointed officials. 
 
The LGB is used by the local government minister to give Zanu-PF loyalists positions in 
urban councils. For instance, the MLGRUD “imposed the Town Clerk to the city of 
Bulawayo against the wish of the council”.25 To qualify this point further city of Bulawayo 
went for three years without a town clerk following the death of town clerk Stanly Donga in 
2007. The LGB could not approve a candidate from the three forwarded by the city council. 
Instead, in contravention of the Urban Councils Act Section 137 (subsection 2) that mandates 
the chamber secretary to act as acting town clerk, the ministry of local government appointed 
Bulawayo provincial administrator Khonzani Ncube as acting town clerk. 
 
There are indications of interference by the MLGRUD in appointing senior council officials 
as a way of bolstering corruption syndicates. This is evidenced by the City of Harare Special 
Investigations Committee’s Report on City of Harare’s Land Sales, Leases and Exchanges 
which found the appointment of senior council heads of departments by the MLGRUD as a 
vehicle for corruption and control in the city (CoH, 2010). These cases are: 
i. The firing of Harare City Engineering Director, who headed a department responsible 
for preparing land for sale. The Department was divided to create the Department of 
Urban Planning Services (DUPS) (now headed by an official seconded from the 
MLGRUD), Department of Engineering Services (now headed by the Minister’s 
brother-in-law). A City Planner was seconded by the MLGRUD to a section mainly 
responsible for preparatory stages of land alienation and was appointed on the eve of 
the installation of the 2008-13 council.  
                                                          
23
 Interview with Key Informant J.  
24
 Interview with Key Informant J. 
25
 Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013. 
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ii. The firing of the Department of Housing and Community Services (DHCS) director 
by the Makwavarara Commission and replaced by a former MLGRUD official. The 
former Director appealed to court and won the case but the Local government 
minister threatened Harare City Councillors with dismissal if the Council agrees to re-
instate him. 
iii. The Harare City Treasurer was suspended on contested circumstances and replaced by 
his deputy, even before the finalization of the case. The Report further alleges that the 
new City Treasurer was used to sign documents pertaining to the final sale of corrupt 
land deals.  The suspended City Treasurer was later reinstated by the 2008-13 Council 
against the local government minister’s wishes (CoH, 2010). 
 
Central government through the MLGRUD plays a major role in terms of recruitment of 
senior council officials. The MLGRUD is supposed to build capacity both financial and 
human resources in urban councils. Where the MLGRUD tried to play that role for instance 
by seconding its ministry staff to local authorities facing challenges, it has been seen as 
interference. Nonetheless, it is the partisan nature of recruitment that raises questions as the 
local government minister would not approve the appointment of known MDC supporters to 
senior council positions. The MLGRUD is circulating people through seconding its personnel 
to urban councils resulting in very few new people getting into urban councils as senior 
managers. 
 
There are cases where the local government ministry’s decisions through the LGB are 
justified. For example, “in the case of Gwanda Municipality, the council conducted 
interviews for the chamber secretary position and recommended its preferred candidate to the 
LGB”.26 The LGB came out with its preferences justifying its position based on interview 
scripts it produced.  It can be argued that these differences were politicized though this was 
purely a technical issue based on presented facts. Conflict ensured resulting in the firing of 
Gwanda Mayor. The municipality operated without a chamber secretary for some time. In 
that view “operating without a chamber secretary affects service delivery as key council 
decisions are not minuted”.27 
 
                                                          
26
 Interview with Key Informant D. 
27
 Interview with Key Informant K. 
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Political parties have a major influence in the appointment of council heads of departments, 
especially Zanu-PF through the local government ministry. For example, “the Deputy 
Director for Estates and Valuations, Ministry of Public Works (MoPW), successfully won 
interviews for the housing director post for Chitungwiza municipality in 2012 but was denied 
to assume the position by the local government minister as he had no traceable Zanu-PF 
political record”.28 It can therefore be argued that council heads of departments are politically 
oriented and appointed positions. This has made the local government minister to be labeled 
the ‘god father of all local authorities’; as he runs councils indirectly through partisan 
appointments. 
 
In April 2002, through three quick directives, the local government minister nullified a 
council resolution to reverse recruitments and appointments made over the previous six 
months, gave himself powers to approve key council decisions on finance and human 
resources, and barred executive mayors from attending Cabinet Action Committee meetings 
unless invited by government (Kamete, 2006a). This summarizes how the local government 
minister exercises his powers to the detriment of coherent urban management. The Urban 
Councils Act through Section 313 gives the minister powers to give directions of a general 
character and policy in matters of public interest. Here, the law gives the minister full 
discretion in his/her interpretation what public interest means. However, difficulties emerge 
where there is no shared view between the minister and councils on what is in the public 
interest, particularly when councils and the minister are from different political persuasions 
(Machingauta, 2010). 
 
5.1.2 Relations between councillors and appointed officials 
Relations between councillors and appointed officials or executives were characterized by 
friction. Issues of roles and responsibilities especially on newly elected councillors comprised 
a “major source of conflict between councillors and appointed officials”.29  In other instances, 
conflict of interests arose as councillors wanted certain things done but due to constraints, 
appointed officials would not implement. Moreover, councillors were communicating 
directly with appointed officials telling them “we are the owners of the council therefore do 
a,b,c,d”30 by-passing the Town Clerk and Mayor. For example, in the City of Mutare (CoM); 
                                                          
28
 Interview with Key Informant A. 
29
 Interview with Key Informant P. 
30
 Interview with Key Informant A. 
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“councillors would tell executive staff that they (council executive staff) do not know that 
they were their employers”.31  Councillors threatened council staff even outside formal 
processes.  
 
Trust between councillors and appointed staff was questionable as evidenced by the Mayor of 
Mutare’s fundraising initiative. In fact, the Mayor was “developing his own administration 
and mobilized funds were not channeled within the normal council system”.32 The City of 
Mutare had a separate executive called resource mobilization team headed by the Mayor. The 
resource mobilization team raised USD 45,000 and the “Mayor hired consultancies to draw 
the budget without any adjudication process except the Mayor”.33 However, the budget was 
nullified after the “CoM Town Clerk told the Local government minister that the prepared 
budget did not follow proper council procedures”.34 In this case, it can be argued that council 
executives felt that their roles were undermined by political contestations with the MDC 
running a parallel structure in the city. 
 
When new MDC councillors came into power, “they found in place senior council staff 
already appointed and aligned to Zanu-PF”.35 Over the years, urban local authorities have 
depended on the bureaucracy which has grown beyond its requirements. Council bureaucracy 
became serving its own interests. During the study period, “a self-serving bureaucracy was 
ready to mislead councillors at any point”.36 A self-serving bureaucracy and councillors not 
knowing their roles provided immense challenges to the management and administration of 
city affairs. In 2008, newly elected councillors “lacked experience in dealing with city affairs 
leading to them being guided by council appointed officials”.37 Instead of councillors being 
leaders in policy making, they were following council officials and in other cases were 
misled. 
 
In addition, relations between councillors and appointed officials were fragmented along 
political party lines. In most instances, “elected officials belonged to the MDC with 
                                                          
31
 Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013. 
32
 Interview with Key Informant D. 
33
 Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013. 
34
 Interview with Key Informant M. 
35
 Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013. 
36
 Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013. 
37
 Interview with Precious Shumba, 09 July 2013. 
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appointed officials inclined to Zanu-PF”.38 Moreover, the MDC was dynamic and forward 
looking in terms of urban governance whilst those aligned to Zanu-PF were either sabotaging 
or opposed to MDC initiatives. As a result, a palpable rift exists between the appointed and 
the elected officials of which the former has been accused of following the diktats of Zanu-
PF (Chirisa and Kawadza, 2011). 
 
Relations were mostly based on suspicion. Councillors came in with a view to remove Zanu-
PF aligned council personnel, creating animosity among senior council workers. However, 
appointed councillors (special interest councillors) lessened the knowledge gap and conflict 
between elected councillors and city managers. Due to suspicion between councillors and 
officials, decisions were interpreted politically.  For example, in Mutare City Council, 
appointed staff proposed dismissing a significant number of workers as a cost cutting 
measure. Councillors did not support the proposal arguing that “the motive of the Town Clerk 
and the local government minister was political - making MDC councillors unpopular”.39 
 
Moreover, relations were strained, with technocrats accused of running the local government 
minister’s agenda. Technocrats were part of a Zanu-PF scheme “to make it difficult and 
strenuous for councillors to relate with appointed officials”.40 On the other hand, MDC and 
its councillors came with their policies and agenda in urban councils. The MDC wanted “to 
appoint council officials loyal to party ideologies as they never believed that existing council 
officials could implement its policies impartially”.41 The MDC believed that existing council 
officials were an extension of the central government and Zanu-PF. Some council officials 
took advantage and further politicized strained relations.  A senior city official pointed that 
“some council officials would advise councillors that s/he was not liked by certain heads of 
departments because of affiliation to councillors political party”.42 The strained relationship 
between councils and council executives resulted in corruption as people solicited help from 
councillors in order to get certain things done.  
 
Appointed officials are responsible for service delivery through the implementation of 
council policies and resolutions. When councillors get into office, they will be under pressure 
                                                          
38
 Interview with Innocent Chirisa, 06 June 2013. 
39
 Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013. 
40
 Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013. 
41
 Interview with Key Informant R. 
42
 Interview with Key Informant R. 
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to make an impact. In the process, councillors aim to achieve quick win results which 
sometimes are against certain fundamentals. Due to long stay in council, “appointed officials 
were uncomfortable with being told what to do by new councillors”.43The refusal by 
appointed officials to get advice from new councillors is shown by Councillor Dore’s (CoH, 
2002-03) attempt to have rubbish collected in his Ward by the city waste department. 
Councilor Dore visited the council department of waste management to raise the query and 
the official said, “I have been here for 20years and as a councillor you are powerless, so 
leave us alone. You are very new in council affairs”.44 Appointed officials had to “exude 
personal resistance to councillors for them to be seen as performing well by the local 
government ministry”.45  
 
Loyalties and rewards are key in Zimbabwean politics and subsequently in councils also. For 
example at one point, Harare city councillors decided to fire the Town Clerk. In a full council 
meeting, the Town Clerk asked councillors “who dares fire me here” and “only three 
councillors stood up”.46 This shows the extent of the relationship between councillors and 
appointed officials. The Town Clerk’s loyalty and protection from the local government 
minister was the springboard of such courageous behavior. 
 
Political violence and the protracted nature of entering political office resulted in the election 
of inexperienced councillors, a condition that widened the gap between councillors and 
executive officials. Incompetence of councillors made councillors to view appointed staff as a 
major deterrent to their plans. After councilor induction programs by NGOs and CSOs, 
“councillors became arrogant after learning about council business”.47 Council administrative 
staff interpreted councillor induction programs as meant for challenging them. Council 
appointed staff thought “acquired knowledge by councillors was an affront to their 
existence”48 and the consequential need to build resistance towards councillors. This 
background created unproductive and antagonistic relations between councillors and appoint 
staff. 
 
                                                          
43
 Interview with Key Informant O. 
44
 Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013. 
45
 Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013. 
46
 Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013. 
47
 Interview with Key Informant M. 
48
 Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013. 
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Most appointed officials concurred that the good relations between councillors and appointed 
staff had a positive impact when council wanted to carry out programs is residential areas as 
councillors would mobilize residents. Nevertheless, on council programs that had “a negative 
political connotation on the political constituency, councillors objected straining relations”.49 
During campaigning period, councillors would make politically motivated decisions that 
were not feasible to implement. As a result, the relationship was stressed as councilors 
sometimes disregarded technical and expert advice so as to further certain political interests.  
 
The gradual MDC dominance in urban areas since 2000 was confronted by a human 
resources challenge. Most senior council officials by 2000 were sympathetic to Zanu-PF. If 
the senior official was not sympathetic to Zanu-PF, “the local government minister would 
delay or frustrate the recruitment process”.50 A case in point is the delay by the ministry to 
appoint Bulawayo city town clerk for a period of three years as all the recommended people 
were considered not aligned to Zanu-PF. The shortlisted three were Gilbert Dube, Middleton 
Nyoni, and Gilbert Mlilo. Between 2000 and 2005, it was a confused situation as council 
officials were not too sure of supporting the MDC or working professionally. However, 
between 2005 and 2008, “council officials were bold enough to challenge councillors because 
they had protection from a Zanu-PF minister”.51 This disempowered the political wing of 
council.  
 
The MDC was at its weakest especially in governing urban local authorities. This is because 
of a combination of factors that included “naïve, young and not informed caliber of MDC 
councillors, working with more knowledgeable and skilled appointed officials that were more 
likely to manipulate councillors”.52 The minister of local government appointed special 
interest councillors who were either an elite on their own or Zanu-PF candidates who had lost 
elections. Council appointed officials waited for councillors to blunder and then react. Zanu-
PF used the formality of the local government system, as the local government minister 
waited for MDC councillors to blunder before taking action.  
 
                                                          
49
 Interview with Key Informant C. 
50
 Interview with Key Informant H. 
51
 Interview with Key Informant B. 
52
 Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013. 
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The MDC argued that the problem was that “some council officials had been in those 
positions for long period of time with patronage related appointments”.53 People whose 
blundering of city management affairs is legendary were still in council for political reasons. 
For instance in Mutare city council; Mayor Brian James was a “victim of an entrenched party 
political system that was running as a local authority in which the Town Clerk is the local 
government minister’s ‘blue eyed boy”.54 In the CoH, Mayor Masunda was concentrating on 
“trivial matters and not pushing an MDC agenda and subsequently failed to directly confront 
the local government minister”.55 It means local authorities are battle grounds for party 
agendas. MDC pushes for its agenda through its councillors and Zanu-PF through special 
interest councillors and senior management executives. The result being tension and conflict. 
 
A Harare city official went to Durban, South Africa with councillors and advised them that 
“Do you see how these people are organized, if you can also do the same, we can talk about 
progress”.56 In 2009, when a researcher was doing a study and collecting data in council 
chambers, the research team gave “councillors pens, and councillors started stealing from 
each other”.57 This form of behavior is least expected from councillors. This type of behavior 
shows that working with councillors was like “converting baboons and making them 
people”.58 Thus, one can argue that conflict between councillors and appointed officials is 
also anchored on the latter’s expectation of minimum behavior from councillors. 
 
Councillors and appointed officials were “not in a marriage though staying together”.59 The 
relationship is by construct and design as despite losing local government elections, Zanu-PF 
retained control of urban councils through appointed officials. The uneasy and sour 
relationship between councillors and staff is one of the main reasons why service delivery 
remains poor in urban councils.  
 
5.1.3 Appointed officials accountability channels 
Appointed officials are accountable to councillors, and the Town Clerk. Section 136 of the 
Urban Councils Act provides functions of town clerk which include accounting to the Mayor 
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and, where necessary, to the council or the executive committee for the performance of any 
tasks entrusted through him to the employees of the council. The Town Clerk seats in full 
council and implements council decisions through heads of departments. The Town Clerk 
“furnishes the local government minister with updates of council affairs which presents a 
problem to many councillors”.60 In terms of Section 309 of the Urban Councils Act, the local 
government minister has powers to compel local authorities to furnish him with reports. The 
provision reads: 
 The Minister may from time to time require a council to submit to him certified copies of 
records of its proceedings, statistics and other documents, and such other information as he may 
consider necessary for the effective discharge of his duties and responsibilities in terms of this 
Act or for any other purpose, and the council shall comply with any such requirement.  
 
This provision allows the supervision of local government by central government from an 
informed point of view (in which government is aware of what is happening at the local 
level).The removing of executive mayors created ceremonial mayors which lack power and 
authority to run city affairs. The change made the office of Town Clerk powerful though the 
Town Clerk is not elected rendering participatory governance weak. 
 
Councillors can pass a vote of no confidence in the Town Clerk but cannot hire or fire 
him/her. There is excessive protection of the “Town Clerk by the local government 
minister”.61 Interparty squabbles were common as the Minister of local government and his 
deputy often gave different and conflicting directives to the local level. Accountability of 
council staff is politicized as “one chief town planner after briefing the city mayor, the next 
day the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), were asking the chief town planner what he 
was discussing with the mayor”.62 Senior council heads of departments have difficulties in 
making independent decisions as one has to make sure that decisions are aligned to some 
political party members. Resultantly, decisions were either delayed or based on informal and 
outside council political consultations and accountability channels.  
 
Accountability was affected by allegiance challenges emanating from appointment loyalties. 
Technocrats are meant to implement resolutions, and “any council resolutions were subject to 
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scrutiny by the local government minister”.63 A number of budgetary resolutions were 
rescinded by the local government minister. The Minister has powers through Section 314 of 
the Urban Councils Act to reverse, suspend, rescind resolutions and decisions of councils on 
the basis that the minister views such decisions, and resolutions to be in a public interest.  
The cumulative effect of the Minister’s powers to act on behalf of councils or to adopt by-
laws or rescind council resolutions and decisions may undermine the council’s ability to 
provide local solutions to local problems (Machingauta, 2010: 145).  
 
In practice, all senior city officials largely reported to the local government minister”64 
because that is where their protection came from
65
 and the local government minister made 
them accountable to him.
66
 Appointed staff knew the minister’ decisions superseded 
everything and everyone.  For formality’s sake, city officials reported to council. The local 
government minister controls levers of power in the local government sector. By design the 
minister of local government “made it obvious that if an executive does not report to the 
ministry, the minister will have the official dismissed”.67 Accounting to the local government 
minister directly by-passing councillors and mayors was however a source of conflict. Direct 
relationship with the minister made executive officials more powerful than councillors.  
 
In Chinhoyi Municipality, where councillors tried to dismiss the town clerk, the Mayor ended 
up being dismissed by the local government minister. The council made serious allegations 
against the town clerk, “but when it was presented to the minister, the minister came with 
several allegations against the mayor”.68 For standards, the MLGRUD vision for service 
delivery implies ministry supervision to local authorities. There is no system of public 
accountability in urban councils making accountability to the community weak. 
 
In Harare, the local government minister managed to “protect corrupt MDC councillors, and 
in return the councillors ingratiated to the minister”.69 This divided councillors. Corrupt 
councillors supported the direct accountability of appointed officials to the local government 
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minister. MDC councillors “were riotous and the party lost control of its councillors”.70 The 
reason is that councillors got filthy rich overnight.  After being elected into office “an MDC 
councillor said she would allocate herself a flea market and a housing stand”71; an indication 
of being elected to accumulate personal wealth. Before being in council, some councillors 
had a pair of shoes and nothing else but ended up owning a fleet of vehicles. Ultimately, 
MDC councillors did not respect the party anymore as before and were no longer accountable 
to the party.  
 
A government official pointed that, “I was astonished 3 months ago in the Provincial 
Development Committee in one city to discover that even Town Clerks also report to District 
Administrators and Provincial Administrators who control development at district and 
provincial levels”.72 Provincial administrators and governors were introduced in the two 
metropolitan provinces of Harare and Bulawayo as a way of fostering allegiance to Zanu-PF. 
In fact, it was a ploy by the local government ministry to dilute MDC power in local 
authorities. 
 
5.1.4 Attribution of council failure 
The first decade of the study period is unprecedented in the history of Zimbabwe’s socio-
economic and political trajectory with the country’s isolation from the international 
community. The operating environment for councils was difficult. The economic meltdown 
made it difficult for council to raise revenue as people were unable to pay rates. This is 
evidenced by huge unpaid bills on water services. Zimbabwe had an economic crisis which 
culminated in sewage flowing in the streets between 2007 and 2008. Council failure to 
provide services became a blame game between councillors and appointed officials. 
 
Councillors are political hence they “tried to avoid their misdeeds by apportioning blame to 
administrative officials”.73 The goal of elected officials is politics of appeasement and 
political mileage, prompting council resolutions that are not practical resulting in failure to 
deliver such a planned service. Appointed officials know what works and what does not, 
though they fail council deliberately for instance giving themselves hefty packages at the 
expense of service delivery (i.e. Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare councils Town Clerks earning 
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more than USD15 000).
74
 For City of Mutare, there is gross financial mismanagement and 
incompetency within the council administrative staff.  Documents availed to the researcher 
indicate that a loan of USD 600,000 in 2009 increased to USD 1,5million by August 2010. 
The loan facility was signed for by the Finance Director, the Town Clerk, and the finance 
manager without the Council Finance Committee’s authorization. Council failure can also be 
attributed to large workforce expenses as staff were appointed for political reasons. Excess 
staff in local authorities posed a financial burden (Table 8). 
 
Table 8: CoH Summary of Excess staff as at 31 December 2012 
Source: CoH HCD, 2013. 
 
Table 8 analyzed with Fig 2 show a financially unsustainable situation for the City of Harare. 
The variance between actual revenue and the wage bill as shown on Fig 2 is very small, 
leaving the city council with limited financial resources for services investment.  
 
 
 
Fig 2: CoH Actual Revenue compared with Gross Wage Bill (Source: CoH HCD, 2013). 
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Actual Revenue
GROSS WAGEBILL
Department Total Excess Redeployed Total Remaining 
Town Clerk 17 0 17 
Chamber Secretary 8 0 8 
Human Capital 40 0 40 
City Treasurer 82 6 76 
Urban Planning 59 0 59 
Engineering Services 191 107 84 
City Health 67 53 14 
Housing & Community Services 189 98 91 
Amenities 106 42 64 
Harare Water 648 0 648 
Total  1407 300 1107 
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Considering the revenue streams and expenditure on Fig 2, one can argue that most council 
failures were self-inflicted in council through failure to balance income and expenditure. To 
be a councillor, one needs to be a person of high socio-economic standing. However, 
councillors were elected on populist social standing making them vulnerable to corrupt 
behavior and manipulation. Councillors allocated themselves land because they were tenants 
and “the corruption permeated to the allocation of housing stands to residents”.75 The 
executive were no longer acting professionally in the execution of their duties, as they 
became political. Appointed officials survived on political patronage of the ministry. Jonga 
and Munzwa (2009) argue that the failure of both politicians and administrators to observe 
the principles of urban good governance notably, transparency, accountability, the active 
involvement and respect of the citizenry, is pivotal to the current problems bedeviling the 
country’s urban management system. 
 
The Local Government Rural and Urban Development Parliament Portfolio Committee 
(LGRUD PPC) Report on the state of service delivery in the municipalities of Harare, 
Chitungwiza and Norton revealed: 
 
Perpetual challenges in all the three local authorities which can be explained by council 
negligence, inconsiderate private developers, systemic corruption, political and government 
interference in council business, abuse of office by council officials, inadequate funding etc. 
 
The report noted with concern a crisis in perpetuity in Zimbabwe’s local authorities. In terms 
of state media (Herald, Chronicle, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation, and Sunday Mail) 
and Zanu-PF, council failure was attributed more to MDC councillors than appointed staff. 
This was a strategy to blackmail councillors and MDC as a majority party in urban councils. 
The MLGRUD was “leading the blackmailing and attack of MDC controlled councils, not 
even mentioning the dismal performance of its appointed officials in councils”.76 
 
The MLGRUD Permanent Secretary described the conduct of some Town Clerks as an 
“embarrassment” to the entire local government fraternity since Town Clerks were involved 
in council mismanagement and the “culture of looting” in urban local authorities (ZILGA, 
2012a). It is ironic as the local government permanent secretary argued that “it is better for 
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individuals who serve in the local government sector to retire with dignity rather than 
embarking on a self-enrichment crusade” (Ibid). Why would the local government ministry 
yearn for corrupt senior council officials to retire rather than dismissing them? Clearly this 
shows the extent of disservice by senior council officials and their protection from the parent 
ministry. 
 
Councilors were accused of failing to guide and develop council goals that were pro-service 
delivery.  This emanates from the fact that councilors make decisions on all council matters 
with appointed officials recommending advice to councilors. Attribution of council failure 
depended on the impression one wanted to create. Council failure was political with the 
failure of cities of Harare, Masvingo, Mutare and Bulawayo interpreted as the failure of the 
MDC. Nonetheless, councillors are not decision implementers, “though in terms of 
prioritization, one can apportion the blame on councillors”.77  
 
5.2 The profession and practice of urban planning 
5.2.1 Effects of centre-local relations to urban planners 
The Regional Town and Country Planning Act (RTCPA) gives the government authority to 
monitor planning standards and the overall urban development process. During the study 
period, town planning principles and foundations were in place but were defeated by politics. 
In fact, “Zanu-PF defeated town planning”.78 The Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP) encroached into peri-urban areas and it became very difficult to implement and 
monitor town planning as the planning profession was vilified by politicians.  
 
Urban planning was affected in development control specifically in change of use as most 
open spaces were converted to private and commercial use. Change of use in urban areas 
“distorted the zoning system”.79 Political players and their cronies exerted pressure for 
change of use on urban planners. Ultimately, most open spaces in Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare 
and Masvingo were converted into private built up spaces. This change led to the 
unpopularity of planning and its association with the wealthy and powerful (Kamete, 2011). 
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Housing cooperatives formed at the behest of political parties bypassed normal urban 
planning procedures. In terms of layout plans, most cooperatives have been complying with 
this requirement. Yet, it is when it comes to infrastructure that is severely lacking. Reasons to 
this are twofold: “one is financial constraints and the second is politicians allowing people to 
by-pass planning law thereby implying development precede infrastructure leading to 
distorted urban planning”.80 The consequential impact on the health of the people is still 
unknown as even the cholera outbreak did not affect these areas.  
 
The polarization and contestation between MDC and Zanu-PF posed severe problems to 
urban planning. Mistrust between central and local government made the work of planners 
difficult as each level of government pushed its own agenda. A senior urban planner argued 
that “contradictions in policy framework between central and local government made 
planning extremely difficult”.81 This is evidenced by the recruitment moratorium placed by 
MLGRUD on all major cities. Under the recruitment moratorium, “development control and 
development planning functions were negatively affected”.82 Effects of the recruitment 
moratorium on City of Harare Department of Urban Planning Services are shown on Table 9. 
The moratorium was aimed at preventing the MDC councillors from employing loyal 
supporters. 
 
Table 9: CoH DUPS Establishment as at 31
st
 December 2011. 
 Approved Establishment Strength Vacancies Excess Staff 
Years 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 
Total 257 232 183 168 123 111 49 47 
Source: CoH DUPS, 2012. 
City urban planning departments have been constrained by human resources shortages to 
carry out development control functions. Subsequently, illegal developments sprouted in 
most urban centers as residents erected structures without plan approval. 
 
When the MDC controlled urban governments, Zanu-PF did not accept the reality arguing 
that it was a regime change ploy. Zanu-PF was intolerable to the rise of the MDC in urban 
areas as local government is the ‘real government’. The rise of MDC was about people 
rejecting Zanu-PF leadership, and within 3 months of Mudzuri mayorship most roads had 
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been repaired (he was fired after 1 year in office and replaced by a Zanu-PF appointed 
commission), “which showed a real grasp of urban issues”.83 The local government minister 
cited poor service delivery performance by the mayor. Conversely, Machingauta (2010) 
argues that the impression created by the suspension and subsequent dismissal was that 
suspension and subsequent dismissal had nothing to do with service delivery but was meant 
to frustrate local councils controlled by the MDC. Zanu-PF could not allow progress in an 
MDC run council as the success of MDC would deter Zanu-PF political fortunes. During the 
leadership of government appointed Commissions planners interviewed argued they could 
not execute their professional duties according to the standards of town planning practice.
84
 
Appointed commissions made urban planners appendages of political party interests. This led 
to planners compromising on professional integrity. 
 
The land reform programme brought tension in peri-urban areas affecting land and delivery 
of planning services (spatial planning). Cities were overtaken by a particular form of urban 
development driven by the informal urban structure of the economy within which planning is 
being practiced. In this instance, ‘planners had no role to play; they were the bonds (as in a 
chess game), the people sacrificed’.85 The greyness of institutions also limited the capacity of 
planners to effectively manage informality in urban areas. 
 
However, the presence of planners in both central and local government structures have 
somehow limited the negative impacts of the estranged centre-local relations to planners. 
Planners in central government represented by the Department of Physical Planning (DPP) 
and those in urban councils have spoken with a complimentary voice from a technical point 
of view and have assisted each other in digesting some of the undesirables of the political 
input without causing much friction with political players. 
 
Because of corruption, planners were being forced to compromise planning principles in 
order to meet the requirements of either councillors or the local government minister. 
Approval of plans was influenced by politics as “planners were forced to approve plans 
quickly, compromising normal planning procedures”.86 This is evidenced by a widespread 
number of mushrooming residential areas without proper urban planning services. These 
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include Ushehwokunze, Komboniyatswa, Whitecliff, Hopley, Madyirakumunda, Hatcliffe 
extension among others in the city of Harare. Planners might not have wanted the haphazard 
urban development that took effect but political pressure led to the compromise of planning 
regulations and standards 
 
Due to political interference, planning rationale has been suspended weakening the planning 
profession. Evictions, due to flouting of planning regulations had tendencies to undermine the 
planner as the main defaulter. Nevertheless, “problems encountered in cities were far beyond 
the planners as there was disorder in cities”.87 The planner was caught in-between vested 
interests - dealing with political players and trying to be impartial breeding a crippled 
planner.
88
  Planners not confident to take decisions ended up stashing things for a long time.  
 
5.2.2 Urban Planners in a turbulent political environment 
Planning is in politics and cannot escape politics and the role of planners is highly political 
(Albrechts, 2003). The political environment to which the planner operated was contested and 
confusing. The consolidated voice of professionals at higher levels became critical. In this 
context, the image and integrity of planning needed strong defense from an effective and 
efficient professional association. The Zimbabwe Institute of Regional and Urban Planners 
(ZIRUP) failed to brink to the attention of the MLGRUD issues affecting the planner. The 
collective voice of planners in a more systematic way was weak complicating the planners’ 
work.  
 
Urban planning has two sides; forward planning and development control. Forward planning 
that is master and local planning suffered most due to insufficient resources. All statutory 
plans in use in Zimbabwe are out of time.
89
 Development control activities such as enforcing 
regulations and approval of plans, vender management suffered as the economy turned 
informal. It was not possible to enforce using planning regulations prepared in a normal 
economy. Planning became nearly impossible emphasizing on “ad hoc, and reactive as 
opposed to futuristic forward planning”.90 
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The caliber of mayors was a critical element determining how planners executed their duties 
in a turbulent political environment. For city of Harare, council officials interviewed 
applauded Mayor Masunda (2008-13) for being dynamic, apolitical, and his tremendous 
performance in assisting the work of urban planners. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(BMGF) project in Harare strengthened and capacitated the CoH’s urban planning 
department with Information Communication Technologies (ICTs), and geographic 
information systems (GIS). DUPS has been struggling to acquire GIS and CoH was having 
difficulties in funding the initial capital. Due to the BMGF project, DUPS is in a position to 
“produce accurate and up-to-date urban planning maps and data which informs decision 
making consequently helping in service delivery”.91 The survey department under DUPS is in 
a position to contract out, “due to capitalization from the BMGF project, which compliments 
were attributed to the CoH mayor”.92  
 
The division of labour between politicians and planners was blurred. Evidence suggests 
duplication of roles and responsibilities between planners and politicians. Kamete (2009b) 
quoting a planner notes that: 
 
There were too many useless changes popping up in and around urban planning. These things . 
. . are not for serious professionals like us . . . There is need for local government to adhere to a 
strict division of labour. Things that have to do with mobilizing and mingling with residents . . . 
are not the work of serious planners. We leave that to . . . politicians . . . Planners deal with the 
serious technical stuff. 
 
In addition, there were also struggles between planners and young people in cities. Young 
people with cover from political parties invaded most urban spaces. Political party youth 
wings occupied and used the open places illegally. Urban sites and spaces occupied by young 
people were featured by illegality, infractions galore, and tangible lawlessness evidenced by 
rampant non-compliance with trading, financial, health, labour, sanitation as well as building 
and planning codes and regulations (Kamete, 2004; 2009b).  
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Allegiance and patronage affected the recruitment of chief city planners. Chief planners were 
“purely political posts thus candidates were vetted over political affiliation”.93 Planning is an 
intricate political process because it is about resource allocation. Resources are used for 
politics therefore one cannot separate processes of planning from politics. Inevitably, the 
profession of planning has not been devoid of political interference and meddling. 
 
5.2.3 Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order and the public image of the planning profession 
The image of the planning profession suffered significantly during the era of impunity 
between 2000 and 2008 which spilled into urban planning. Zanu-PF “forced councillors and 
councils to turn a blind eye into disorganized urban planning”.94 Unplanned and informal 
settlements sprouted. The partisan political element affected town planning, with planners 
becoming powerless. The efficacy of planning as a profession was queried. 
 
Disorganized urban planning resulted in the infamous Operation Murambatsvina / Restore 
Order (OM/RO) of 2005. OM/RO is a house demolition campaign launched by the 
Government of Zimbabwe in May 2005. OM/RO destroyed houses or structures which were 
considered illegal. The Operation left more than 700 000 households homeless and affected a 
further 2,4 million (Tibaijuka, 2005).  Ironically, the local government minister officiated at 
Joshua M. Nkomo cooperative which was later destroyed during OM/RO. Upon the 
destruction of cooperative houses, the minister argued ‘ukandidaidza kumuchato wako 
ndinouya asi kuti ndizoziva kuti wakatora mukadzi wemunhu handizivi’ (if you invite me to 
your wedding I will come but I cannot know that you are wedding someone’s wife).95   
 
The preamble of the RTCPA states the objectives of town planning. Among them is 
protecting the physical environment, which was a key deliverable for OM/RO. Prior to 
OM/RO, destruction of the physical environment and unhealthy environment were extensive. 
A senior city planner argued that “the UN Special Envoy Tibaijuka was a ‘traitor’ as she 
appeased her paymasters instead of the welfare of the people – a challenge that planners 
face”.96 Planners and other urban development professionals were constrained. Party politics 
resulted in the problem of overcrowding and informal settlements in cities.  
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The impact of OM/RO exposed planning as a profession. Planning had “failed to respond to 
challenges it was supposed to address”.97 If planning served its purpose, it would have 
planned and handled OM/RO in a professional manner and there would be no need for 
another operation. Urban planning principles to address informality were superseded by 
politics. OM/RO resembles the failure of planning, one can argue. Government’s housing 
destruction during OM/RO emphasized the essence of planning, which can be understood as 
the supremacy of planning. Consequently a senior planner argued that “OM/RO was the best 
thing that happened to planners as all of a sudden planning was elevated though planners did 
not capitalize on the program”.98 Unfortunately, gradually things reverted to pre-OM/RO, and 
planners became irrelevant.  
 
Planning did not enforce OM/RO as a policy, but planning regulations were used. Planning 
was very insensitive and unreasonable to the public eye though Zimbabweans remember 
OM/RO not about planners, but the brutality of President Robert Mugabe. During OM/RO 
the violence was wanton, symbolic and punitive, signifying Zanu-PF's determination to 
maintain power and social control in the face of a population who (probably) did not provide 
a majority vote for it, with areas who voted for the opposition MDC the worst affected 
(Bracking, 2005). Zanu-PF thought that the “people who voted for MDC were mainly 
residing in unplanned settlements”.99 The plan was to send MDC supporters to rural areas 
under the control of traditional chiefs who are loyal to Zanu-PF.  
 
With time, it emerged that OM/RO political motivations were bigger than planning 
motivations. Bratton and Masunungure (2006: 21) posit that one of the aims of the operation 
was “to stifle independent … political activity in the country’s urban areas.” GoZ further 
argued that the program was for security reasons as there was an immense urban 
concentration of opposition supporters. Therefore, the level of unemployment and 
infrastructure decay was anticipated as a trigger to mass uprisings. 
 
Expensive housing structures were destroyed in the name of planning. This made planning to 
people not wholly a profession to assist but a “dictatorial, and demagogue profession to make 
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people’s lives difficult”.100 Yet, that is not the intention of planning. Planning is viewed with 
skepticism in Zimbabwe, as a profession out to find and punish culprits. Even the Tibaijuka 
report did not exonerate planners but rather attacked planning law and regulations. Illegal 
settlements sprouted in the presence of urban planners and “only to turn against these 
settlements when Zanu-PF lost support in cities”.101 This resulted in the public viewing 
planning as a disorganized profession. 
 
Planning curricula deals with issues of regularization, and incremental planning which should 
be a reprieve to informality in cities. A government planner asked the following questions 
that further expose planning as a profession during and after Operation Murambatsvina: 
 When did it become lawful in Zimbabwe to destroy someone’s housing without 
compensation or providing an alternative?  
 If Planners have a say, why did they remained silent watching the sprouting of illegal 
settlements and structures in towns?  
  Who and whose Building Inspector was approving building construction? 102 
  
These questions remain largely unanswered as there has not been a detailed inquiry on the 
part of government to find out the role of planning before, during and after OM/RO. 
Ultimately the public is confused about ‘planners’ and their role in the built environment. 
 
As a result, planners are “not considered important by both the public and government”.103 
The profession of planning has little merit in Zimbabwe. This is exacerbated by the dearth of 
a vibrant professional planning association (ZIRUP). The future of planning in the country 
rests on the country shifting from a predatory to a developmental state. The planning system 
has remained intact, “though corruption has deeply infiltrated”104. Rent seeking behavior in 
the profession damaged the image of the profession. The process of plan preparation, 
application for planning permit and approval has institutionalized corruption.  
 
Kamete (2007) argues that two issues implicated the planning profession in partisan agendas. 
One of these was the position of senior planners in government or government-backed 
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institutions, such as urban councils and government ministries, in particular the local 
government ministry. The other issue had to do with the public utterances of some well-
known planners. These include the then ZIRUP president speaking in his official capacity and 
therefore rightly seen as speaking for all planners. These utterances largely resonated with 
those of the state. These issues made it easy for critics to put ZIRUP in the same category as 
the Harare City Commission, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and other confirmed 
Zanu-PF foot soldiers. 
 
In Bulawayo, Bulawayo city council (BCC) provided an ideal model by having 1000 un-
serviced stands and 3 farms at any point in time up to 1995. The city tried to plan ahead of 
housing demand. However, BCC was caught up in socio-economic and political change. In 
1995 Cowdry Park, a suburb in Bulawayo had “5000 planned stands waiting development of 
roads and sewer services”.105 BCC’s general development and housing fund ran dry. When 
OM/RO came, government wanted space to resettle people, and “BCC directed government 
to Cowdry Park and overnight Cowdry Park became a slum”.106 Urban areas have been 
distorted, in one way or the other with squatter proliferation without adequate services. Urban 
development in Zimbabwe changed because of a combination of politics and economics 
which acted both as causes and triggers. 
 
Despite the impacts of OM/RO, one can argue that the planning profession had long lost 
credibility during the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) period (1990-95). 
During this period, planning was criticized by groups like the “Affirmative Action Group 
(AAG), Indigenous Groups, and national economic planning commission making spatial 
planning a nuisance”.107 However, during OM/RO planning statutes became useful in 2005. 
One can argue that the damage to planning profession during OM/RO was minimal as 
compared to before (indigenization, land reform and affirmative action) which three resulted 
in an indirect acceptance of the informal sector. 
 
OM/RO had substantial repercussions on urban planning as a profession. Quoting a Senior 
Planning Consultant, Kamete (2007: 159) writes:  
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What we as planners have demonstrated is an unacceptable degree of fear, incompetence and 
malice. I challenge those who disagree to prove me wrong when I say that the damn profession 
was totally cold-hearted, negligent and spineless during this operation. There are no two ways 
about it. We are the laughing stock of the cursed country. Until someone proves me wrong, I 
won’t shut up.  
 
Town planning standards have been castigated as ‘very high, very elaborate, rigid and not 
amenable to physical and climatic conditions’, irresponsive to end users with planners 
criticized for planning for themselves (GoZ, 2009). The UN Special Envoy Report castigated 
the ‘outdated’ Regional Town and Country Planning Act. Reluctant to discard the limiting 
cloak of scientism, and unwilling to look beyond the prescriptions of instrumental rationality, 
planners emerged out of the storm (Operation Murambatsvina) with a severely dented 
reputation (Kamete, 2007: 168). 
 
5.2.4 Operation Garikai and Urban Planning 
Operation Garikai was a government housing program spearheaded by the Army in the 
aftermath of the Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order. Government participation in actual 
land servicing and house construction was through the flagship Operation Garikai/Hlalani 
Kuhle, which however has remained a modest contribution to addressing housing shortages 
in Zimbabwe (Chatiza and Mlalazi, 2009). Operation Garikai (OG) was initiated after a world 
outcry as OM/RO featured excessive and brutal use of military as capacity. The military is 
used to “mounting a barrack in 4 days for 3000 people and planned to replicate that for 
housing (15 000 units)”.108 The house building model failed, and the promise was left 
unfulfilled.  
 
Operation Garikai was a political response to OM/RO. A response to world pressure, though 
government tried it ended up deceiving people. Pressure that came with Operation Garikai 
was from the Tibaijuka Report and government wanted to show the UN envoy that it can 
build houses in a limited space of time. From a political point of view, “Operation Garikai 
was needed though from a planning perspective, infrastructure services must have taken 
precedence”.109 Planning was defeated. As of 2013, no Operation Garikai housing schemes 
has running water, sewer and surfaced roads.  
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After the OM/RO UN Special Envoy Report, instead of reverting to urban planning law and 
principles as a way of reorganizing housing and urban development, government took a 
political route. Operation Garikai took effect and its shadows are still haunting all urban 
councils since the program gave people housing stands and ‘houses’ in un-serviced land. 
Operation Garikai was a hastily prepared package and there is enough evidence to suggest 
that if urban councils were adequately consulted, the program could have better achieved its 
objectives. Between 2005 and 2008 time was very short, and Zanu-PF wanted to work on its 
image before the 2008 harmonized elections. The party decided “to use land and a housing 
scheme to reward and lure supporters excluding town planning rationality and practices”.110  
 
When Operation Garikai was launched, planning standards were abandoned. Stand sizes were 
reduced to 48m
2
 and “local authorities were not fully involved in the planning stages”.111 The 
housing projects were co-managed by the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and Ministry of 
Public Works (MoPW). The priority was on incremental housing development where by the 
government offered beneficiaries land and building materials to build houses for themselves. 
Due to lack of adequate funding, planning conflicts and political influence, the houses were 
handed over to beneficiaries at various stages of completion, such as completed units, 
window level, foundation level and site clearance level. Incremental development process is 
providing challenges to coherent and comprehensive urban development. 
 
In some instances, urban planners prepared Operation Garikai layout plans “which raise 
questions as to why planners failed to point out that the program would not work”.112 
Planners were forced to succumb to naïve political visions explaining why most planners 
have left central and local government. The political culture in Zimbabwe’s urban 
governance is that “if one thinks differently, one has to leave or face subsequent 
victimization”.113 
 
In 1982, when Queen Elizabeth was visiting Zimbabwe, people were relocated from Mbare to 
Churu Farm. When Ndabaningi Sithole took over Churu farm and wanted to house evicted 
people, “government relocated them to Porta farm and later moved to Hatcliffe, Caledonia 
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and finally Hopely in 2005 during Operation Garikai”.114 Politicization of informal 
settlements makes it difficult to provide urban planning solutions. In addition, the 
government provided housing units instead of offsite infrastructure, against the advice of 
urban councils. The program was ‘dumped’ to urban councils. In the view of urban councils, 
“central government created problems with Operation Garikai and handed it over to cities”.115 
In Harare, Operation Garikai houses were built in Whitecliff, a private land which the 
Constitutional Court ruled in favour of a private owner but government had already settled 
people.  
 
Operation Garikai shows ad hoc planning, as it was not in the GoZ budget. Planning 
processes of land development (surveying, engineering designs, installation of service mains, 
planning permission) were never followed as land servicing only came after housing had 
been built. Completed housing is more visible than infrastructure, the political reason used to 
justify absence of infrastructure services during the program. Allocation of housing was 
political, as predominantly Zanu-PF supporters benefited. It is unusual to comprehend a 
housing project “driven by the Army with sergeant majors and brigadiers directing operations 
in the presence of housing and urban planning experts and authorities”.116 
 
In Bulawayo, Operation Garikai is “riddled with political controversy between government 
and the city”.117 The council was forced to regularize the housing development as well as 
“providing water and sewer reticulation to the houses”118. However the city’s urban planning 
is facing serious challenges of integrating Operation Garikai into the city’s urban 
development plan. The political conflict emanated from double allocation of stands and 
housing units. The situation has been worsened by the involvement of the army in the project 
from construction to allocation. The housing trust in Bulawayo was chaired by Zimbabwe 
National Army (ZNA) brigadier general “who was always in conflict with beneficiaries over 
double allocation.
119
   
 
The final allocation of Operation Garikai houses in Bulawayo by the housing trust led by 
army officials brought more confusion since it annulled decisions made by ministry of 
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national housing officials. The involvement of different actors resulted in multiple allocation 
of stands and houses to such an extent that there is no clear ownership of the project outputs. 
In the view of the Bulawayo city, “the council inherited a problem from government”.120  
 
During the handover ceremony of the houses from government to Bulawayo city council, the 
local government minister “warned the city authority not to reallocate the stands and houses 
and reiterated that no house built under Operation Garikai was supposed to be demolished on 
the grounds of inconsistency with the council bye-laws”.121 Bulawayo city council argues 
that, the government of Zimbabwe has “created a monster in the form of Operation Garikai 
and dumped the confusion to the city council”.122 The city is finding it difficult to integrate 
Operation Garikai housing scheme into the city’s urban development network due to a 
number of planning irregularities. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The chapter presented the interface between urban governance politics and urban 
management and planning systems in Zimbabwe. Politics within the urban governance realm 
compromise how cities are managed and planned. Key players in the urban governance 
politics include central government represented by the local government ministry, 
councillors, political parties and council administrative staff. The partisan nature and 
polarization within urban governance politics was evident and clear though acting to the 
detriment of proper urban planning and management. The next chapter presents the 
relationship between urban governance politics and service delivery. 
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CHAPTER SIX: URBAN GOVERNANCE POLITICS AND SERVICE 
DELIVERY IN ZIMBABWE: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
This chapter explains the state of service delivery in Zimbabwe as driven by urban 
governance politics. In particular, four service delivery areas of low cost housing, water and 
sanitation, public transport and road infrastructure are emphasized. With regards to low cost 
housing, I focus on allocation of land for housing, developments in council-led housing, low 
cost housing initiatives outside council, and a comparison of council and outside council 
housing initiatives. Reasons for shifting water and sanitation functions from urban councils to 
the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), impacts of the shift to the delivery of 
water and sanitation functions, and the effects to residents of water and sanitation authority 
changes form the core of discussion on Water and Sanitation. For public transport, emphasis 
is placed on the seizure of bus termini by rank marshals and politicians, the subsequent 
effects of public transport chaos to residents and the causes of public transport crises over the 
study period. Finally, the chapter deliberates on road infrastructure focusing on the rationale 
for shifting vehicle licensing from Urban Councils to the Zimbabwe National Road 
Administration (ZINARA), effect of this shift on road infrastructure maintenance and 
development, reasons for post 2000 infrastructure dilapidation, and the awarding of council 
road infrastructure tenders. The ensuring section focuses on low cost housing. 
 
6.1 Low cost housing 
6.1.1 Allocation of land for housing 
That there are considerable housing challenges in Zimbabwe’s major cities is not in doubt. 
The housing challenge is constrained by supply and demand factors. The chief supply factor 
revolves around availability of suitable land for housing. There are problems ‘associated with 
blockages to availability and actual delivery of land for low-cost and / or low income 
housing’ (GoZ, 2009). This is despite the compulsory acquisition of land for urban expansion 
by the GoZ using the Land Acquisition Act (Chap 20:10). The Ministry of Lands and Rural 
Resettlement has gazetted 68 farms, (Harare – 44, Ruwa – 1, Chinhoyi – 1 and Bulawayo – 
22), though due to legal challenges only four have been confirmed by the Administrative 
Court (GoZ, 2009). Land availability is a principal determining factor for housing delivery. 
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Urban councils and the state are the two principal allocators of housing land in cities. Land 
allocation and approval process is political. If one submits a land application proposal to any 
city council, if land is available and suitable for residential development, the city (executive 
staff) writes a report in response to the application. The report is discussed and a decision is 
taken by the council land committee. If the council land committee approves, the decision is 
taken to full council which takes a decision as advised by the land committee. However, “if 
council land committee is dominated by one party and full council dominated by another 
party, it complicates the process”.123 Decisions are then interpreted in terms of politics.  
 
The stipulated land allocation process was not followed as evidenced by post-2000 invasion 
of peri-urban farms and demolition of houses during OM/RO in 2005. Political parties 
capitalized on people invading land without following proper town planning procedures. A 
case in point is Zanu-PF which “saw mileage in Mbuya Nehanda Housing cooperative and 
facilitated the regularization and formalization of the housing cooperative”.124 Post-2000 land 
allocations were inspired and driven by politics relegating normal procedures of land 
allocation.  In some instances, after invading council, state or private land, land occupiers 
“facing evictions approach councillors to either seek reprieve or to be allocated land 
somewhere”.125 People were using politics and political structures as a convenient way of 
accessing land.  
 
State land is allocated by the stateland office (in the MLGRUD) “with provincial governors, 
and provincial administrators having great influence on who gets state land”.126 Central 
government politicized the land allocation process and the effect spilled to local authorities. 
State land allocation is done through housing cooperatives, “most of which are Zanu-PF 
linked”.127 Zanu-PF is in control of land, and party loyalists are the beneficiaries though not 
allocated according to housing waiting lists. In housing cooperatives like Hacliffe, 
Ushehokunze and Stoneridge farm, there are indications of contestation between CoH and the 
state as the former is ‘refusing’ to approve layout plans and connect water. These settlements 
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are seen “as Zanu-PF projects spearheaded by the local government minister, evidence to a 
politicized and contested process”.128 
 
Council land is allocated by council. Council executive staff recommends what should be 
done to councillors. Previously, councillors had no business in land allocation. Councilors’ 
role was restricted to housing policy formulation and land allocation “was the executive’s 
role but councillors involved themselves because land is highly sought by people”.129 
Involvement in the land allocation process provides gateways for personal enrichment; 
explaining why the majority of MDC councillors are perceived to be corrupt. Councillors 
would sell land illegally and even the local government minister is sucked in corrupt land 
deals (CoH, 2010).  
 
In general, land for low cost housing is lagging behind in terms of housing delivery. Shortage 
of land for low-cost housing in cities is evidenced by 37 slums in the city of Harare (DoS and 
CoH, 2012); as most local authorities lack legally developed land suitable for the 
development of low-cost housing (UNHABITAT, 2006). Local authorities are hamstrung to 
deliver the extent of housing need. Subsequently, occupation of land or farms around Harare 
for example Caledonia, and Whitecliff were necessitated by landless people in the name of 
political motivations. In the early 1990s, site and services programs supported by the World 
Bank and USAID enabled urban councils to deliver consistent housing programs.  
 
Council has a prerogative to allocate land to councillors though “it is problematic as it 
escalates a culture of entitlement”.130 In practice, councillors land entitlements covered high, 
low, and medium density, and industrial areas; a clear sign of primitive accumulation. Land 
accumulation by the local government minister shows massive corruption (as the minister 
owns houses and stand in 16 of the 92 local authorities).
131
 Councillors look up to the 
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primitive accumulation exuded by the minister of local government, and think their 
participation in local government gives them entitlement.  
 
Between 2000 and 2004 the mere change of faces and experience of benefits brought new 
dynamics to council decision making processes. Land allocation changed, as councillors 
“shared interests and mutual benefits when they got into office”.132 In terms of assets, “most 
MDC councillors had nothing, and thus prioritized amassing housing stands”.133 Former 
MDC councillor argued that MDC councillors “were interested in housing stands and office 
and not service delivery”.134 Here, the assumption that councillors are elected to improve 
service delivery is questionable.  
 
Within councils, demand for housing land is initiated by the council department responsible 
for housing followed by urban planning processes and engineering designs. Land 
expropriation is done according to the Urban Councils Act Part X (Immovable Property). 
Section 152 of the Urban Councils Act (Chap 29:15) provides conditions for the alienation of 
council land. According to this Act, before selling, exchanging, leasing, donating any council 
land, council is obliged to publish its intention to do so in two newspapers, availing a copy of 
such notice to the public for 21 days and receive objections of such proposals within 21 days. 
The Urban Councils Act also mandates selling, exchanging, leasing, donating of land where 
there is a town planning scheme, with exceptions only possible with ministerial approval. 
This process was compromised and not followed. 
 
The pricing of council land is done by councillors.
135
 Land for housing is allocated by council 
to individuals using the Council Housing Waiting List Method on a first come first serve 
criteria. In Bulawayo City Council one has to pay a sum of USD 20 yearly to remain on the 
housing waiting list. Corruption has rendered this method useless as thousands have been on 
these lists for decades. There are “known cases of notable business people and politicians 
who bribe council officials to get housing stands overnight”.136 Examples include a former 
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Zanu-PF parliamentarian Phillip Chiyangwa (nephew to the President of Zimbabwe) who 
acquired a total of 109 properties (mostly land) (See Annex III for a full list of the properties) 
from councils through corrupt means. Such corrupt land acquisition as reported in the state 
media (Herald, November 29, 2013) came in the public view during the businessman’s 
divorce with his wife. 
 
The conventional method of land allocation on a first come first serve basis using the housing 
waiting list “have been compromised by corrupt councillors”.137 Councillors are of the view 
that “as long as land is in their Wards, they must have authority on land allocation”. This 
facilitates corruption among councillors. Corruption severely affected the poor who depended 
on low cost housing. People own several housing stands while the “poor have limited access 
due bribes paid in accessing land”.138 The Special Investigations Committee’s Report on city 
of Harare’s land sales, leases and exchanges from the period October 2004 to December 2009 
concluded the existence of rampant corruption in all council departments specifically with 
regards to land deals (CoH, 2010). Thus, the perception amongst home seekers is that “the 
land allocation process is corrupt and time consuming”.139 
 
From a planning point of view, the process of acquiring a piece of land is very clear for 
instance compulsory acquisition or expansion of urban area through government 
proclamation. Nonetheless, “only in cases where Zanu-PF has no interest, law would 
apply”.140 Where the party had interests, law would not apply as evidenced by the (ab)use of 
youths to grab land in cities and forestall BMGF project in Mbare, Harare. Most open spaces 
in Harare have been invaded by Zanu-PF youth and supporters without council approval. In 
addition, the allocation of marketing stalls at Mupedzanhamo and Mbare Musika is controlled 
by Zanu-PF functionaries with little influence from Harare city council.  
 
Central government through FTLRP acquired farms around cities which programme is Zanu-
PF controlled with the MDC controlling urban councils. In the view of Zanu-PF, “giving land 
to MDC would entail promoting the MDC”.141 This brought a dilemma in urban housing 
development as central government could not provide land to urban councils. Instead, Zanu-
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PF gave land to housing cooperatives without services resulting in the sprouting of unplanned 
settlements around cities. The idea of housing cooperatives is noble and beneficial but its 
politicization brings many challenges to coherent urban development. Within the CoH, 
“MDC councillors have created some housing cooperatives though they have not occupied 
land”.142  
 
Farms surrounding cities have been allocated to co-operatives, “with a view to create new 
constituencies that are loyal to Zanu-PF”.143 The strategies worked well on a pilot project in 
Harare South where it is the only constituency retained by Zanu-PF over the past elections 
(2000-2012). Ownership through title deeds is deliberately delayed as a way to enforce 
loyalty. Occupants are threatened with repossession of stands if they are no longer visible in 
political gatherings. How long the strategy will work remains to be seen. Zanu-PF councillors 
who lost in urban councils continue to work in their Wards on parallel structures contending 
to represent people against the wish of the electorate. 
 
Through the Urban Councils Act, local authorities have a role to allocate land for housing 
either for public or private development.  Land allocation for housing is a highly political 
issue in Zimbabwe. First, councillors are involved in shady land deals by sprouting housing 
cooperatives mainly to guarantee support for re-election. Second, land allocation is done for 
self-enrichment by the councillors. In Zimbabwe, the role of a councillor is more of self-
enrichment using public funds and resources than service. Third, the local government 
minister exercises too much powers to the detriment of the council. Through ministerial 
influence, “partisan housing cooperatives have been allocated land at under-valued prices”.144 
Most of these cooperatives have failed to deliver and in many cases, they have defrauded 
potential beneficiaries.  
 
For most cities, available land for housing (in peri-urban farms) has been gazetted to become 
state land. As a result, acquiring urban land for expansion purposes and housing requires 
negotiation with the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and MLGRUD. Urban councils 
found themselves with a need “to get land acquired under the FTLRP which counters the 
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MDC programme for land distribution”.145 Land for housing in councils relies on the 
benevolence of lands and local government ministers and “Zanu-PF thwarts this process so as 
to restrain the governance of MDC Councils”.146 The introduction of Provincial 
Administrators and District Administrators made it more complex and bureaucratic for MDC 
to have control over land outside urban areas.  
 
Through the Land Acquisition Act (Chap 20:10), Zanu-PF used the government compulsory 
land acquisition process as a conduit to get land access. Zanu-PF “mobilized and capitalized 
on landless people”.147 Zanu-PF aligned housing cooperatives have “leadership that is 
political with cooperative names following liberation rhetoric”.148 Zanu-PF rewarded FTLRP 
participants in urban areas with land and properties.
149
 The party invaded peri-urban farms 
and “allocated stands to Zanu-PF supporters with the MLGRUD giving lease agreements”.150 
Many people in urban areas especially low income earners have “taken advantage of political 
allegiance to Zanu-PF to form cooperatives where they allocate themselves land and later 
push for the regularization of their housing schemes”.151 Politics became a convenient tool to 
land access. 
 
In some cases, people occupying land in per-urban areas took over vacant land. Landlessness 
is a pure testimony of poor land delivery. Political structures came in after land occupation as 
“Zanu-PF took advantage of people benefitting through the FTLRP”.152 Despite political 
facilitation, one can argue that people had waited for a long time on the housing waiting list. 
This can be interpreted as a response to a complicated process of getting land in urban areas.  
 
Housing cooperatives went beyond housing provision struggles to include land reclamation 
and challenging housing provision institutional arrangements (Masuko, 2008). The urban 
land question became critical than ever in Zimbabwean history, as social movements (CBOs 
and cooperatives) challenged the conventional way of housing provision. Most housing 
cooperatives were Zanu-PF aligned and most local authorities refused to accept these 
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cooperatives as being “part of an illegal housing and urban planning system”.153 Housing 
cooperatives are used as platforms for political membership mobilization.
154
 Politically 
aligned housing cooperatives have easy access to housing land and are used as a way of 
gathering votes and rewarding those active in local politics.  
 
Housing cooperatives have also posed serious consequences to ecologically fragile lands. For 
instance, in Mutare, Gimboki Housing Scheme is developing part of Dangamvura and 
Chikanga of which the areas are unsuitable for human settlements as the Dangamvura scheme 
is “on a mountain slope posing threats of inhabitants getting drowned in cases of slope failure 
due heavy and torrential rainfall”.155 Hence, politics is over-riding issues of environmental 
integrity and preservation as well as planning principles.  
 
Housing cooperatives are targets for political infiltration especially during elections. Some 
cooperatives such as Joshua M Nkomo (in Harare) “force members allocated stands to 
register four of their family members in that political constituency for voting purposes”. 
Housing linked voter registration and voting is an attempt to use cooperatives to garner more 
party supporters. The idea of housing cooperatives is political as it enabled managing the 
ordinary person’s political life to some extent.156 In cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo 
and Mutare, it was evident that politicians would advise squatters to form cooperatives as a 
way to access housing stands. To join Zanu-PF linked housing cooperatives, prospective 
members would be asked to possess a Zanu-PF membership card even in MDC strongholds. 
 
The issue of cooperatives is a socialist principle which is a Zanu-PF strategy which started 
before independence (for instance Cold Comfort in Harare). The MDC also realized that 
cooperatives “are the only way people can get quick access to land”.157 Councillors gave 
preference to housing cooperatives quickening access to housing. However, there are cases 
where councils have been taken to court or councillors suspended on the basis that land was 
not properly exchanged.
158
 Cooperatives have made significant progress in acquiring land 
from urban local authorities. For the year 2011, the CoH allocated 2954 residential stands to 
                                                          
153
 Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013. 
154
Interview with Precious Shumba, 09 July 2013.  
155
 Interview with Key Informant A. 
156
 Interview with Key Informant H. 
157
 Interview with Key Informant G. 
158
 In Kadoma Council chairperson fired, and Zvishavane, Council Chairperson and Director of Housing fired; 
Chitungwiza, Town Clerk arrested, convicted and fired, and MDC fire all its councillors). 
 
 
 
 
 91 
 
76 housing cooperatives and 16 individuals on the housing waiting list (in excess of 500 000 
home seekers) (CoH DCHS, 2011). During the same year, the city trained and registered 243 
housing cooperatives with a total membership of 15, 311. 
 
Allocation for housing land is characterized by confusion. One key informant bought land in 
Whitecliff, Harare from MoNHSA “though the land was being promised other prospective 
land seekers by some politicians”.159 Moreover, the land in question here is at the centre of 
conflict between property owner (Pfugari Properties) and government. Land is a resource 
used to gain votes rather than a community development tool. A Zanu-PF official was 
allocating land in Hopely, a constituency that Zanu-PF has only managed to retain in all 
elections between 2000 and 2012. In Manyame, “politicians were allocating land without the 
knowledge of Chitungwiza municipality”. Another senior Zanu-PF official was allocating 
and selling housing stands nearer Harare International Airport “where people believed that 
the illegal housing scheme was a front for the local government minister”.160 Land seekers 
are losing money in shoddy land deals spearheaded by politicians.  
 
Council land is normally allocated to private developers, housing co-operatives and corporate 
consortium employer assisted schemes. Current strategies favour the allocation of un-
serviced land to registered cooperatives; “as this is seen as a direct allocation to those in need 
of housing”.161 Co-operative members must meet certain conditions at council level, that is, 
they must be in the housing waiting list and not registered owners of a property within the 
greater Harare region which includes Chitungwiza and Norton. Housing cooperatives are 
being allocated infill stands and land close to existing suburbs so as to reduce the cost of off-
site infrastructure. Land developers and employer consortiums’ are allocated farms that were 
recently incorporated into the new Harare boundaries “because they are better resourced to 
meet the huge infrastructural requirements of the periphery”.162 
 
During the inclusive government (2009-13), the ministries responsible for housing 
(MoNHSA) and land (MLGRUD) were controlled by two different political parties. The 
ministry responsible for land “allocated housing stands directly to beneficiaries”163, usurping 
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and circumventing the role of the MoNHSA. The effect has been the occupation of surveyed 
land without services giving problems to urban local authorities who do not have resources 
for off-site infrastructure. The MoNHSA has been forced to enter into partnership with land 
developers who possess land.
164
 As a result, the MoNHSA with its finance partnered Sunway 
City, a subsidiary of Industrial Development Cooperation which had land to deliver housing 
stands in Harare. The housing stands “were not affordable to low income earners and 
subsequently the housing waiting list could not be followed”.165   
 
In addition, the construction of Willowvale flats in Harare was financed through a loan of a 
USD25 million accessed from the World Bank in 2009. Loan repayment made housing units 
sold at higher price so as to pay back the principal and interest. It is clear that such schemes 
are not balancing housing provision and affordability as high income earners benefit from 
such schemes. The MoNHSA also runs its own housing projects for instance; the Ministry is 
developing and offering housing stands in White Cliff (Harare) and Lower Paradise Park 
(Marondera).  
 
After 2010, land in general was no longer available in the four case study cities. Available 
small pieces of land, to some extent MDC tried to make its members benefit for example “in 
Willowvale flats, and Mufakose flats in Harare; and Kilan and Cowdry Park in Bulawayo 
city”.166 The allocation of housing stands in Budiriro, Harare shows a significant role of 
political parties. Harare City Council “allocated 2000 housing stands in line with sympathetic 
MDC supporters”.167  Zanu-PF quickly invaded the housing stands portraying contestation in 
land allocation. Existing land allocation methods are logically sound though political 
dimensions are worrisome. From a Zanu-PF political strategy, the infills are supposed to be 
allocated to its supporters “as a way to dilute the opposition constituency strongholds and 
narrow the gap as this becomes vital in national elections”.168  
 
6.1.2 Developments in council-led housing 
The urban housing problematic in Zimbabwe is identical with critical shortages. The housing 
backlog is estimated to be at least 1 million, though there is a no comprehensive assessment 
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to substantiate this figure (GoZ, 2012). By year 2000, most urban councils stopped housing 
projects aimed at giving completed housing units. Instead, councils provided land only with 
people providing infrastructure services themselves. High land servicing costs constrained 
development in council-led housing. Councils were even struggling to pay salaries for 
workers and the situation became worse after the dollarization period in January 2009. 
Central government is no longer providing Public Sector Investment Projects (PSIP) grants to 
local authorities, “necessitating a new local authority taxation mechanism”.169 This 
development has led to the dominance of housing delivery by private players, CBOs, 
cooperatives and company assisted housing projects.  
 
Up to 2000, local authorities benefitted from the National Housing Fund (NHF), PSIP, and 
partnerships with building societies in housing delivery. Local authorities had access to low 
interest bearing loans, both on open market and from government. This money was made 
possible because government had access to long term low interest loans from World Bank, 
African Development Bank (AfDB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) extended 
over periods of 25-30years with a low interest rate (4-5%).
170
 Zimbabwe failed to pay its debt 
to multilateral financial institutions (MFIs) resulting in the country only eligible to access 
costly loans of between 18-25% per annum outside MFIs. 
 
A decline in housing finance resulted in a decline in housing delivery. For some time, “local 
authorities facilitated housing delivery through providing off-site infrastructure”.171 During 
the study period, loans from bilateral agencies such as USAID, and SIDA, that helped cities 
in providing off-site infrastructure could no longer be extended. Investing in off-site 
infrastructure is expensive because of high initial capital outlay. The city of Harare does not 
have the infrastructure capacity to support new housing developments. The sewerage 
treatment and water capacity, to support even an additional 100,000 housing units is not even 
sufficient. To that end, “the Iranian project aimed at building between 15, 000 and 20,000 
housing units in Harare failed due to insufficient infrastructure”.172 
 
Urban planning is shaped around the British planning system of spacious stands, quality 
building materials, expensive and generous infrastructure. However, most urban councils 
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have accepted that the current housing delivery approach is untenable. The 2012 National 
Housing Policy reviewed the expensive conception of urban planning and housing delivery 
through allowing incremental development and emphasizing the importance of community 
based organizations (GoZ, 2012). In addition, cities have refocused internally, using different 
kinds of technology to make habitable houses as well as “reducing off-site infrastructure”.173 
For Cities of Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare the review of local development plans resulted in 
densification, reduction of building lines, stand sizes, roads, and creating semi-detached 
houses which in reality are an acceptance that there are no resources.
174
 Cities are also 
allowing people to settle before infrastructure (incremental development) like sewer, water, 
and surfaced roads. Alternative methods of sanitation such as ecosan and boreholes are 
assisting low cost housing development. 
 
Partnership arrangements which are not entirely council projects have increased in 
magnitude. Partnerships are that the Council provides the land and the developer provides the 
required infrastructure. Thus, council role is limited to land allocation and development 
control rather than ownership of housing projects. When housing provision is solely driven 
by a public sector institution, issues of affordability can be catered for. The City of Harare 
and Zimbabwe Building Society (ZBS) partnership housing stands “were unaffordable to low 
income households”.175 The Old Mutual, Central African Building Society (CABS) and City 
of Harare housing project in Budiriro (Harare) aimed at delivering 5,000 stands is the largest 
post-independent housing initiative which is attributed to a networked and strong mayoral 
leadership.
176
 However, the CABS-CoH partnership requires a “CABS bank account and a 
defined income bracket making it difficult for ultra-low income households to benefit.
177
 For 
low cost housing delivery, city council-partnerships with profit oriented organizations subvert 
issues of affordability. Urban councils in Zimbabwe are not able to provide housing alone 
due of capacity constraints. Table 10 (page 95) shows CoH partnership housing projects. 
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Table 10: CoH Housing partnership projects (2008-11). 
Name of project Year Started No. of housing units / 
residential stands 
Slum Upgrading Project Dzivarasekwa 2011 480units 
CABS Project in Budiriro 2009 5000 units 
IDBZ 2008 72 units 
CYBC (Mabvuku) 2007 42 stands 
Shelter Zimbabwe (Chizhanje area, Mabvuku) - 6-7000 stands 
Pearl Properties 2010 Block of flats (132 units) 
Glaudina Housing Development 2007 1351 stands 
Source: CoH DHCS, 2012. 
 
To put into perspective the other case study cities, Table 11 shows city-private sector 
partnership housing projects in Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare. 
 
Table 11: Council-private sector partnerships in the cities of Mutare, Masvingo and Bulawayo. 
Developer No. of Stands  
Allocated 
Completed  
Houses 
Houses Under 
Construction 
Mutare 
Aloe Enterprises 617 500 117 
Pegasus 693 85 - 
ZIMTA 1381 100 188 
Aloe Enterprises 130 - - 
Dream House 333 - - 
Masvingo 
Treasure Consultants 500 16 21 
KPM International 500 NIL NIL 
Mac Dowell 20 NIL 20 
Steel Makers 7 6 1 
NSSA  653 NIL NIL 
ZIMRE 437 NIL NIL 
Bulawayo 
Aggregate Properties 100 6 17 
Glendinning 1004 244 204 
Habek Deug 207 125 73 
Bopse 381 197 205 
ZIGEU 500 425 75 
Standard Products 377 - 4 
G G 116 - - 
Hardware 118 45 32 
Glenkara Homes 1702 696 150 
Source: Mapurisa, 2012: 57. 
 
Table 10and 11 demonstrates that local authorities are constrained to deliver housing projects 
without partnerships. Of the case study cities, the city of Harare is currently running an ultra-
low income housing project financed by the BMGF. The project targets the provision of 480 
housing stands together with infrastructure services. The project initially earmarked Mbare, 
the oldest suburb in Harare but “Zanu-PF claimed 51% of the housing units”178, a clear 
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indication of anti-developmental patrimonialism. Due to political contestation in Mbare, the 
project was subsequently moved to Dzivarasekwa extension, a move that can whittle down 
the expected project impacts. 
 
Operation Garikai is the only Government of Zimbabwe directed universal project which has 
resulted in the provision of low cost housing in the cities of Bulawayo, Harare, Masvingo and 
Mutare between 2000 and 2012 as shown on Table 12. 
 
Table12: Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle projects 
Mutare 
Garikai Phase I 
Chikanga 3 
537 stands allocated 272 houses  
Completed 
31 under  
construction 
Garikai Phase II 
Chikanga 3 
333 stands allocated to 
consortium  
Servicing of the  
Stands completed 
         - 
Bulawayo 
Cowdry Park 
Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle I 
7 000 stands  
Allocated 
200 houses 
Completed 
718 under various  
Stages of  construction 
Masvingo 
Runyararo North 
Garikai I 
340 stands allocated 100 houses 
Completed 
240 are still to be 
developed 
Source: Mapurisa, 2012: 56. 
 
6.1.3 Low cost housing outside council 
In terms of housing delivery, non-state actors provided more quantities as compared to local 
authorities. This can be attributed to capacity and changes in the housing delivery system. 
The Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation technical partner argued that the state is not the 
best institution to housing delivery, “as government is not efficient in housing delivery”.179 
Therefore, the government should create enabling conditions such as housing finance and 
bye-laws. Urban social movements such as the Alliance of DoS and ZIHOPFE managed to 
deliver 15,000 tenured stands and 3,000 housing units to its members.
180
  
There are a number of institutions involved in housing delivery. Table 13 (page 97) presents 
the key institutions involved in housing delivery and their main functions.  
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Table 13: Housing delivery components and assigned institutions  
Institutional category. Main functions. 
Central government. Land allocation, land-use planning, land policy (tenure issues) and general 
regulation of standards (e.g. building materials, housing finance etc.) and 
provision of technical assistance where needed to Councils and other 
stakeholders. Under Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle Government also went as 
far as producing own materials. 
Local authorities. Land allocation (state land allocated to Councils), land use planning, on and 
offsite servicing, technical backstopping of community groups. 
Private sector.  Land development and servicing (build-own-operate-transfer and other public-
private partnership schemes), actual home construction (contractors and 
employing organizations), supporting employees’ housing programmes. 
Building material suppliers. Production and distribution of relevant materials. 
Financial institutions. Provision of finance to home builders and land developers by local and 
international banks, building societies and private investors. 
Construction sector. Land servicing and home building. 
Civil Society Organizations. Savings mobilization, social mobilization of home seekers and capacity 
building, technical backstopping of such groups. 
Source: Chatiza and Mlalazi, 2009. 
Through the national housing loan development facility, central government explored joint 
ventures with the private sector and local authorities in delivering housing. The majority of 
these joint ventures however cater for medium and high income earners. Table 14 shows GoZ 
joint ventures in Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare in delivering high density housing. 
 
Table 14: National Housing Load Development Facility Joint Ventures 
Location Project Status %complete 
Harare Dzivarasekwa 800 high density stands 
300mm diameter sewer line 
Roads, sewer and water reticulation services 
30% 
Bulawayo Parklands Home 
Link 
137 high density stands 
Roads, sewer and water reticulation services 
70% 
Masvingo Nemanwa 300 stands 
Roads, sewer and water reticulation services 
5% 
Mutare Chikanga 201 high density stands 
Roads, sewer and water reticulation services 
100% 
Source: MEPIP, 2012:127-128. 
 
Cooperatives and savings groups played a significant role in terms of housing delivery for 
low income communities. In particular, “these developments were concentrated in peri-urban 
areas using incremental housing development though infrastructure services are poor”.181 
This is largely due to the flexibility of these groups to survive in a hyperinflationary 
environment. Despite these attempts, “the challenge is how to increase the scale of these 
operations”.182 Scalability and changing the regulatory framework are key considerations in 
addressing low cost housing concerns. Urban housing co-operatives think and practice 
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numbers (Kamete, 2006b: 985). Official government statistics reveal that cumulatively CBOs 
delivered over 10, 000 units (serviced stands and finished houses), while building societies 
delivered more than 40, 000 units, thus non-state actors kept some reasonable momentum in 
housing delivery (MoNHSA, 2013). Between 2000 and 2012 the City of Harare allocated 
12,554 housing stands to 254 housing cooperatives with 2,301 housing units completed.
183
 
 
Housing cooperatives have been effective but is some cases cooperative management 
defrauded members for their own benefit without delivering agreed goals. At one stage, this 
prompted the local government minister to issue a directive compelling all cooperative 
members to stop paying contributions to cooperatives. In reality people were suffering, “as 
some cooperative leaders, known Zanu-PF functionaries continued forcing people to pay or 
risk losing housing stands”.184 Most housing cooperatives are dominated by Zanu-PF in terms 
of membership and leadership making these housing schemes highly politicized.
185
 Low cost 
housing projects have been hijacked by politics as a government planner observes: 
 
I have attended several cooperatives including the one currently developing Hatcliffe 
Extension. Zanu-PF slogans are the norm before every member passes any message during 
cooperative meetings. This cooperative got that land through the local government minister 
despite several court contestations by the land owner.
186
  
 
 The pace of development in cooperative housing schemes is very slow owing to the little 
monthly contributions (between USD 20-100). The contributed money caters for all 
administration and development activities such as water, sewer and road construction. 
Despite this observation, Table 15 (page 99) shows the expansion of low cost housing outside 
council in the City of Mutare. 
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Table 15: Housing projects in the City of Mutare 
Name of Project Number of units Project Status 
Chikanga Infill Housing 
Scheme 
166 stands  
 
Being serviced with water sewer 
and roads. 
Hobhouse III high density 
residential scheme 
±1 432 stands 1 200 stands have water and sewer. 
Occupied already. 
Greenside low density scheme 181stands. Occupied since 2005. No roads. 
Shangani (Murambi 
West) residential infill 
32 stands Stands allocated in 2003 and 
2008.There are no services. 
Birkley South 180 low density residential stands. Allocated in 2008. No services 
Dangamvura Golf Course 54 high density stands Finalizing roads 
Dreamhouse housing scheme 365 high density residential stands Roads outstanding. Water and 
sewer partially completed 
Beira Corridor Phase 1 320 low density residential stands Roads and sewer on course 
Gimboki South. 5 500 high density residential 
Scheme 
Yet to start. Run by Gimboki 
Housing Consortium 
Source: Adapted from CoM, 2010. 
 
The period under focus (2000 – 2012) in terms of housing was hindered by the melting down 
of the economy. Despite the said challenges; Table 15 depicts the performance of Shelter 
Zimbabwe as a single entity. These projects have been completed and duly awarded 
certificates of compliance by the relevant local authorities. 
 
Table 16: Shelter Zimbabwe’s housing provision in Harare and Epworth 
Period Number of 
Stands Serviced 
Location (Residential Area) Socio Economic 
Status 
Project Status 
2000-2002 14 Hatfield Medium density Completed 
2000-2002 20 Prospect Medium Density Completed 
2000-2002 328 Railway reserve Phase 1 
Glenview 
High Density Completed 
2004-2005 371 Railway Reserve Phase 2  
Glenview 
High Density Completed 
2004-2005 122 Hopely High Density Completed 
2007-2009 139 Rockview Park Phase 1A  (ELB) Medium Density Completed 
2010-2012 173 Rockview Park Phase 1B (ELB) Medium Density Nearing 
Completion 
Adapted from Shelter Zimbabwe Company profile. 
 
From the foregoing, low-cost housing is no longer spearheaded by local authorities but 
through housing cooperative schemes.
187
 The role of the council has been limited to land 
allocation. Cumulatively, low cost housing schemes outside council have significantly 
contributed to housing delivery. The challenge is that housing cooperatives circumvent urban 
planning laws and in some cases the housing waiting list. Council urban services 
management is riddled with corruption, “as urban councils are taking money without making 
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sure there is proper compliance to planned services”.188 The situation is further aggravated by 
housing cooperatives in which people are refusing to pay for urban services arguing that they 
were not allocated land by councils.  
 
6.1.4 Comparison of council and outside council housing initiatives 
Because of the huge number of housing cooperatives in many urban centers and real estate 
companies which are into land development, housing initiatives outside council have 
contributed significantly to housing provision. Furthermore, central government’s Ministry of 
Housing and Social Amenities is contributing to housing provision using compulsorily 
acquired land for housing development (for example, Dzivarasekwa (Harare), Chikanga 
(Mutare), Parklands Home Link (Bulawayo) and Nemanwa (Masvingo) (MEPIP, 2012). 
Council is doing less in housing delivery “due bankruptcy, corruption and limited machinery 
to embark on housing projects”.189 
 
Council led housing schemes benefitted the middle income, such as civil servants and not low 
income individuals. A case in point is the Willowvale flats in Harare that were built as a low 
cost housing project but ended up benefitting high income groups.
190
 Outside council housing 
initiatives specifically CBOs and cooperatives have contributed more to the delivery of low 
cost housing. Council partnerships with private firms mainly concentrate on medium and low 
density housing projects due to the profit motive of private capital. 
 
Councils have redefined their role from a provider of housing to only a virgin land allocator 
and regulator of private and co-operative housing developments. There is not a single housing 
project wholly under taken by cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare since 
2000.
191
 At the same time, councils have allocated land to various co-operatives and private 
developers. Comparisons can however be made between the private sector  and cooperative 
movement as these have significant housing development projects in urban areas. 
 
Some of the land in peri-urban areas is owned by private companies and its use for council 
housing depends on councils’ ability to negotiate with private companies. Urban council’s 
success was much muted because of the financial crises. Councils could only provide un-
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serviced land. Housing waiting list ballooned with housing cooperatives providing a 
significant contribution to housing shortages. Housing cooperatives were associated with 
Zanu-PF politicking making cooperatives a tool for political expediency. Nonetheless, “if 
housing is only about a roof, outside council initiatives performed well, though infrastructure 
provision in these areas remains a big challenge”.192 The next section looks at the role of 
urban governance politics in the delivery of water and sanitation. 
 
6.2 Water and Sanitation 
6.2.1 Rationale for shifting water and sanitation functions to ZINWA 
In June 2006, Cabinet of Zimbabwe issued a directive compelling all urban local authorities 
to transfer water and sanitation functions to the Zimbabwe National Water Authority 
(ZINWA). The directive raised contestation between central and local government. At that 
time, water contributed the biggest percentage of council revenue making it a cash cow to 
local authorities. The Second report of the parliamentary portfolio committee on local 
government on the takeover of water and sanitation functions presented to the Senate on 11
th
 
April 2007 put the following figures as the percentage contribution of water to total council 
budget (Table 17). 
 
Table 17: Contribution of water to council budgets 
Local authority % contribution of water account to total budget 
Bulawayo 71 
Harare 89 
Mutare 55 
Average 71,7 
Source: PoZ, 2007. 
 
Water and sewerage infrastructure constituted over 60% of urban assets (PoZ, 2007). The 
takeover made ZINWA a huge cash resource, “where Zanu-PF would occasionally take the 
revenue to finance the party”.193 Following this argument, the shift of water and sanitation 
functions from local authorities to ZINWA “show political motivations rather than technical 
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or economic”.194 Central government thought of various ways of getting resources and a 
parastatal presented such opportunity.  
 
The MLGRUD initiated the take-over of water and sanitation functions, “something that most 
local authorities were not expecting from the parent ministry”.195 The city of Bulawayo 
refused to hand over functions to ZINWA and Harare, Mutare and Masvingo councils view 
the city as not having much problems compared to other cities.
196
 The ZINWA board had 
strong characters that were “power hungry and wanted to take more than they can deliver”.197 
Central government did not realize inherent challenges such as deterioration of water and 
sanitation infrastructure. Government tried to find a solution to a problem it did not fully 
understand.  
 
On the other hand, at the takeover by ZINWA, local authorities were struggling to deliver 
water. Despite political motivations, one can argue that central government might have 
thought of reducing overburdening local authorities. ZINWA was managing catchment areas, 
prior to the June 2006 directive. Water is managed as a cycle and therefore one can argue that 
it was a comprehensive water management attempt. 
 
The takeover of water and sewerage functions was a power battle
198
 evidenced by the fact 
that the transfer of assets from urban councils to ZINWA circumvented legal compliance 
issues like asset valuations. ZINWA was selling bulk water to CoH from a city of Harare 
dam. Politics of that time saw “water as a game changer”199 with whoever controlling water 
seen as powerful. Any institutional changes within government “benefits Zanu-PF top 
officials with businesses or relatives in business”.200 Nonetheless, the Urban Councils Act did 
not change as it was only a policy directive from central government. In other words 
according to Sections 168
201
 and 183
202
 of the Urban Councils Act, urban councils were 
mandated to provide water and sanitation services in their areas of jurisdiction. 
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The shifting of water and sanitation functions to ZINWA marked another step in 
government’s re/centralization drive. The official government position was that “local 
authorities had failed to efficiently provide service” (PoZ, 2007). Water is a basic human 
right and “local authorities were labeled to be violating that human right.203 Government used 
the gimmick of human rights with an ulterior motive. Resultantly, local authorities were 
weakened further because of a depleted revenue resource. In 1986, CoH power stations were 
taken over by the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), a central government 
controlled entity. Central government is determined to takeover and manages directly urban 
services.  
 
The state thought it was “mighty and powerful and that it can do anything”.204 Since 1995, 
local authorities were beginning to have less money and “we had a city like an ice block and 
suddenly started melting”.205 Elements of the state wanted to take over and deliver services 
directly. Health, education and electricity were taken over from local authorities by the state. 
Government thought it had the budget and technical expertise to deliver but it failed to 
understand the implications of the take-over. The motive was to strip the powers of councils 
which were dominated by the MDC. Zanu-PF wanted better control by starving local 
authorities of revenue so as to make sure MDC run councils fail. 
 
6.2.2 Impacts of the shift (6.2.1) to the delivery of water and sanitation functions 
Central government failed to administer ZINWA. The supply of water in Harare became 
more erratic with the takeover as there was constant bursting of major water pipelines 
(Chirisa and Jonga, 2009). The services collapsed nationwide. Water treatment became 
difficult and water supply during ZINWA was a nightmare. Water cuts and persistent water 
shortages in all case study cities were frequent. Sewerage was overwhelmed due to lack of 
maintenance and sewer bursts became the order of the day.  
 
Revenue collection was poor and not systematic as evidenced by huge unpaid water bills 
when local authorities took over. ZINWA lacked capacity to manage water and sanitation 
services. Under ZINWA, urban water became hazardous as evidenced by the 2008 cholera 
outbreak. ZINWA was inexperienced, under capacitated, too political and the delivery of safe 
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and clean water to residents was secondary.
206
 The shift was at the expense of urban residents 
who paid the price of suffering (water borne diseases and water rationing) with UNICEF 
drilling hand pump boreholes in most cities to rescue the situation.  The formation of ZINWA 
was a “litmus test by Zanu-PF to have a stake in service delivery to urban residents”.207 
However, ZINWA turned out to be a nightmare to Zanu-PF. 
 
The shift from local authorities to ZINWA created more problems than which existed before 
prompting reversal to local authorities in January 2009. ZINWA performed worse than local 
authorities, the water crisis became more pronounced until the Parliament of Zimbabwe 
demanded water and sewer functions to be returned back to local authorities. ZINWA 
personnel were “poorly remunerated compared to when under local authorities negatively 
affecting personnel morale and performance”.208 To date, there is a personnel crisis which is 
still unresolved, as some urban councils refused to take back the politically appointed staff. In 
Gwanda, the council refused totally to take ZINWA personnel. ZINWA began charging 
Gwanda town council exorbitant rates for water, with the council passing the button to 
residents portraying contestation and confusion in water management. 
 
Central government’s recentralization of water and sanitation was a retrogressive move. 
Government rushed decisions to contain something with very little research making the shift 
to ZINWA an ‘emotional decision’.  After looting all the resources, government returned the 
‘empty shell’ to local authorities. A senior Planning School lecturer noted: “Kwakaenda mota 
kukadzoka vanhu” (movable assets were taken to ZINWA but only workers were returned to 
urban councils).
209
 Massive looting featured the process. ZINWA was taking water pumps 
“from urban councils (i.e. Ruwa) and installing them on top Zanu-PF officials’ farms”.210  
Assets were given to ZINWA with more liabilities returned to urban councils.  
 
To substantiate government’s rushed decision and the politicization of such decision; I cite 
the Auditor and Comptroller General’s 2007 report which shows the extent of ZINWA’s 
incapacity in delivering its mandate before even taking over from urban local authorities. The 
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government ignored the findings and recommendations of the Auditor and Comptroller 
General. The Auditor and Comptroller General revealed that: 
 
My audit revealed that ZINWA was failing to provide undisrupted water supply and water of 
the right quality to its customers in small towns, growth points and institutional customers such 
as Prison Services, Zimbabwe Republic Police and the Defence Forces,….My visits to the 
water treatment stations in the catchment areas revealed that maintenance of plant and 
equipment was not being done according to standards set by management, and according to the 
manufacturer's specifications,….Based on the station inspections which I conducted in the 
catchment areas, I concluded that maintenance was not being taken as a priority by the 
authority. I observed that pumps and pipes were rusty and leaking and not all gate valves were 
working,….The tanks (reservoirs) were not cleaned at regular intervals. The walls of treatment 
tanks at most stations were almost falling apart due to cracks and leakages caused by lack of 
maintenance (Auditor and Comptroller General, 2007; cited in PoZ, 2007). 
 
Residents started complaining about ZINWA’s failure arguing that local authorities were 
better off than ZINWA and government backtracked. However, councils were in the weakest 
position to run water and sanitation services after taking over from ZINWA. City of Harare 
had no chemicals, and was “struggling to meet sanitary standards, which was a challenge in 
most urban local authorities”.211 This is despite the fact that water and sanitation is a key 
human development service defining standards of living. To date, 31 urban local authorities 
have taken back water functions with the exception of one local authority (Plumtree).  
 
When water and sanitation functions were returned to local authorities, government made 
sure that the function is delivered effectively using another parastatal, Environmental 
Management Agency (EMA). EMA concerns itself with water quality, emissions, sewerage 
disposal among other things and “if urban councils are not careful, water revenue goes back 
to government through EMA”.212 EMA was put in place as the chief custodian of 
environmental preservation and stewardship. Most local authorities view EMA as a 
government strategy to siphon local government resources (ZILGA, 2012a). Zimbabwe’s 
political system is corrupt, that it is very difficult to trust politicians and any system they put 
in place. The shift to ZINWA and back to urban councils created serious challenges in terms 
of water administration and billing. Local authorities had not willfully surrendered water and 
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sanitation services, and “therefore were sabotaging ZINWA”.213 The sabotage was evidenced 
by poor and inconsistent water billing by local authorities which resulted in sharp water 
revenue decline handed over to ZINWA.  
 
6.2.3 Effects to residents of water and sanitation authority changes 
ZINWA did not properly manage the available resources and it returned a deteriorated 
infrastructure. The ZINWA issue can be likened to “giving someone an intact water fetching 
gallon and one return it leaking”.214 Non delivery bred distrust in residents. Water charges 
increased. Frequent bursting of water pipes was driven by lack of maintenance skills, 
knowledge and experience by the new authority. In many suburbs such as Corowborough, 
Glen Norah and Glen View (Harare) water become very scarce and used to be provided two 
days per week.  Water standards were not closely monitored. Residents were supplied with 
dirty and un-purified water because the “contracts with companies which used to supply 
Harare City council with water chemicals were terminated with new found suppliers failing 
to meet the demand”.215 Residents were the worst affected as a planner pointed out:  
They are the ones who went for days, months, and years without running water. They are the 
ones who experienced raw sewage gushing out of sewer pipes. They are the ones who had to 
look for alternative sources of clean water.
216
  
 
This is in addition to paying exorbitant water bills and rates for a service not delivered. 
Residents succumbed to diseases out-break like cholera and typhoid. The cholera outbreak 
claimed 4000 lives (ICG, 2009). However, part VII, Section 100 of the Health Act compels 
Local Authorities to prevent or remedy danger to health arising from “any well or other 
source of water supply or any cistern or other receptacle of water, whether public or private, 
the water which is used or likely to be used by man for drinking or domestic purposes…” 
In this case local authorities had no role to play in fulfilling this mandate. 
 
Extracts (Box 3, page 107) from reports on Rockview Park, Shelter Zimbabwe’s (SZ) 
housing project in Epworth shows challenges faced by residents as a result of the collapse of 
ZINWA.  
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Box 3 indicates that, the absence of a centralized water authority created by the handing over 
of water supply functions from ZINWA to local authorities created serious problems of co-
ordination in sharing water resources between local authorities. There is essentially no 
integrated planning of water resource infrastructure between developments in proximity areas 
but under different local authority jurisdiction. For Harare metropolitan province, CoH, ELB 
and Ruwa Local Board have not developed a common infrastructure that would service 
Zimre Park, Sunway City, Rockview Park and other upcoming housing projects in Epworth, 
Ruwa and Harare. To have a Shelter Zimbabwe bulky water line crossing the Sunway City 
bulky water line and the two water lines getting supplies from the same source shows lack of 
integrated planning of off-site infrastructure by local authorities concerned.  
 
When ZINWA took over water and sanitation functions, it employed local authorities to bill 
and collect water charges. Revenue collection system went down as local authorities were not 
collecting the charges properly, “as a way of sabotaging ZINWA”.217 When water and 
sanitation services were handed to local authorities, local authorities revised the revenue 
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Box 3:  Rockview Park Water Supply sequence of events. 
 
A project feasibility study of Rockview Park in Epworth carried out in 2006 indicated that the underground 
water supplies of the area were not adequate to have the drilling of boreholes. As a result the same study 
recommended that the housing development be connected to Harare water through the existing 350mm 
Ventersburg - Ruwa main. 
 
On 20 May 2008, SZ submitted an application to ZINWA for a water connection from the existing 350mm 
ZINWA Ventersburg - Ruwa main that runs parallel to Harare - Marondera railway line. On 09 September 
2009, ZINWA approved the water connection of Rockview Park to the Ruwa main. In 2009 ZINWA handed 
over water supply services to Local Authorities. City of Harare and Ruwa refused to recognize the 
connection of the project to the Ruwa main arguing that ZINWA made an error it should have consulted the 
two councils prior to granting the connection. In a letter dated 24 January 2011 City of Harare advises SZ to 
negotiate with Ruwa Local Board because the line was financed by Ruwa and hence they own the line. In a 
response to SZ application to regularize the water connection on 27 February 2011, Ruwa Local Board 
advises that it cannot negotiate with a private developer but Epworth Local Board (ELB). Negotiations 
between the two Local Authorities continue to drag on at the expense of the developer and beneficiaries. 
 
SZ had to look for an alternative by approaching another private developer Sunway City which is adjacent to 
Rockview, who have developed water reservoirs at Ventersburg and owns a separate water line running 
parallel to the Ruwa line into Sunway City. SZ sought connection of the development to the Sunway line. In 
a letter dated 10 October 2011, Sunway City advised SZ that the water infrastructure was adequate for their 
development only and it was not negotiable for other developments. SZ being a major competitor of Sunway 
City the decisions of Sunway City could have been motivated by out playing its competitor in terms of sales 
as they were marketing similar products.  
 
Source: Various Shelter Zimbabwe Documents and letters. 
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collection system. As a result, bills increased and residents were unable to pay prompting 
central government interference discouraging local authorities from cutting water supplies. It 
affected the viability of local authorities as it “increased the number of people not willing to 
pay”.218 The quality of services is dependent on the financing the service gets. By owing 
council large sums of money, residents were actually making councils unable to provide the 
service. Partially, this explains why suburbs were going for months without water as local 
authorities revenue shrank in addition to obsolete water and sanitation infrastructure. 
 
6.3 Public Transport 
6.3.1 Rank marshals and political players 
Ranks marshals besieged and controlled bus termini in cities, which can be argued as the 
proliferation of the informal sector. Due to harsh macro-economic environment, people were 
doing anything for survival. Nonetheless, it became political as politicians recognized 
political mileage and capitalized. The process of bargaining followed, with “Zanu-PF 
protecting rank marshals on condition to attending party meetings”.219 The underlying cause 
was economic in nature with politics riding on economic concerns. Politics superseded 
everything in the informal sector. Urban control was difficult because the “MDC risked 
losing support”.220 Inadvertently or intentionally, the MDC became a victim of political 
correctness.  
 
The city of Harare has a traffic population of 160 000 (entering CBD per day during business 
hours), 800 000 registered vehicles, 7000 parking bays in the CBD and 16 000 licensed 
vehicles an average per year (CoH DUPS, 2012). Registered commuter omnibuses in Harare 
during year 2010 were 1,038 and 825 in 2011 (CoH DUPS, 2012). It is reported that there are 
more than 6, 000 unregistered commuter omnibuses in Harare.
221
 Traffic in cities was 
uncoordinated with rank marshals being the only visible ‘regulator’. This was compounded 
by the fact that local authorities do not have control over commuter omnibus licensing 
contrary to discussions concluded in 1997 and a draft Statutory Instrument prepared to allow 
control of commuter omnibus licensing by local authorities (ZILGA, 2012a). 
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Zimbabwe lacks a broader plan in terms of public transportation system. Rank marshals were 
controlled by “individuals with money and political power”.222 Ultimately, rank marshals had 
become a law unto themselves. The military intervened after rank marshals had beaten a 
soldier and the situation improved thereafter. Vigilante groups like Chipangano linked to rank 
marshals terrorized residents; a signal of lawlessness and a manifestation of powerless urban 
councils. Rank marshals disrespected the public to the extent of beating anyone who did not 
follow their instructions. With functional bye-laws and traffic police, “the victimization of 
passengers and residents by rank marshals could not have happened”.223  
 
Harare Residents Trust, an urban social movement advocating for effective representation of 
Harare Metropolitan Province residents is of the view that, it was Zanu-PF’s economic tactic 
to sustain its youth wings through the creation of vigilante groups such as Chipangano and 
Upfumi Kuvadiki.
224
 Rank marshals were youth organized under Zanu-PF vigilante groups 
with state protection and access to state resources. Youths were collecting money on bus 
termini, setting fares with Zanu-PF protection, a clear and willful violation of the law. Zanu-
PF extended its hands in the chaos that characterized urban central business districts. Rank 
marshals acted like “mafias extorting people with the blessing of state institutions like the 
Police”.225 More so, there was unending conflict between rank marshals and commuter 
omnibus drivers. These drivers had in many instances Zanu-PF bosses and were being 
quizzed by the public (who were not prepared to pay any fare hike), police and rank marshals.  
 
On average each commuter omnibus paid to rank marshals USD6 per day with 5, 
000commutters operating 364 days gives an annual income of USD10, 92 million. One 
would therefore be confronted with questions as to whether rank marshals were making 
money for themselves or a cartel. A senior Planning school lecture at the University of 
Zimbabwe argued that rank marshals were “working in partnership with Zimbabwe Republic 
Police (ZRP) and political cronies making the process complex and intricate”.226 Rank 
marshals flourished at “bus termini remitting the bulk of their daily takings to a political 
syndicate aligned to Zanu-PF”.227 This explains why “rank marshals charged commuter 
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operators using the language and regalia aligned to Zanu-PF”.228 The failure by the police to 
deal with rank marshals meant that there was an underhand propping rank marshals.  
 
Of the case study cities, Harare was worst affected. A city official argued that, “Bulawayo 
City Council is run administratively and there is law and order with Harare being run 
politically and there is no law and order”.229 City of Harare was failing to even collect rates 
from flea markets “as the rentals were paid to Zanu-PF structures”.230 This view was verified 
and confirmed when the researcher visited flea markets pretending to be in need of having a 
flea market. Discussions with five individuals indicated Zanu-PF supremacy in handling flea 
markets rentals. This development makes Zanu-PF supreme to any authority. 
 
6.3.2 Effects of public transport chaos to residents
231
 
The public transport chaos did not negatively affect residents per se though predictability and 
organization were poor. Zimbabwe in general was reacting from a crisis every time as there 
was little evidence of investment in preparedness planning. Residents benefitted more than 
they suffered. Due to transport chaos, congestion was rife though citizens had a choice, 
variety and access. The urban public transport sector was too crowded and over-traded 
resulting in the oversupply of public transport, reducing the transport cost. Public safety was 
crippled as “commuter drivers drove without driving licenses coupled with the proliferation 
of unroadworthy vehicles”.232 Several accidents occurred with most commuter omnibuses 
uninsured. Safety and security were the biggest fatality. Most accidents which occurred in 
CBDs were also caused by commuter omnibuses that would either be running away from the 
ZRP or over speeding. 
 
It became difficult to regulate omnibus fares and rank marshals increased fares at will. A 
practicing planner noted that:  
 
In some instances, residents ended up paying more. They were also subjected to verbal and 
physical abuse by the rank marshals. There were also thieves amongst the rank marshals who 
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were stealing from the unsuspecting residents. The rank marshals also contributed to the 
pollution of the city by relieving themselves in service lanes and littering.
233
  
 
Rank marshals emotionally and physically harassed the public as they competed to get 
passengers to load commuter omnibuses. Many old and young people “lost their belongings 
due to theft during the process of queuing to access public transport”.234 The public were also 
affected by fare hikes in areas furthest from city centers as there was no fare monitoring. 
Hence, uniformity and consistence in prices disappeared. Noise pollution characterized most 
CDBs as rank marshals touted all day soliciting for clients. Also related to this include drug 
abuse, quarrels and fights in CBDs by competing rank marshals.  
 
A considerable number of senior Zimbabwe Republic Police officers own commuter 
omnibuses, retarding impartial law enforcement. Clampdown on rank marshals positively 
affected people as fares reduced from USD4 to USD2 to and from a journey. It was a blessing 
for people as sanity prevailed at ranks and transport became more efficient than before. 
 
6.3.3 Causes of public transport crises over the years 
The increase in population has not been matched by an equal increase in public transport 
infrastructure investments over the years. The decline of industrial activities in industrial 
areas also meant that most residents travel to the City centre on a daily basis where most 
activities are concentrated. The flow of traffic in Harare is not distributed along roads leading 
to industrial zones (e.g. Workington, Southerton, Willowvale and Msasa). Instead all traffic is 
directed towards the CBD because of “low industrial activity in the aforementioned areas”.235 
 
The liberalization of public transport created numerous individual players who are not 
coordinated. Due to the absence of barriers to entry, the public transport business in cities is 
overtraded increasing the levels of competition. The unsustainable level of competition made 
commuter operators to do “anything to survive the competition and break even”.236 Increase 
in commuter omnibuses made traffic management challenging for city managers. Due to 
increase in private commuter omnibuses, termini facilities have failed to cope. To 
substantiate this, Table 18 shows the city of Harare planned termini facilities. 
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Table 18: City of Harare Planned termini facilities 
Rank Location Area Serviced Minibuses Buses Rank Location 
Fourth Street 
Bus Terminus 
Hatcliffe, Domboshava, Tafara, Mabvuku, 
Epworth, Masasa Park, Highlands, 
Mandara, Ruwa, Chishawasha    
279 4 Fourth Street 
Bus Terminus 
Charge Office Hatfield, Zengeza, Makoni, Sunningdale, 
Seke 
232 _ Charge Office 
Market Square Budiriro, Glenview, Machipisa, 
Kambuzuma, Western Triangle, Mufakose, 
Glen Norah, Christon Park 
330 _ Market Square 
Source: City of Harare, 2010. 
 
Planned termini facilities in the four case study cities are inadequate in terms of capacity and 
maintenance.  Termini infrastructure is unable to absorb the increasing number of commuter 
omnibuses. Due to adjacent developments, “the physical expansion of the existing termini is 
not possible”.237 The transport section of the City of Harare indicated that there is need to 
increase efficiency and relevance of the existing planned termini infrastructure (Chakamba, 
2010). Revamping existing termini to improve functionality, attractiveness and 
competitiveness so as to lure commuter omnibuses is important. 
 
Incidental bus termini have developed as a coping mechanism. Incidental termini are 
informal commuter services area that lack basic amenities like toilets, shades and loading 
bays. These include former on-street parking provisions which have been converted and 
designated by the city council as commuter omnibus ranking facilities and unofficial areas 
dotted across city centre were commuter omnibuses load and drop off passengers (Chakamba, 
2010). For city of Harare, Table 19 (page 113) shows a number of created incidental bus 
termini.  
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Table 19: Incidental bus termini in the City of Harare 
Termini location Area serviced Minibuses  Buses 
Western side of Mbuya Nehanda Street between Nelson Mandela 
and Kwame Nkrumah Avenue 
Norton  25 - 
South side of Kwame Nkrumah Avenue between Mbuya 
Nehanda Street and Harare Street 
Belvedere  60 - 
Eastern Side of Mbuya Nehanda Street between Jason Moyo 
Avenue and Nelson Mandela Avenue 
Kuwadzana 
Extension 
36 - 
Southern side of Nelson Mandela Avenue between Mbuya 
Nehanda Street and Harare Street 
Dzivarasekwa 
Extension 
46 - 
Northern side of Kwame Nkrumah Avenue between Chinhoyi 
Street and Mbuya Nehanda Street 
Mt Pleasant 60 - 
Western side of Jason Moyo Avenue between Mbuya Nehanda 
Street and Harare Street 
Malbereign/ 
Westgate 
70 - 
Western side of Chinhoyi Street between Albion Street and 
Robert Mugabe Road 
Westgate  41 - 
Western side of Mbuya Nehanda Street between Jason Moyo 
Avenue and Speke Avenue 
Malborough  45 - 
Western side of Chinhoyi Street between Nelson Mandela 
Avenue and Kwame Nkrumah Avenue 
Warren Park  140 - 
Northern side of Nelson Mandela Avenue between Chinhoyi 
Street and Mbuya Nehanda Street 
Dzivarasekwa  - 10 
Western side of Chinhoyi Street between Speke Avenue and 
Albion Street 
Southerton  35 - 
Eastern Side of side of Seke road off Rail over bridge Manyame Air 
Base 
17 - 
Rezende Street South Epworth  53 - 
Robson Manyika road opposite Charge Office Seke  59 - 
Northern side of Bank Street between Harare Street and Kaguvi Chinhoyi and 
Bindura  
118 - 
Source: City of Harare, 2010. 
 
Incidental bus termini as shown on Table 19 made traffic management difficult. This was 
compounded by limited resources at the disposal of municipal police. 
 
6.4 Road Infrastructure 
6.4.1Reasons for taking vehicle licensing from Urban Councils to ZINARA 
The Vehicle Registration and Licensing Act (Chap 13:14) provides local authorities as Roads 
authorities with the power to collect vehicle licensing revenue. The Vehicle Registration and 
Licensing Act Chapter 13:14 Section 31(1) reads:  
 
Notwithstanding anything in any law but subject to section 38 and subsection (3), (5) and (6) a 
local authority may, in consultation with the Road Administration and by notice published by 
the Minister in statutory instrument in the prescribed form, fix a tariff of fees in respect of 
vehicles ordinarily kept at night within the area under control or administration of a local 
authority to be paid for licenses, temporary licenses, temporary identification cards … and the 
issue of other  documents by a local authority in respect of vehicles and such fees shall be 
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charged, levied and collected for the benefit of the Road Fund and the local authority may by 
like notice and amend or replace such tariff or fees. 
 
The beneficiary of such fees is the road fund, which in terms of the Act means Zimbabwe 
National Road administration (ZINARA). 
 
Furthermore, Section 31(2) of the Act provides that: 
  
The proceeds of fees charged, levied and collected in terms of subsection (1) shall after 
deduction by the local authority of any administrative fees fixed by the Road Administration in 
terms of section 54, be held by the local authority on behalf of the Road Fund and be used by 
the local authority in a manner approved by the Road Administration. 
 
The Act mandates local authorities to collect and administer vehicle license fees. It is 
recognized that local authorities in Zimbabwe had been collecting motor vehicle licenses with 
some degree of success.   
 
ZINARA was created in 2001 through the Roads Act (Chap 13:18) with the main aim of road 
administration and the management of the Roads fund. In 2010, at the time when local 
authorities were placing orders for motor vehicle license books, they were surprised to learn 
that the license fees collection functions had been removed and placed into the hands of 
Zimbabwe Posts and Telecommunications (ZIMPOST) with no formal communication from 
ZINARA or the Ministry of Transport, Communication and Infrastructure Development 
(ZILGA, 2012b). Vehicle licensing functions were taken away from local authorities to 
ZINARA through a government directive. The Vehicle Registration and Licensing Act (Chap 
13:14) did not change. Central government realized the fast deterioration of infrastructure and 
deteriorating central revenue funds and looked for an avenue to exploit. Taking vehicle 
licensing became “the easy way out”.238  Here, it can be argued that the centralization of 
vehicle licensing through ZINARA was aimed at coordinated infrastructure development.  
 
The purpose of vehicle licensing fees is road infrastructure maintenance. However, very few 
local authorities were failing to account for the money due to misappropriation (i.e. paying 
for salaries at the expense of roads). The Minister of Transport used an excuse of one RDC 
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(Wedza) which misused vehicle licensing funds as the reason for withdrawing the function 
from local authorities (ZILGA, 2012b). Section 32(1) provides for circumstances where 
minister may collect fees on behalf of local authority:  
 
If in the opinion of the Minster, a local authority fails or is unable to collect all or any part of 
the fees payable to it in terms of this Act, the Minister may undertake the collection of such 
fees on behalf of the local authority and recover from such local authority any costs incurred by 
him in that connection.  
 
Due to poor accounting systems, “there were also fake road licenses depriving local 
authorities’ revenue”.239 In addition, the enforcement of vehicle licensing by the Municipal 
police was weak resulting in inefficient revenue collection.  Based on these two reasons, one 
can argue that local authorities were responsible for the decision taken by the government. 
However, local authorities are of the view that each local authority “should have been 
advised of its shortcomings before such drastic actions were taken and that the current 
arrangement of distributing funds through ZINARA is unsustainable”.240  
 
The idea of recentralization by the government was “premised on power, control and 
opportunities for rents”.241 ZINARA is an attempt by government to centralize vehicle 
licensing and fees collection. Government had no money to build rural roads and decided to 
take the function from local authorities so as to spread the money across the country. 
ZINARA’s distribution of licensing fees has raised a lot of concerns and debate as the 
minister of transport skews allocation of vehicle licensing funds to Zanu-PF strongholds. 
ZINARA plays a redistribution role to all provinces irrespective of number of cars and road 
coverage; an indication of the folly of government’s recentralization drive. Allocation by 
ZINARA does not take into account the geographical concentration of license payers. 
 
The ZINARA vehicle licensing takeover disconnected licensing to what the city can afford to 
manage (absorption levels). Decentralization of roles and responsibilities remained with 
revenue centralized.  Cities were no longer in control of the supply side of urban transport. 
Central government interference in road management with ZINARA affected the ability of 
local authorities to repair and build roads through vehicle licensing of motorists. 
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Centralization through ZINARA raises questions of distribution efficiency and the City of 
Harare “showed displease with the revenue allocation process”.242 Urban councils have no 
direct control of vehicle licensing putting local authorities in a weak position to perform road 
maintenance functions. 
 
Urban councils are of the view that “where they are making some revenue, central 
government takes over the function”243. To that end, urban councils are victims of a difficult 
and complex political environment. Six council officials argued that central government had 
no reliable revenue streams therefore vehicle licensing was a remedy to government 
bankruptcy. The nature of politics in urban Zimbabwe is synonymous with MDC. Zanu-PF 
tried to take political life out of urban areas through “centralizing possible revenue streams 
for MDC run councils”.244 One can argue that ZINARA was an attempt to under-resource 
urban councils such that councils fail to get enough revenue to service urban areas so that 
failure is ascribed to MDC run councils. Urban areas have been battle fields by virtue of 
being run by the MDC; “every aspect of it, be it water treatment, pot holes, are contested and 
politicized”.245  
 
Central government is committed to have direct control over local authorities’ potential 
revenue generating streams so as to under-resource MDC run councils. If the MDC had 
access to vehicle licensing revenue, “the party would make significant developments in 
infrastructure development and Zanu-PF would be seen as a failure”.246 Away from politics, 
two questions arise for interrogation. These are: previously when urban local authorities had 
vehicle licensing responsibility, what is that they achieved? How are the ZINARA funds 
accountable and used for road maintenance? These two questions could not be fully 
ascertained with data available to the researcher. Nonetheless, it is clear that ZINARA is 
“mechanism that ensures funds from vehicle licensing are used to benefit roads maintenance 
and not salaries of local authorities’ personnel”.247  
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Government realized the “collapse of ZIMPOST; a parastatal despite having huge 
infrastructure around the country”.248 It was essential to rescue ZIMPOST and therefore 
government took over the function from local authorities. It seems that the collapse of 
ZIMPOST was burdened to local authorities, as central government made sure that 
ZIMPOST collected ZINARA license fees. The Government of Zimbabwe has a long history 
of “taking over functions from local authorities with one reason that is access to funds”.249 
ZINARA, ZESA, ZINWA, and ZUPCO allow central government to direct service delivery 
operations through parastatals. It also became easy to use service delivery commandeered 
through centralization to garner political support.  
 
6.4.2 Net effect of this shift (6.4.1) on road infrastructure maintenance and development. 
ZINARA is maintaining national roads only, though not comprehensively. Thus, ZINARA is 
looking at “one’s face and not the rest of your body”.250 Access roads in all case study cities 
are derelict and unattended signifying little or no improvement. When someone hits a pothole 
in cities, “one thinks of council and not ZINARA”.251 In major cities like Harare and 
Bulawayo, people pay more traffic levies but when allocating ZINARA funds, equity issues 
are considered rather than the number of cars. Fund allocation criteria are wrong, since it 
suffocates largest contributing cities. One can argue that ZINARA is a wrong model to urban 
road infrastructure maintenance. 
 
The allocation of ZINARA funds from both toll gates and vehicle licensing is questionable as 
some “local authorities in Zanu-PF strongholds (Mashonaland province (Bindura and 
Zvimba) have benefitted more than other big cities”.252 Local people must have full control of 
their resources. However, this is not the case as revenue collected in major cities like Harare 
and Bulawayo is being taken to benefit people in other areas who might not have contributed. 
Moreover, revenue generated to benefit roads, “is channeled elsewhere by the government as 
ZINARA money was diverted to pay arrears to the World Bank”.253 
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The net effect to road infrastructure maintenance is a “serious and negative one, the same 
effect with ZINWA and ZESA”.254 In the past Mutare, Kadoma, Harare, Gweru and 
Bulawayo generated their own electricity until 1986 when ZESA was created and people are 
still feeling that effect today. Instead of government focusing on power generation and 
network development, government through ZESA are focusing on distribution. That 
centralization which happened gradually between 1990 and 2005 destroyed service delivery. 
However, centralization in Zimbabwe goes back to a one party state where government tries 
to do everything for the people. 
 
The association of rural district councils (RDCs) and Urban Councils argued to the local 
government ministry that the impact will be highly negative in that roads will not be 
maintained and more legal suits will arise and council will lose significant amounts of funds 
compensating the complainants. In addition, Zimbabwe Local Government Association 
(ZILGA) noted with concern the public outcry due to poor roads resulting in local authorities, 
and residents/stakeholders losing confidence in their local authorities (ZILGA, 2012b). 
 
ZINARA has no accountability pressure, “since it does not have any constituency except 
being part of a central government ministry”.255 The researcher could not determine the 
efficiency, and corporate accountability of ZINARA. It was also difficult to ascertain the 
accountability mechanism for toll gates and vehicle licensing funds. In broadest sense, 
ZINARA revenue should support infrastructure development and capacity building of local 
authorities in infrastructure maintenance. It was also established that ZINARA is not too 
divorced from central government, making the entity prone to a “revenue generating vehicle 
for central government”.256 ZINARA funds are not properly accounted for as “USD 
20million is reported to have vanished”.257  
 
6.4.3 Reasons for post 2000 Infrastructure dilapidation 
Road construction standards were severely compromised. This can be attributed to either 
absence of quality control or corruption in council construction works. Substandard products 
which are not durable, and temporal solutions provided by most local authorities explain the 
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sub-standard infrastructure in place.
258
 Private property developers were cheating home 
owners by using sub-standard road equipment materials which last for only 6-7years instead 
of 20-25 years.  
 
Of all the case study cities, there are no infrastructure rehabilitation and development plans in 
excess of a 20 year planning period. Local authorities do not prioritize planning and “without 
benchmarks, city authorities cannot be assessed”.259 Plans with well-articulated indicators are 
crucial aspects to measure performance. Incompetence, poor planning, wrong priorities, and 
staff bloating affected the capacity of urban councils to maintain infrastructure. The 
MLGRUD introduced results based management framework, though at present it is still a 
grey area. Challenges of maintenance can also be attributed to central government which is 
no longer providing PSIP grants that can support road maintenance. A formula for sharing 
road maintenance between the state and urban councils seem dysfunctional and non-
transparent. The operation of ZINARA resembles “ratepayers subsidizing the state rather than 
the reverse”.260  
 
Some new suburbs have no roads at all. Before 2000, roads and sewer infrastructure were 
built first before house construction but post-2000; people were allowed to build without 
infrastructure. The situation is haphazard as councils no longer have enough money to put 
infrastructure before house construction. The state of infrastructure is dilapidated, “due to a 
combination of politicization of road infrastructure construction and maintenance, and 
economic instability”.261  
 
6.4.4 Awarding of council road infrastructure tenders 
Tendering is opaque, “with no plans and time for councillors to devote to this process as 
councillors are preoccupied with taking decisions”.262 The lack of transparency created chaos 
leaving everything to uncertainty and cloudiness. Corruption marked road infrastructure 
tenders, as corruption thrived on lack of transparency. In most tenders “as long as councillors 
were involved, there was evidence of corruption”.263 The tendering process is defrauding 
public funds because of overpricing due to the constructed process (paying councillors and 
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the service to be provided). As a result, councils suffered due public funds misappropriation. 
Corruption became a critical source of living to the detriment of residents. 
 
The awarding of tenders is not clear, although the council advertises inviting tender bids. 
However the tender selection criteria are not public knowledge. Tendering is contested issue 
because most companies that “were awarded the tenders either belong to council officials or 
their political counterparts”.264 The researcher was denied by the four cities a roaster of all 
tenders awarded during the period under study. Tendering was also controlled by the local 
government ministry, with tenders given to Zanu-PF sympathizers. Umguza, Ruwa, and 
Harare councils were forced to pay in advance by the MLGRUD for tender services not yet 
provided.  
 
6.5 Conclusion  
The chapter presented how service delivery was affected by urban governance politics. 
Research findings indicate that service delivery suffered most due to contestations and 
confusion among political parties, city administration, city political wing and central 
government. It is also evident that politics of survival and appeasement were prioritized 
during the study period leading to the neglect of key service delivery considerations (water 
and sanitation, low-cost housing, public transport and road infrastructure). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR 
URBAN GOVERNANCE IN ZIMBABWE. 
 
Key summaries and conclusions are based on the interface between urban governance politics 
and service delivery. Recommendations are developed based on the key conclusions and 
findings. In particular, I explain policy directions to improve service delivery in urban areas 
of Zimbabwe. The subsequent section presents key conclusions. 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
Considering the role of politics in urban governance, the crisis of service delivery in urban 
Zimbabwe is a political crisis driven by the political impasse between the MDC and Zanu-PF. 
That the urban governance system in Zimbabwe is a creation of a one party state is not in 
doubt. The rise of the Movement for Democratic Change heralded a period marked by 
contestation, confusion and change. Contestation emanated from the contest for control of the 
urban constituency between MDC and Zanu-PF. Change manifested itself in the rise of the 
MDC in controlling urban councils, with the decline of Zanu-PF support in urban areas. 
Confusion revealed itself through the actions of the local government ministry which 
relentlessly interfered and distorted the operations of urban councils. The local government 
minister became the ‘god father of all local authorities’ or the ‘defacto Mayor of Zimbabwe’. 
Urban councils became weak as service delivery was politicized with party structures more 
powerful than urban administration. Political contestation brought confusion as it became 
difficult to determine who was in control of urban affairs. Elected councillors and mayors 
were suspended or fired with central government taking over the delivery of some urban 
services.  
 
Nonetheless, centre-local relations have been problematic for a long time, even when Zanu-
PF was the only dominant party. In 1998, central government fired a Zanu-PF Mayor 
(Solomon Tawengwa) when the city of Harare went for days without water. During the 
period under study, at the centre of the problem between urban local authorities and central 
government relations is a legislation challenge. The Urban Councils Act (Chap 29:15) and its 
amendments had serious operational and political ramifications on the autonomy and 
management of urban affairs. Three important legal issues need to be underscored here. First, 
the Urban Councils Act gives excessive and unrestrained power to the local government 
minister. Second, the abolition of Executive Mayors undermined the importance of citizens’ 
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voice as the Town Clerk became more powerful than elected councillors. Third, the provision 
allowing the Local Government Board to appoint senior council heads of departments has 
largely been manipulated by the local government ministry to effect partisan appointment of 
loyalists in key council posts. 
 
Ministerial powers to suspend councillors, appoint commissioners, and reinstating expelled 
councillors ultimately affected service delivery as people elected in some cases have not been 
given the chance to serve and deliver. For instance, Mayor Elias Mudzuri was elected by 
Harare residents but due to excessive ministerial powers, the Mayor was fired despite positive 
and significant contributions he made in his short term in office (1 year). The subsequent 
Zanu-PF (Makwavarara) commission presided over intensive service delivery deterioration 
and massive corruption in land deals.  
 
In February 2010, a new twist to urban governance contradictions emerged as the MDC fired 
the entire Chitungwiza Municipality councillors and the local government minister protected 
the fired councillors. The party’s decision was premised on lack of good governance, 
accountability and failure to deliver amongst councillors. In some instances, the caliber of 
councillors from the MDC was poor and corrupt. People contesting to be councillors were not 
driven by desire to change people’s lives but driven by bravado to challenge Zanu-PF, as well 
as earning a livelihood. The caliber of MDC councillors questions the qualities that should be 
exhibited by councillors such as professional experience, respected, and senior citizens of the 
society. 
 
The relationship between central and local government is meant to strengthen the functioning 
of urban councils as defined within the law. The local government ministry plays supervisory 
and monitoring roles. Local authorities are supposed to furnish their operations to the 
ministry periodically. In principle, this relationship as defined by the Urban Councils Act is 
meant to enhance service delivery. However, the actions of the local government minister are 
perceived as anti-service delivery with supervision viewed as an impediment to service 
delivery. A case in point is the council budgeting process which the minister took longer to 
approve budgets with inflation taking effect. In accordance with the Urban Councils Act 
(Chap 29:15, Section 288b), local authorities submit the proposed budget for the minister’s 
information, though the minister took it as permission seeking process. One can interpret this 
as over performing the supervisory role. Moreover, the local government minister interfered 
 
 
 
 
 123 
 
in the setting of rates. Rates objections from the local government minister on behalf of 
government have often resulted in the incapacity of local authorities to deliver services.  
 
Politics severely compromised the profession and practice of urban planning. It is evident that 
planners succumbed to politics of patronage at the expense of urban residents and town 
planning principles. In fact, the Zanu-PF regime defeated town planning. Urban planning law 
only applied where Zanu-PF had no interests. The failure of urban planning manifested in the 
infamous Operation Murambatsvina, which left an estimated 700, 000 people homeless. 
Central government used town planning laws and regulations to back a hasty and insincere 
Clean-up Operation. Urban planning was exposed, with the efficacy of the profession 
questioned. Planners interviewed indicated that, the profession of urban planning is weak and 
to some extent confused. Yet, some semblance of organized urban planning in Zimbabwe still 
exists.  
 
The housing challenge in Zimbabwe is synonymous with enormous shortages and 
bottlenecks. The major challenge constraining housing is the availability and politicization of 
suitable land for housing. Beginning 2000, Zimbabwe embarked on the Fast Track Land 
Reform Programme, which program gave Zanu-PF access and control over peri-urban farms - 
a critical supply factor for urban development expansion. Zanu-PF had control over most 
peri-urban land and the MDC controlled cities. It was therefore difficult for the MDC to 
acquire peri-urban land for housing development, as this would mean direct confrontation 
with Zanu-PF. Land was or is a political resource used to canvass votes in urban areas.  
 
Due to land shortages, it is clear that urban councils are failing to provide adequate land for 
housing. Despite this, housing cooperatives have sprouted, making the most significant 
contribution to low-cost housing post-2000. Housing cooperatives have challenged the 
conventional norms of urban planning and housing development. Inevitably, incremental 
planning is evident which has serious impacts on comprehensive urban infrastructure 
planning. 
 
The Zimbabwean case depicts a central government which is not committed to local 
authorities’ autonomy in running and managing urban affairs. This is substantiated by central 
government’s continued re/centralization that resulted in the empowerment of government 
parastatals like ZINWA, ZINARA, and EMA to play a critical role in urban service delivery. 
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ZINWA shows an attempt by central government to directly connect with urban residents 
through service delivery commandeered by the state. There is evidence that the failure by 
government to run ZINWA further restrained the relations between government and urban 
residents. The reversion of water and sanitation functions to local authorities coincided with a 
vigilant Environmental Management Authority fining local authorities polluting the 
environment. Urban councils are of the view that, the approach by EMA is meant at 
siphoning council revenue to central government.  
 
The introduction of ZINARA in collecting and managing vehicle licensing fees ahead of 
local authorities shows a clandestine approach by central government. The move exposed the 
MLGRUD as the ministry failed to defend local authorities. The ZINARA vehicle licensing 
takeover disconnected licensing to what the city can afford to manage (absorption levels). 
Decentralization of roles and responsibilities remained with revenue centralized.  ZINARA is 
rehabilitating major national roads leaving city access roads unattended. Central government 
interference in road management with ZINARA affected the ability of local authorities to 
repair and construct roads through vehicle licensing of motorists. Centralization through 
ZINARA raises questions of distribution efficiency as major cities are uncomfortable with the 
new arrangement. 
 
Politics of patronage and rents were more powerful than any urban administration. The 
control of bus termini by politically aligned youth is testament to this assertion. State 
institutions like the Zimbabwe Republic Police, could not reign in touts in central business 
districts of most cities. The public transport system was chaotic and dangerous to passengers. 
No state institution bothered. Lawlessness took effect, as politically aligned ‘mafia’ extorted 
and terrorized the public. There is evidence of a political cartel involving senior politicians 
protecting rank marshals and sharing the proceeds of extorted money. Where there is no law 
and order enforcement, cities are difficult to manage as city managers are weakened.  
 
In summary, attributing the state of service delivery to economic collapse or political 
contestations poses a strong attribution challenge. For example, experiencing these political 
tensions in a normal economy, what would have been the impact? This question is difficult to 
answer with practical evidence, as the situation it provides is speculative. What is clear is that 
the political contestations seriously affected service delivery in cities. Having laid down key 
conclusions, the ensuing section explains some policy directions. 
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7.2 Policy Directions 
 
Local Authority Capitalization 
The state of infrastructure in Zimbabwean cities is dire and dilapidated. The provision of 
urban functions and services is reliant on urban infrastructure. The urban population has 
tremendously increased whilst there has been no major urban infrastructure expansion works 
undertaken over the past 13 years. In as much as urban councils are keen on providing 
services, they are constrained by limited existing infrastructure. Urban councils are losing a 
considerable percentage of revenue in repairing dilapidated infrastructure. It is therefore 
essential for urban councils to prioritize infrastructure investment planning. The capital 
expenditure budget for urban councils should significantly improve or be predetermined 
through law and policy. 
 
Defined centre-local relations 
Zimbabwe cannot sustain a situation where central and local governments always contest on 
matters of urban planning and management principles. Matters of principle should be 
executed as defined in law and policy and not left for politicians to decide as corruption and 
bickering takes effect. Relations between central and local government determine the latter’s 
thrust in service delivery. Law and policy should be clear on the sharing of roles, 
responsibilities and revenues between central government and urban councils. A common and 
shared vision and commitment to govern together between central and local government is 
important in Zimbabwe’s urban governance system.  
 
Council reorientation 
Councillors should stick to the mandate of overseeing services delivery to the public and 
desist from corruption. The gesture by the MDC to fire some of its councillors who were 
involved in corruption is exemplary. Political parties should ensure their councillors are 
delivering services to people. There is need to demonstrate proper governance with 
discernible results. Councils should invest in professionalism. Young, talented and dynamic 
individuals should be tapped into council administration to foster modern technologies and 
methods of city governance. In addition, there is need to select men and women of integrity 
to serve as councillors. Examples to emulate include Florence Chitauro and Dr. Timothy 
Stamps who started as councillors and ended up government cabinet ministers. The culture of 
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entitlement requires robust checks and balances so that councillors operate within a set and 
defined reward mechanism.  
 
Support to urban governance institutions 
State institutions are weak and the social fabric of the society is torn apart. Therefore, 
mending the society through institutional reform and capacity building is imperative. 
Bringing accountability and transparency in urban councils is crucial. There is need to put 
incentive mechanisms to foster performance and dissuade corruption amongst workers in 
councils. The present scenario where councillors have little authority over personnel 
performance affects service delivery. Councillors do not have power and resources to run 
urban councils, which two the local government ministry has. 
 
Contracting out or out-sourcing 
Urban councils must focus on core functions by looking at services and functions they 
possess a comparative advantage. According to the Urban Councils Act (Chap 29:15), urban 
councils are mandated with functions of sidewalk construction, sewerage and drainage, 
parking, omnibuses and other transport services, refuse collection, fire services, development 
control, making of by-laws and regulations, valuation and assessment of property for rating, 
property rating, among others. These functions are not proportionate to the capacity and size 
of an urban council. It is prudent for local authorities to streamline their functions through 
collaborating with the private sector and other non-state actors in the delivery of services. It 
means that some council services should be commercialized or privatized, and these services 
must not be monopolized but be exposed to the open market so as to allow fair competition. 
 
If urban councils embrace contracting out, this calls for a change management program 
involving reaping stakeholder efforts and resources in service delivery through guiding 
coalitions. However, this is difficult in politically contested environments as political will 
should be tapped in. Stakeholders who matter should be part of the change process 
irrespective of them being political allies or adversaries.  
 
Alignment of local government Acts to the New Constitution.  
The New Constitution of Zimbabwe specifically Chapter 14 brings devolution of power in 
particular to provincial, metropolitan councils and local authorities. The new constitution 
provides a new dispensation for local governance in Zimbabwe. There is need to revamp the 
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local government system so that local authorities are given authority to run urban affairs. 
Local authorities should be empowered to generate own resources where it is feasible. The 
Executive mayoral system is effective for service delivery enhancement as evidenced during 
the term of Executive Mayors in Zimbabwe. Thus, an immediate return to executive mayoral 
system provides positive results to service delivery. The introduction of the Executive Mayor 
puts to an end the era in which the local government minister acts as the ‘Mayor of 
Zimbabwe’, as it allows elected officials to run urban councils. 
 
Aligning local government statutes (Urban Councils Act, Rural District Councils Act, 
Regional Town and Country Planning Act) with the new constitution is an important 
milestone in making sure that local authorities are autonomous and accountable in providing 
services to people. After aligning local government statutes to the New Constitution, 
residents’ awareness is critical. Community awareness should take the form of what type of 
central and local government existed before, and new relations and their impact to service 
delivery. 
 
Prioritization  
Though it is clear that politics and the macro-economic situation were key in affecting service 
delivery, urban councils were not innovative beyond this reality. Politics became a scapegoat 
for lack of imagination and innovation. Urban councils lack strategic thinking and planning 
that allows them to take advantage of the prevailing political and economic circumstances. 
Prioritization in urban councils is key as some Town Clerks are earning salaries of USD 
15000 - a clear sign of wrong priorities. The employee benefits system for urban councils 
require revision as it must be in sync with collected revenue and services to be delivered. 
 
Broadening Local Government Board Representation 
The current LGB representation structure leaves other key local government stakeholders. 
The composition of the LGB (Section 116 of the Urban Councils Act) comprises of 
representative of the Urban Councils Association, Municipal Workers Union, Town Clerks, 
Public Service Commission and two people with public administration experience. In 
practice, the traditional and vocal UCAZ has been sidelined as Zanu-PF created the 
Zimbabwe Local Government Association (ZILGA) which is now taking over. The 
constituency of two experienced public administration officials is not defined. Two academic 
Local government training institutions that are the Department of Rural and Urban Planning, 
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University of Zimbabwe and Department of Local Governance, Midlands State University 
require representation on the LGB. It is envisaged that the two centers of local government 
teaching and training gives the academic input of enhancing systems of urban governance as 
well as in-cooperating recruitment needs to curricular. In addition, residents associations 
should be represented on the local government board. 
 
Ministerial powers 
First, the powers of the Minister of local government as enshrined in the Urban and Rural 
councils Acts should be revised and reduced to allow local authorities autonomy. There are 
sections which allow the minister to have unrestrained powers over the elected mayors and 
councillors. The fact that a minister can willfully dismiss and appoint Mayors and councillors 
indicates that councils cannot be entirely blamed for service delivery failure. This is further 
supported by senior appointed personnel by the minister who are in actual sense the ‘eyes and 
ears’ of the minister in council matters. Revising these Acts will enable smooth delivery of 
services in contested areas such as Harare, Bulawayo and other cities where residents elect 
the MDC to manage urban affairs though facing stiff resistance from central government. 
 
7.3 General recommendations  
 
Building public confidence in local authority systems.  
During the study period (2000-2012), there existed a tendency of residents not paying rates as 
a response to poor and inadequate service delivery by urban councils. Convincing the public 
that rates paying is for a worthy cause becomes imperative. Therefore, there is need for 
public confidence building and recognition that biggest partners in city affairs are residents. 
Programming aiming at inculcating a sense of responsibility and ownership of urban services 
to the end users (residents) is critical. Residents’ movements in Zimbabwe are weak. 
Strengthening of grassroots residents associations fostering citizen agency and citizen 
demand for service delivery is a key strategic option. Civic awareness should result in 
residents beginning to ask service delivery issues from local authorities.  
 
New Political Dispensation  
Political governance systems must respect people’s right to make decisions that affects them 
at the very local level. Centralization and control are key overtures to an authoritarian 
government. Decentralization and empowerment are important tools of a democratic and 
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people-centered government. If a democratic government takes effect in Zimbabwe, it is clear 
that service delivery is going to improve significantly. The current governance arrangement 
in Zimbabwe is anti-service delivery and anti-developmental as the government keeps on 
centralizing and interfering in local authorities. 
 
Modernizing revenue collection systems 
The present rating and billing system in local authorities is outdated, and estimate based. This 
has presented challenges as residents are not willing to pay estimates they consider unrealistic 
in most circumstances. Inevitably, urban councils should modernize revenue collection 
systems and records. Proper billing and modern methods of revenue collection systems curb 
revenue loss through corruption and other means by city officials. Adoption of information 
technology based revenue system increases ratepayers’ confidence in their accounts. 
 
Staff Performance Appraisal 
The appointment of most council officials has been soiled by political dynamics in the 
country. Evidence suggests that due to nepotism and patronage, a number of people were 
appointed without required qualifications and expertise. To that end, there is evidence that 
most council workers are either without requisite skills or are placed in departments outside 
their expertise and experience. The execution of urban services is highly a function of council 
administration officials. An overall and skills audit of council administrative officials is 
important so that all council departments are staffed with fully trained and competent 
professionals. Staff should be remunerated adequately based on clear performance criteria. 
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Annex I: Interview Guide  
 
Contestation, Confusion and Change: Urban Governance and Service Delivery in 
Zimbabwe (2000-2012). 
As indicated in my appointment communication (either through electronic mail or telephone), 
my name is Davison Muchadenyika, a student pursuing an Master in Administration degree 
at the School of Government (SOG) of the University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, 
South Africa. I am conducting a research on urban governance politics and Service delivery 
in Zimbabwe (2000-12). The purpose of the research is purely academic as it forms the 
requirements of my Masters by full thesis. Thank you very much for granting me permission 
to interview you in our prior communication.  You are at liberty to refuse to answer any 
question or withdraw from the study at any time you wish. I assure you that your identity is 
anonymous unless you want it mentioned in the study. All the information you provide will 
strictly be treated as confidential and will only be used for the purpose of the master thesis. 
Please feel free to ask any questions before, during and after the interview if you wish. You 
may reach me at +263 712 525 180 or via email at muchadenyikad@gmail.com if you have 
questions later on relating to the study for clarification. 
Do you want a copy of the final Master thesis? 
Introduction to interview questions 
Post-independent urban Zimbabwe was dominated by Zanu-PF until the rise of MDC 
dominance in urban governance. Post-2000 era saw urban governance in Zimbabwe 
becoming hotly contested, resulting in confusion as to the direction of political change. 
Political contradictions ensued; as efforts by the MDC to run urban local authorities seem to 
be systematically being frustrated by Zanu-PF through MLGRUD. Political struggles 
between the Zanu-PF and MDC over the control of urban councils have turned more energy, 
focus and resources away from service delivery to political expediency. It seems that political 
contestation relegates service delivery as political grip and survival are prioritized. Within 
this background, let’s discuss the impacts of the highlighted political dynamics on the 
following: 
Low cost housing 
1. How is land for housing allocated? (Probe the role of political parties) 
2. What have been the developments in council-led housing projects? 
3. What have been the developments in low cost housing outside council programs? 
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4. Which housing initiatives (council-led vs. outside council) have contributed 
significantly to the delivery of low cost housing? 
 
Management systems 
1. How are council head of departments appointed? (Probe role of councillors, central 
government, political parties). 
2. How were the relations between councillors and appointed council officials? (Probe 
cases of extraordinary relations i.e. due to politics) 
3. What are the accountability channels used by appointed council staff? (Probe council, 
ministry of local government). 
4. How is council failure attributed? (Councillors or Council staff). 
 
The profession of urban planning 
1. What are the effects of the fight between central government and urban councils to 
planners? 
2. How have planners managed to carry out their duties in a turbulent political 
environment? 
3. What is the image of the planning profession in the public eye after Operation 
Murambatsvina? 
4. What have been the impacts of Operation Garikai on Urban Planning? 
 
Water and sanitation  
1. What were the reasons for shifting water and sanitation functions to ZINWA? 
2. What are the impacts to water and sanitation services of the shift from urban councils 
to ZINWA and back to urban councils? 
3. How residents were affected by the changes in water and sanitation authorities? 
 
Public Transport 
1. Rank marshals seem to have the blessing of some political players! What factors 
contributed to the management of bus termini and commuter omnibus in cities? 
2. How are residents affected by the chaos that characterizes the public transport 
system? 
3. What are the causes and sources of public transport crises witnessed over the years? 
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Road infrastructure 
1. What were the reasons for shifting vehicle licensing function from local authorities to 
ZINARA? 
2. What have been the effects of the shift (in 1 above) to road infrastructure maintenance 
and development? 
3. Why is that most road infrastructure constructed after 2000 is old and derelict? 
4. How are council road infrastructure tenders awarded? 
 
What are your recommendations for councils to effectively and efficiently deliver 
services in contested political environments?  
Thank You. 
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Annex II: Interview Schedule 
No. Name Organization  Date and Time 
1 Kudzai Chatiza Local Governance Consultant 17-06-2013 1240-1330hrs 
2 Peter Mutavati Country Programs Manager, 
UNHABITAT 
25-07-2013 0917-0935hrs 
3 Christopher 
Matumbike 
Senior Local Governance Fellow, 
IDAZIM
265
 
14-06-2013 0900-1030hrs 
4 Nyasha Gumbo Chief Planning and Research Officer, 
Dept. of Housing & Community 
Services, City of Harare 
05-07-2013 1514-1545hrs 
5 Levision Mutekede Administrator, UCAZ
266
 26-06-2013 1400-1500hrs 
6 Mr. Marovanyanga Committees Manager City of Harare 24-07-2013 0915-0945hrs 
7 Beth Chitekwe-Biti Executive Director – Dialogue on 
Shelter 
20-06-2013 1017-1111hrs 
8 George Masimba 
Nyama 
Programs Coordinator – Dialogue on 
Shelter 
20-06-2013 1119-1215hrs 
9 Davious Muvindi Coordinator, Zimbabwe Homeless 
Peoples’ Federation 
20-06-2013 1221-1241hrs 
10 Mallon Mapika Projects & Administration Officer, 
Peoples’ Own Savings Bank 
19-07-2013 1035-1115hrs 
11 Tariro Kadzirange Programs Officer, Practical Action 
Southern Africa 
12-07-2013 0906-0956hrs 
12 James Chiyangwa Deputy Housing Director, City of 
Harare 
25-06-2013 0941-1043hrs 
13 Psychology 
Chiwanga 
Dept. of Urban Planning Services 
Director, City of Harare 
19-07-2013 0835-0915hrs 
14 Joseph 
Kamuzhanje 
ZIRUP
267
 12-06-2013 1300-1400hrs 
15 Thollet Mware Monitoring & Evaluation Officer, 
Civic Forum on Housing 
17-07-2013 1533-1606hrs 
16 John Choto Housing Officer, Ministry of National 
Housing and Social Amenities 
19-07-2013 1145-1210hrs 
17 Cosmas Murepa Town Planner, Ministry of Local 
Government Rural & Urban 
Development 
13-06-2013 1000-1045hrs 
18 Percy Toriro Programs Manager MDP-ESA
268
 10-06-2013 0810-0945hrs 
19 Andrew Mlalazi Development Consultant/ Planner 17-06-2013 1500-1551hrs 
20 Precious Shumba Director, Harare Residents Trust  
21 Joel Chaeruka Chairperson Department of Rural & 
Urban Planning, University of 
Zimbabwe 
01-07-2013 1400-1450hrs 
22 Innocent Chirisa Senior Lecturer Department of Rural 
& Urban Planning, University of 
Zimbabwe 
06-06-2013 1400-0330hrs 
 
23 Ablsom Masendeke Chief of Party RTI
269
 & Civic Forum 
for Housing 
06-06-2013 1010-1110hrs 
24 Charles 
Mangongera 
MDC 19-06-2013 1108-1143hrs 
                                                          
265
 Institute for Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe.  
266
 Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe. 
267
 Zimbabwe Institute of Regional and Urban Planners 
268
 Municipal Development Partnership Eastern and Southern Africa. 
269
 Research Triangle Institute International. 
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25 Rejoice Ngwenya Political Analyst 06-06-2013 0830-0940hrs  
26 Blessing 
Kwambana 
Planner, MoPW 05-07-2013 1400-1530hrs 
27 Isaac Nyikayapera Planner, MoPW 03-07-2013 1400-1530hrs 
28 Emmanuel Siraha Shelter Zimbabwe 10-07-2013 1400-1530hrs 
29 Elton Manjeya  Practicing Planner 13-06-2013 1100-1150hrs 
30 Shadrack Tondori Coordinator, Zimbabwe Homeless 
Peoples’ Federation 
20-06-2013 1221-1241hrs. 
31 Dale Dore MDC Councillor CoH (2002-3) 03-06-2013 1100-1205hrs 
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Annex III: Corruption in land alienation process: Chiyangwa’s wealth List 
1. Stand 422 Quinnington Township of Lot AD Quinnington measuring 4128 square metres, 
Salisbury DT 8683/97, DT 7155/2002. 
2. Stand 707 being remainder of Subdivision C of the Grange measuring 60, 6869 hectares 
held under DT8322/2005.3. Stand 2453 Hatfield Township of Subdivision D of Subdivision 
B of Hatfield held under DT2686/2009 dated 22 May 2009. 
4. Property held under DT 1001/2007. 
5. Remainder of Stoneridge in Salisbury measuring 586, 7149 hectares held under DT 
5428/2001. 
6. Lot 1 of stand 223 of Quinnington township of Lot 1A Quinnington measuring 1, 6239 
hectares held under DT 5929/1971, DT 3840/1988, DT 5418/2005 dated 23 June 2005. 
7. Stand 19682 Harare Township of Stand 19675 Harare Township measuring 6, 1884 
hectares held under DT 2037/59 dated 16 April 1959, DT 2688/09 dated 22 May 2009 and 
DT 5128/09. 
8. Lot 1 of Lot 16A of Reitfontein measuring 4164 square metres held under DT 216/2013, 
DT 1614/58 and DT 1862/87 dated 26 March 1987. 
9. Stand 65 Colne Valley Township 5 of Lot 7A Colne Valey measuring 7,5956 hectares held 
under DT 2037/59 and DT 2888/2009. 
10. Stand 19682 Harare Township of Stand 19675 Harare Township measuring 6, 1884 
hectares held under DT 2685/2009. 
11. Stand 3789 Salisbury Township of stand 4450 Salisbury measuring 9959 square metres 
held under DT2685/2009. 
12. Lot 3 of Delnadamph Estate measuring 5, 105 square metres held under DT 2683/09. 
13. Stand 2453 Hatfield Township of Subdivision D of Hatfield measuring 2, 2876 hectares 
held under DT 2686/2009. 
14. Stand 389 Derbyshire Township of Subdivision E of Derbyshire measuring 25, 8304 
hectares held under DT8209/99. 
15. Lot AD Quinnington measuring 5, 4867 hectares. 
16. Stand 426 Quinnington Township of Lot AD Quinnington measuring 4002 square metres 
held under DT3532/56, DT 2770/83 and DT 8687/97. 
17. Stand 402 Quinnington Township of Lot AD Quinnington held under DT 3499/93, DT 
2770/83 and DT 750/2002. 
18. Stand 3701 Salisbury Township of stand 4450 Salisbury measuring 1190 square metres 
held under DT 3455/48 and DT 5525/2007. 
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19. Property known as 26 Fleetwood Road, Alexandra Park. 
20. Stand 120 Quinnington Township of Subdivision K of Quinnington of Borrowdale Estate 
measuring 86223 square metres held under DT3248/48, DT 785/56 and DT 7831/87. 
21. Stand 121 Quinnington Township of subdivision K of Quinnington Township of 
Borrowdale Estate measuring 8135 square metres held under DT 3248/48, DT 3993/78 and 
DT 6855/85. 
22. Stand 311 Quinnington township of lot 1A Quinnington measuring 23632 hectares held 
under DT 5285/73, DT 5897/85 and DT 2658/2002. 
23. Subdivision 1 of Wilbered in Zvimba District of Mashonaland West Province measuring 
1331.20 hectares. 
24. Remainder of Stoneridge measuring 586, 7149 hectares held under DT1465/75 and 
DT5428/01. 
25. Subdivision A of Subdivision A of Stoneridge measuring 13, 4188 hectares held under 
DT 25369/30, DT 1465/75 nad DT 5428/01. 
26. Subdivision A of Odar measuring 8, 2283 hectares held under DT 25703/30, DT 1465/75 
and DT 5428/01. 
27. Subdivision 1 OF Sinoia Citrus in Makonde District of Mashonaland West Province 
measuring 3477 hectares. 
28. Lot 1 of Lot 1 of Fern Rock Block C of Hatfield Estate measuring 40952 sqm held under 
DT 391/58 and DT 392/58. 
29. Stand 532 Derbyshire Township of Shortson measuring 7 544 square metres. 
30. Piece of land in Salisbury Shortson measuring 72 3652 hectares held under DT 2685/94 
and DT 6238/2004. 
31. Property in Chinhoyi held under DT 1674/63. 
32. Sinoia Drift Farm, Chinhoyi measuring 901, 05 hectares held under DT 5709/85. 
33. Sangwe farm, Chinhoyi measuring 845,67 hectares held under DT109/29. 
34. Olympus farm, Chinhoyi measuring 2812,86 hectares. 
35. Old citrus farm, Chinhoyi measuring 1416, 124 hectares held under DT 1674/63. 
36. Strathcona farm, Chinhoyi measuring 1416,124 hectares held under DT 3924/94. 
37. North Umzari farm Chinhoyi measuring 600, 217 hectares. 
38. Remainder of subdivision A of Stoneridge measuring 589,5874 hectares held under DT 
1567/46, DT 3634/03, DT 5021/07 and DT 5631/07. 
39. Remainder of subdivision A of Stoneridge measuring 586,8960 hectares held under DT 
5021/07 in favour of Pinnacle Holdings (Pvt)Ltd. 
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40. Lot 11 of Lot AB Quinnington measuring 8902 square metres held under DT4011/2002. 
41. Lot 1 of stand 223 of Quinnington township of Lot 1A Quinnington measuring 1, 6239 
hectares held under DT 5418/05 and DT 1247/12. 
42. Property held under DT 5021/2007. 
43. Remainder of Thornicroft park of Galway Estate measuring 17, 3104 hectares held under 
DT1965/45, DT 1540/2010, DT 1539/10 and DT 2193/86. 
44. Stand 424 Quinnington township of Lot AD Quinnington measuring 4002 square metres 
held under DT 8685/97 and DT 7158/2002. 
45. Property otherwise known as No. 11 Crowhill Road, Borrowdale. 
46. Stand 420 Quinnington of Lot AD measuring 4003 square metres held under DT 8681/97 
and DT 7153/2002. 
47. Stand 419 Quinnington of Lot AD measuring 4002 square metres held under DT 8680/97 
and DT 7152/02. 
48. Stand 427 Quinnington of Lot AD measuring 4002 square metres held under DT 8688/97 
and DT 7161/02. 
49. Stand 421 Quinnington of Lot AD measuring 5281 square metres held under DT8682/97 
and DT 7154/02. 
50. Stand 418 Quinnington measuring 4056 square metres held under DT 8679/97 and DT 
7151/02. 
51. Stand 423 Quinnington measuring 5933 square metres held under DT 8684/97 and DT 
7157/02. 
52. Stand 425 Quinnington measuring 4002 square metres held under DT 8686/97 and DT 
7159/02. 
53. Stand 426 Quinnington measuring 4002 square metres held under DT 2770/83, 8687/97 
and DT 7160/02. 
54. Stand 422 Quinnington measuring 4128 square metres held under DT 8683/97 and DT 
7155/02. 
55. Stand 428 Quinnington measuring 4048 square metres held under DT 8689/97 and DT 
7156/02. 
56. STAND 3052 Bluffhill Township of Lot 13 of Bluffhill measuring 3, 7919 hectares held 
under DT4940/2006. 
57. Remainder of Lot H Borrowdale Estates situated in the district of Salisbury held under 
DT2844/90. 
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58. Remainder of stand 24 of Lot C of Borrowdale Estate measuring 1, 0959 hectares held 
under DT 11252/2003. 
59. Remainder of Lot 1 of stand 24 of lot C Borrowdale estate measuring 4067 square metres 
held under DT 3212/2003. 
60. Properties under Brighthouse Investment P/L. 
61. Stand 3523 Chinhoyi Township measuring 850 square metres in district Lomagundi held 
under DT 6952/2006. 
62. Stand 418 Quinnington measuring 4056 square metres held under DT 8679/97 and DT 
8656/05. 
63. Property held under DT3840/1988. 
64. Property held under DT 5418/2005. 
65. Stand 7753 Salisbury Township of stand 4839 Salisbury Township measuring 2, 1194 
hectares held under DT 9423/2000 and DT 1771/2003, Phillip Chiyangwa Trust. 
66. Stand 625 Mandara Township 16 of Lot 7A Mandara measuring 6, 6867 hectares held 
under DT 1592/75 and DT 3432/2009. Pinnacle Property P/L. 
67. Stand 2453 Hatfield Township of Subdivision B of Hatfield held under DT 2686/2009 
and DT 2688/2009. 
68. Stand 19682 Harare Township of stand 19675 measuring 6, 1184 hectares held under DT 
2614/2009. 
69. Stand 3789 Salisbury Township of stand 4450 Salisbury measuring 9959 square metres 
held under DT 2685/09. 
70. Remainder of Lot 3 of Delnadamph Estate measuring 5105 square metres held under 
DT2683/2009. 
71. Stand 65 Colne Valley Township 5 of Lot 7A Colne Valley measuring 7, 5956 hectares 
held under DT 2037/59. 
72. STAND 19682 Harare Township of stand 19675 Harare Township measuring 6, 1884 
hectares held under DT2614/2009. 
73. Stand 3789 Salisbury township of stand 4450 Salisbury township measuring 9959 square 
metres held under DT 2685/2009. 
74. Remainder of Lot 3 Delmadamph estate measuring 5105 square metres held under DT 
2683/2009. 
75. Stand 2453 Hatfield Township of subdivision b Hatfield measuring 2, 2876 hectares held 
under DT 2686/2009. 
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76. STAND 389 Derbyshire township of subdivision E of Derbyshire measuring 25 8304 
hectares held under DT 8209/99. 
77. Property held under DT 2888/2009. 
78. Property held under DT 2688/2009. 
79. Stand No. 7753 Salisbury Township of portion of stand 4839 Salisbury Township of 
Salisbury Township Lands held under DT 2246/47 and DT 9423/2000. 
80. Lot 57 of Meyrick Park of Mabelreign in Salisbury measuring 1, 0553 hectares held 
under DT 2460/96 and DT 8442/90. 
81. Stand 3507-3544 Chinhoyi township of Chinhoyi being residential Park medium density 
housing development of 38 units residential stands measuring 6, 0505 hectares valued at $675 
000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
82. Lot 11 of Bluffhill, corner Northolt Drive and Lavenham Drive , East Bluffhill. A cluster 
of 120 units of residential stands with water supply and sewer connected and borehole drilled 
measuring 1, 0065 hectares and valued at $5 940 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
83. Stand 3051 of Bluffhill, corner Northolt Drive and Lavenham Drive East Bluffhill being a 
cluster development of 57 units with water and sewer connected and borehole drilled 
measuring 1, 7385 hectares valued at $10 260 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
84. Stand 3052 of Bluffhill, corner Northolt Drive and Lavenham Drive East Bluffhill being a 
primary school built on a stand measuring 3, 7919 hectares and valued at $6 300 000.00 as at 
31 May 2008. 
85. Remainder of Lot 13 Bluffhill, Corner Northolt drive and Lavenham Drive East, Bluffhill 
being a secondary school with 23 cluster houses and 36 Duplex Flats built on a stand 
measuring 7, 5291 hectares and valued at $19 300 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
86. Stand 3341 Kadoma Township (stand 2620-3340 Blue Ranges) Kadoma being a 
residential development with 693 stands/units measuring 20,7900 hectares and valued at $1 
600 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
87. Stand 1-504 Eyecourt Township of Nyarungu estate being a development with a shopping 
centre, hotel/motel, and industrial stands measuring 46, 1270 hectares valued at $7 320 
000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
88. Stand 389 of Derbyshire Township being a development with a shopping centre and 
industrial site measuring 7,2287 hectares valued at $1 210 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
89. Stand 19345 harare township beong a development with residential stands measuring 10, 
000 hectares and valued at $5 000 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
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90. Stand 913 Mandara Township being a cluster development of 26 units measuring 3, 1634 
hectares valued at $7 840 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
91. Subdivision C of The Grange (stands 566-712 the Grange Township) off Beeston avenue, 
a development with a five star hotel, 496 cluster homestead properties and 43 low density 
residential stands in total measuring 307, 957 hectares and valued at $12 010 000.00 as at 31 
May 2008. 
92. The remainder of Stoneridge a mixed use development with a shopping centre, 
institutions and residential developments measuring 586,7145 hectares and valued at $36 150 
000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
93. Subdivision A of Stoneridge an agric-residental development measuring 8, 2283 hectares 
and valued at $1 340 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
94. Subdivision A of Arda an agri-residental development measuring 8, 2283 hectares and 
valued at $820 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
95. Stand 289 Willowvale Township, an industrial stand with 14 units measuring 0.9752 
hectares and valued at $200 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
96. STAND 10050 Chinhoyi Township being a hotel site measuring 1.4430 hectares and 
valued at $220 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
97. Lot 8 of Hunyani, a hotel site IN Chinhoyi measuring 29.9077 hectares and valued at $4 
490 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
98. Stand 7538 Gweru Township in Gweru, a hotel site measuring 4.9534 hectares and 
valued at $920 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
99. Stand 8432 Gweru Township in Gweru, a hotel site measuring 4.5934 hectares and 
valued at $390 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
100. The remainder of subdivision A of stoneridge a mixed use development with a shopping 
centre, instituions and residential developments measuring 586,8960 hectares and valued at 
$63 480 000.00 AS AT 31 May 2008. 
101. The remainder of Arda Farm being a mixed use development with a shopping centre, 
institutions and residential developments measuring 605,8092 hectares and valued at $75 730 
000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
102. The remainder of A of the rest being a mixed use development with a shopping centre, 
institutions and residential developments measuring 1456,1440 hectares and valued at $36 
400 000.00 AS AT 31 May 2008. 
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103. Stand 625 Mandara Township being a mixed use development with a shopping centre, 
institutions and residential developments measuring 6,6860 hectares abd valued at $3 340 
000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
104. Stand 27406 Masvingo Township being a hotel on a stand measuring 1.9879 hectares 
and valued at $280 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
105. A mixed use development with a shopping centre, institutions and residential 
developments in Kasese Township of Kariba measuring 65, 5325 hectares and valued at $7 
910 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
106. A lodge called Victoria Falls lodge in Victoria Falls built on a stand measuring 0.8000 
hectares and valued at $320 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
107. Stands 418-428 Quinnington Township of Lot AD Quinnington Borrowdale, Harare a 
development with 12 units of residential stands serviced with 7 boreholes and 3 reservoirs of 
water 
108. Stand 288 Willowvale Township an industrial property measuring 0.6792 hectares and 
valued at $140 000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
109. Block D Avondale Township being an office complex in Broadlands with 1400 square 
metres with lettable office space on a stand measuring 0.1980 hectares and valued at $2 800 
000.00 as at 31 May 2008. 
 
 
 
 
